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INTRODUCTION
When the United States entered the Second World War General
Bernard L. Montgomery of Great Britain believed the war in Europe could
be concluded by the end of 1944.

He maintained this view during the

ensuing months and in August 1944 recognized an opportunity to end the
war in accordance with his timetable.

His plan, which called for a

narrow front approach to Berlin, was refuted in favor of the previously
planned broad front approach of General Dwight D . Eisenhower. The con
duct of the campaign in northwestern Europe under the broad front ap
proach versus the narrow front has remained a subject of controversy
since that time,
During the conduct of the war in Europe events appeared to flow
in a coherent and connected pattern under the guiding hand of Eisenhower.
One great milestone followed another;

first, the unbelieveable success

of the landing in June and the capture of Cherbourg.

Then, through July

and August, the long anxious battle of the bridgehead ending with the the
American breakout through St. Lo and the encirclement and destruction of
the German Army in the Falaise pocket.

Following this were the days of

pursuit, the fall of Paris and Brussels, and the line-up with the new
American army sweeping up from southern France.

The German resistance

was crumbling and each day brought talk of ending the war.
Each event of the war appeared to follow logically and inevitably,
1

2
but this was not so.
High Command.

Grave divisions of opinion developed in the Allied

Personal jealousies flared up and there were many moments

of serious doubts and hesitations.
tional rivalries clouded the issues.

Vain and ridiculous emotional na
Prejudices took root through lack

of information and the unavoidable confusion of war.

Mainly because the

Allies were winning, and very largely through the patience and determined
tact of Eisenhower, these animosities never reached the point of open
revolt.

The Command of this war was far more steady, far more complete

and unified than the Command in the previous war.

Rivalries and minor

cross-currents between nationalities erupted, but were subdued by the
Supreme Commander or lost in the shock and movement of the fighting.
There were British officers in the combined headquarters who favored the
American strategy and Americans in the same headquarters who could see
the British position with equal clarity.

Those were difficult days for

all concerned.
The most famous and long lasting difference of opinion between
Eisenhower and Montgomery was the narrow front versus the broad front
approach to Berlin.

General George C. Marshall supported Eisenhower's

position while General Sir Alan Brooke and Prime Minister Winston Chur
chill supported Montgomery.

Eisenhower, while agreeing with the general

axis of advance of the narrow front plan, would not approve its imple
mentation because of the inherent risks attached.

The logistical situ

ation was such that he believed all other operations in the European
Theater of Operations would have to be suspended in order to support
Montgomery's plan.
The purpose of this work is to determine whether, given all the
variables, the narrow front approach could have succeeded. In order to

present the situation in clear prespective and as it actually existed at
the time of the disagreement, it is necessary to review the overall
planning for the cross-channel attack and look at the situation as it de
veloped.

This early planning was to affect directly the personal atti

tudes and command relationships in the months ahead.
The personalities and characteristics of the leaders involved
coupled with their nationalistic chauvinism and sensitivity to public
demand, could not be isolated from the decision-making processes.

This

led to charges and countercharges of putting public opinion ahead of tac
tical considerations, favoritism, and devious planning to circumvent the
orders received.

The major participants in the controversy are examined

to determine whether or not these charges were contributing factors in
the decision to implement the broad front instead of the narrow front
approach.

Finally, the question of whether or not the narrow front could

have succeeded is addressed;

could Montgomery have successfully fought

his way to Berlin and possibly ended the war in Europe five months ear
lier?
To answer this question the following parameters have been used
in this analysis;
1.

When Montgomery presented the plan to Eisenhower on 23 August

1944, the earliest date it could have been implemented was 1 September.
Selection of this date provided the period of least resistance for the
advance across France, Holland, Belgium and Germany.
2.

The time-frame established for the completion of the thrust

i

was 1 September to 31 December 1944.
3.

The forty divisions requested by Montgomery were the same

divisions that were in contact with the enemy on 1 September 1944— all

4
were combat tested and proven.
4.

Airpower has been given the same capabilities it demonstrated

during the period 1 September-31 December 1944.
5.

Due to the near emergency logistical conditions existing in

the autumn of 1944, the logistical support capability has not been changed.
6.

The German ability to build additional divisions and refit

others during the autumn of 1944 remains the same.
7. As the thrust entered the heartland of Germany it would have
brought the same defensive measures around Berlin as those taken in 1945
when the city was attacked.
No psychological advantage has been given to either side as the
will-to^win of the Allies nearing the heart of Germany would be offset
by the determined resistance of the enemy fighting for his homeland.

CHAPTER 1
NORMANDY TO BELGIUM
I. PREINVASION PLANNING
The greatest armada of ships and airplanes in the history of
the world converged on the Normandy Coast on 6 June 1944.*

The invasion

of the continent of Europe had begun and was of such magnitude that only
the men who laboriously planned the operation could grasp its scope.
Initial planning for a cross channel invasion started as early as July
1940, when Winston Churchill ordered the organization of raiding forces
to hit the coasts of countries occupied by the enemy.

These plans were

primarily to conduct raids on the mainland and then withdraw; however,
in September 1941, General Sir John Dill, Chief of the Imperial General
Staff (CIGS), directed the British military planners to formulate a
plan for a permanent return to the Continent.

He further instructed

General Sir Bernard Paget, Commander-In-Chief, Home Forces, to prepare
an outline for an invasion and conduct of combat operations on the Conti
nent.

General Paget was to review the plan periodically ’’with a view to

-1-Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War: Triumph and
Tragedy, (Boston; Houghton Mifflin Company, 1953), p. 3.
^Forrest C. Pogue, The Supreme Command, US Army in World War II,
European Theater of Operations; (Washington; Office of the Chief of
Military History, Department of the Army, 1954), p. 98.
See also; Winston S, Churchill, The Second World War: Their Finest
Hour (Boston; Houghton Mifflin Company, 1949) pp. 249-51.
5
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being able to put it into effect if a sudden change in the situation
should appear to warrant such a course."
Numerous plans were prepared before the actual invasion occurred.
At the suggestion of the Chief-of-Staff of the US Army, General George
C. Marshall, the Combined Chiefs of Staff ordered a study made of the
possibilities of landing and maintaining forces on the Continent in 1942
with an invasion to follow in early 1943 ?

In April 1942, General

Marshall and Presidential Advisor Harry Hopkins went to Great Britain
to discuss the strategy for 1942 and 1943.

While they were in London the

first definite plan for a large-scale cross-channel operation was pre
sented to the British Chiefs of Staff.

Marshall approved the plan and

proposed to build the United States force to one million men for an
5
invasion of the Continent by 1 April 1943.
In case of an emergency,
created by a serious weakening of Russia or the probable collapse of
Germany, a force was to be put in readiness to enter the Continent in
the fall of 1942.
Prime Minister Churchill was uncertain that a cross-channel
operation could be put into effect in the near future.

He did not be

lieve the Allies had sufficient combat power to gain and hold a landing
area on the Continent.

He asked that the possibilities of an American
£
attack in North Africa be explored.
Meanwhile, Joseph Stalin was clam
oring for a second front to relieve the pressure on Russia.

President

Roosevelt had promised Stalin an invasion of the Continent by 1942 and
....

A fH, Head, ^Amphibious Operations,M Journal of the Royal
United Services Institute, XCI (November, 1946), p. 488.
4p0gue^ The Supreme Command, p. 100.
5Ibid.

6Ibid.
6
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a second promise was given for 1943 but Churchill insisted that any
force landed across the Channel would be defeated in detail.

Roosevelt

relented and the American participation in the North African Campaign
was launched in late 1942.
The Selection of the Supreme Commander
In January 1943, at Casablanca, Roosevelt and Churchill selected
General Marshall as the Supreme Allied Commander for the cross-channel
invasion (Operation OVERLORD). General Marshall worked well with the
Combined Chiefs of Staff and the British favored him for the position.
One year previous to this selection the American and British Combined
Chiefs of Staff agreed that one Allied commander should have supreme
command in each theater of operations. The first Supreme Commander was
General Sir Archibald P. Wave! who commanded the air, sea, and ground
forces of Australia, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and the United
States in the Southwest Pacific.

8

The need for this command soon disap

peared but the principle was retained and other Supreme Commanders were
chosen for areas of the Pacific, Middle East, Mediterranean, and Euro
pean theaters,^
From January to December 1943 it had been accepted that General
Marshall would be the commander; however, President Roosevelt did not
want to lose the advice and assistance of Marshal 1 through his
7Ibid.
"Gordon A, Harrison, US Army in World War II, European Theater
of Operations; Cross-Channel"lCttack (Washington: Office of the Chief
of Military History, Department of the Army, 1951), p. 106. General
Wavel was to have the same position in the India-Burma Theater at a
later date.
9
Pogue, The Supreme Command, p. 41.

8
appointment to a combat command, and asked Marshall to remain as Chief
of Staff of the United States Army.*^ Marshall agreed and the search
for another commander stopped at Eisenhower who had been Supreme Com
mander for the Mediterranean area.

The announcement of Eisenhowerfs

selection to direct the Allied invasion of the Continent was made on
Christmas Eve by the President of the United States.

Another milestone

had passed as the invasion was now confirmed by the appointment of a
supreme commander.'*''*'
General Morgan as Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied command (COSSAC)
In March 1942, Lieutenant General Frederick E. Morgan was
ordered to report to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff for an in
terview:,

He was immediately assigned the position of COSSAC and directed

to draw up plans for numerous contingencies which involved crossing the
Channel for an invasion of the Continent.

Morgan was under the impres

sion that the Supreme Commander would be a British officer and the staff
was established accordingly.

He was given broad powers to act in the

name of the commander and made many decisions which affected the forth
coming operation.

He, in fact, served as commander for ten months while

waiting for the Supreme Commander to be appointed.

The cross-channel

attack was to be a joint operation; therefore an American was named to
the COSSAC staff to present the US views. Major General Ray W. Barker
became deputy to Morgan and the two generals complemented each other in
^William D. Leahy, I Was There, (Kibdibm Bollancz, 1950),
pp% 191-92,
^Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade In Europe, (New York:
and Company, 1948) p. 208.
See also:Pogue, The Supreme Command, p. 45

Doubleday

9
staff work and planning.

A highly efficient and congenial staff was

formed that worked together as the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expedi
tionary Forces (SHAEF) staff until the war ended.
Major General Walter Bedell Smith served as Eisenhower^ Chief
of Staff in the Mediterranean Command and when Eisenhower assumed com
mand of SHAEF he wanted to retain Smith on his staff.
Morgan, who had done a superb job, was to be replaced.

This meant that
Morgan was

offered a command in Italy but refused it to remain with the OVERLORD
plan and insure its successful completion.

He was appointed to the posi

tion of Deputy Chief of Staff to Smith and served in that capacity until
12
the end of the war.
II.

MONTGOMERY AS LAND FORCE COMMANDER

The matter of the ground command was settled temporarily in 1943
by Morgan during a vist to Washington.

He obtained General Marshall*s

views on the matter and discussed them with the Allied naval and air com
manders.

Shortly thereafter, Morgan, acting in the name of the Supreme

Allied Command, issued a directive to the 21 Army Group (British) com
mander.

This officer, then General Paget, was made jointly responsible

with the Commander, Allied Naval Expeditionary Force, and the Commander,
Allied Expeditionary Air Force, for planning the assault.

When so

ordered, the Commander o f '21 Army Group was also to be responsible for
its execution "until such time as the Supreme Allied Commander allocates
an area of responsibility to the Commanding General, First Army Group."
io
LTG Sir Frederick Morgan, Peace and War: A SoldierTs Life,
(London; Hodder and Stoughton, 1961) pp. 155-79, Pasaim.
...................
' 13
Pogue, The Supreme Command, p. 45

13
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The 21 Army Group Commander was informed that the assault would be made
by two corps under the Commanding General, First US Army, who would
remain in charge of land operations until such time as the British com
mander felt that a second headquarters should be brought into the thea
ter.
Later, when the enlargement of the assault force and the area to
be attacked required the landing of two armies instead of two corps, the
21 Army Group Commander was charged with the task of commanding land
operations.

He was thus designated de facto commander of the ground

farces in the assault, but not given the title of Ground Commander.

Fur

ther, because his tenure in this temporary position was not clear, it was
certain that the arrangement could be changed when the Supreme Commander
decided to do so.

14

When it became apparent that 21 Army Group would command the
Allied forces in the assault, it became necessary to place a seasoned
combat officer in command.

For this post General Montgomery was chosen.

His selection was announced on Christmas Day, 1943.

Eisenhower was not

consulted on the selection as it was solely a British decisionj however,
he had earlier expressed a preference for General Sir Harold Alexander
15
who could not be spared from the Mediterranean.
On 3 January 1944 General Montgomery was formally briefed on the
OVERLORD plan and he was critical of the narrow front of the assault.
He favored supporting assaults in Brittany, around Dieppe, and on the
west coast of the Cotentin.

He had approval to act in the name of

Eisenhower and by his disapproval the OVERLORD plan was changed to

15Eisenhower, Crusade In Europe, p. 211.

11
include more forces and a wider frontage, but not the supporting attacks.
Other reasons for broadening the attack were that it would be harder for
the enemy to define and locate the limits of the attack and conversely
cosier for the Allies to break out of the initial bridgehead.

A wider

frontage would give the Allies a larger number of vehicle exits from the
beachhead and so facilitate the penetration inland and subsequent build
up.

Montgomery had insisted that it was essential, in order to avoid

confusion of administration and supply, that armies and corps go in on
their own fronts and not through bridgeheads established by other
units.^

Events were to prove him correct when the Units went ashore.
III.

EISENHOWER AS SUPREME COMMANDER

On 13 January 1943 Eisenhower flew to London and studied the
original OVERLORD plans vetoed by Montgomery two weeks earlier.

He im

mediately agreed that the attack needed more divisions in the initial
assault.

He recognized that the landing needed to be broadened to insure

initial success, to secure beaches for the build-up, and to have enough
strength to get to Cherbourg quickly to capture and control a port.
Eisenhower was in agreement that a supporting attack was necessary to en
gage some of the enemy forces elsewhere.

An attack on Southern France

had been planned to coincide with OVERLORD and to insure its success.
Eisenhower considered this supporting attack essential.

17

The addi

tional troop requirements carried with it the need for over-water
*^Sir Bernard L. Montgomery, The Memoirs of Field-Marshall The
Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, K.G. (London: Collins, 1958) p. 212.
17
Stephen E. Ambrose, The Supreme Commander: The War Years of
General Dwight D. Eisenhower (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1969),
p. 336.

12
transportation and here Eisenhower faced a dilemma.

In order to provide

transportation for OVERLORD the attack on Southern France, code name
ANVIL, had to be reduced in strength.

The supporting attack was dis

cussed with Marshall at length before Eisenhower went to London and the
Chief of Staff of the Army was emphatic that ANVIL should be launched.
Many British, including Montgomery, were not so firm on the splitting of
forces and suggested that ANVIL be dropped to provide the necessary
transportation and forces for OVERLORD.

Eisenhower used the same argu

ments for the defense of ANVIL as he had used in broadening the base of
OVERLORD and the operation remained as a supporting attack.
The final OVERLORD plan consisted of two armies under command of
21 Army Group (see map 2).
Corps with three divisions:
airborne divisions.

The First US Army was composed of the VII
4th Infantry, landed at UTAH Beach, and two

The 82nd Airborne and 101st Airborne were dropped

west and east respectively of Ste. Mere-Eglise.
divisions:

The V Corps had two

29th Infantry (minus) and 1st Infantry (plus); both divisions

went ashore over OMAHA Beach.
British forces consisted of the Second Army with two corps.
30 Corps with the 50th Infantry assaulted over Gold Beach.

The

18
The 1

Corps with the 3rd Canadian Infantry went ashore over JUNO beach and the
3rd British Infantry over SWORD Beach.

The 6th Airborne Division was

dropped astride the Ome River in the British 1 Corps zone.

19

18
The British system of unit identification used arabic numbers
to designate both Corps and Divisional units. The US Army system used
Roman numerals to designate corps and arabic numbers for divisions.
^United States Military Academy, A Military History of World
War II: Atlas. (West Point, New York, 1953) p. 174.

13
The Allies were ashore on the Continent and the final phase of the War
in Europe had begun with General Montgomery commanding the land forces.
IV.

20

COMMAND RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EISENHOWER AND M0NT0G0MERY

Eisenhower remained in England and commanded the troops from his
headquarters located in Bushey Park while the commander of 21 Army Group
exercised local command on the ground in France.

Montgomery moved his

tactical headquarters to France on 8 June 1944.

This method of command

was little different than the normal dispersion of command except that a
body of water, the English Channel, separated the commander from the
troops.

Channels of communication were opened between SHAEF and

Montgomery*s headquarters with the same degree of effectiveness as was
later established when both headquarters were located on the Continent.
For control of ground forces no special appointment as "Ground
Forces Commander" was contemplated.

Since the amphibious attack was on

a relatively narrow front, with only two armies involved, one battleline
commander had to be constantly and immediately in charge of tactical co
ordination between the two armies in the initial stages.
charged with this responsibility.

Montgomery was

Plans called for the early establish

ment of separate British and American army groups on the Continent and
it was logical that when the army groups were of sufficient force to
accomplish a decisive breakout and begin an advance through Europe the
land force in each natural channel of march would have its own commander
that reported directly to SHAEF,^
20
Harrison, Cross-Channe1 Attack, p, 116.
21

.

Sir Bernard L. Montgomery, Despatch (New York; British Infor
mation Services1946), p. 5.

14
On 25 July, General Eisenhower directed that the US Ground
Forces on the Continent be regrouped into the First and Third Annies
under the control of 12th Army Group which Lt. Gen. Omar N. Bradley was
to command.

The new army group was to remain under the command of the

Commander-in-Chief of 21 Army Group until the Supreme Commander allo
cated a specific area of responsibility to the 12th Army Group.

The

existing command structure had been adopted because it was impossible to
move Supreme Headquarters to the Continent until an adequate communica
tions network could be secured to connect the United Kingdom and the
Continent.

While waiting for this development, Eisenhower found it neces

sary to make one person responsible for the temporary control of ground
forces in Normandy and had chosen Montgomery on the basis of seniority
and experience.

This was the second time Montgomery was de facto ground

commander of the Allied forces.

In carrying out that task, the British

commander worked under plans approved by Eisenhower, who made his influ
ence felt by frequent visits to the battlefront. This situation was less
than ideal because the Supreme Commander was needed on both sides of the
Channel.

Toward the end of August the small town of Jullouville was1

found suitable as a headquarters site and Eisenhower announced he would
assume direct operational control on 1 September with General Montgomery
22
and General Bradley as commanders of the Groups of Armies.
The other
units, which were even then engaged in the battle for Southern France,
were shortly to be incorporated into Eisenhowerrs command as the 6th
Army Group,

22
Pogue, The Supreme Command, p. 264.

CHAPTER II
THE PERSONALITIES OF THE PARTICIPANTS AND THEIR CONFLICTS
I.

INTRODUCTION

The personalities and character traits of the participants can
not be ignored in the conflict of ideas which emerged after Eisenhower
assumed operational control of the forces on the ground.

Montgomery

was a successful combat veteran from North Africa who, like the knights
of old, carried the colors of his lady— the United Kingdom.

He was a

colorful and confident leader who provided Great Britain with a hero
at the time of her darkest trials following a string of defeats.

Having

led the land forces on the Continent for almost three months during the
toughest fighting to be encountered, it was natural that he should have
firm ideas about the conduct of the war and the direction it should take.
Eisenhower was looked upon as a staff man who had never commanded
combat troops and was therefore unproven.

He was a product of the US

Army schools and was not overly popular with the British Imperial General
Staff who believed the command of such a large force was beyond the
Americanos capabilities.*
The experience he gained in the Mediterranean found favor in
General Sir Alan Brooke, British Chief of the Imperial General Staff, who

X

.................
Arthur Bryant, Triumph In The West, (New York:
Company, 1959), p.. 139.
15

Doubleday and

16
believed the selection of Eisenhower was best because Marshall never had
a command in combat except a company in the First World War.

2

Eisen

hower soon proved himself an able commander in the Mediterranean Theater.
Bradley first enountered Montgomery in North Africa and again
in Sicily.

To the British, Bradley seemed inexperienced and too jealous

of his own reputation and independence of command.

3

On the other hand,

the British staff officers liked the quiet and confident way he spoke
to his commanders and encouraged them with simple words of praise.

4

He

was accused of presenting Major General George S. Patton's views to
Eisenhower when Montgomery was trying to effect the single thrust and of
disobeying orders from Eisenhower to stop Patton's ground movements.
Patton, a commander of a lesser organization and subordinate to
Bradley* must be included in this analysis of individuals because of the
boldness with which he acted and the effect his actions had on the
military situation.

Secondly, he captured the imagination of the

American public and any restraint placed upon him was open to a tremendous
American outcry.

He was colorful* attacked with zest, and had a keen

sense of mobile action which elevated him to the status of worthy op
ponent and respected commander.

2Ibid. p.74.
3
Hanson W. Baldwin, Battles Lost and Won: Great Campaigns of
World War II (New York: Harper and Row, 1960), p. 494.
4
■.. ...........
MG Sir Francis DeGuingand, Operation Victory (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1947), p. 436.

17

II.

EISENHOWER

Personality and Character Traits
On 6 June 1944, only a few hours after the Allied troops landed
on the Continent, a correspondent asked Eisenhower if he was nervous.
The Commander, "who did not reveal any outward signs of nervousness
replied that he was so nervous that he was boiling over inside."^
During the wait for information from the landed forces Eisenhower ap
peared outwardly calm, perfectly poised, and absolutely confident.

Few

men know that he had a rough-draft communique in his pocket drawn up the
day before the landings.

The text of the message showed how he instinc

tively assumed responsibility if anything went wrong with the invasion.
It read;
Our landings in the Cherbourg-Havre area have failed to
gain a satisfactory foothold and I have withdrawn the troops.
My decision to attack at this time and place was based upon the
best information available. The troops, the air and the navy
did all that bravery and devotion to duty could do. If any
blame or fault attaches to the attempt it is mine alone.^
Eisenhower once said, "The worst part of high military command is
7
the loneliness which prevents comradeship." The nature of this
^Kenneth S. Davis, Soldier of Democracy: A Biography of
Dwight Eisenhower, (New York; Harper and Row, 1960), p. 494.
^Captain Harry C , Butcher, My Three Years With Eisenhower
(New York; Simon § Schuster, 1946),p. xxix.
7 .
.................
Davis, Soldier Of Democracy, p. 3.
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loneliness was chiefly that where other men had an external human
standard against which to measure their conduct he, in his hours of
supreme decision making, had none.

For the most part the men who served

under him shaped their decisions within a pattern already laid down, but
often it was for him to determine the final shape of the pattern which
guided them.

He had to dominate and be the arbiter of right and wrong,

and of truth and error.
In his role of Supreme Commander he showed himself to be the
military statesman; he devoted himself to the task of ending the war; he
never forgot the human aspects tied to the war.

His staff was a team of

trusted and loyal men who worked smoothly and efficiently together, not
only to end the war, but because of their admiration for the commander.
As General Morgan stated after his first meeting with the new Supreme
Commander, "Right from the first moment it was clear that here was a man
8
that one would follow gladly wherever he should go."
Eisenhower’S Opinion Of Montgomery
The personality differences between Eisenhower and Montgomery
were significant factors in their often difficult relationship, but
what mattered more was their fundamental disagreement over strategy
and tactics.

Eisenhower’s military theory, reflecting that of Marshall

and the traditions of the US Army, was straightforward and aggressive.
He favored constant attack and became disturbed if any substantial part
of his force was not gaining ground. He was an advocate of the direct
o
LTG Sir Frederick Morgan, Overture To Overlord (London:
Hoddard § Stoughton, 1955), p. 149.

19
approach and put his faith in the sheer smashing power of great armies.
This was one reason he concentrated on logistics, on the orderly flow of
goods from America’s factories to the battlefield.

He was once accused

of having a mass production mentality, which was true, but beside the
9
point.
He simply wanted to use his nation’s strengths on the battle
field.
Given the contrasts between Eisenhower and Montgomery it was al
most inevitable that the two men would have difficulty in dealing with
one another.
lation.

Eisenhower was gregarious, while Montgomery lived in iso

Eisenhower mixed easily with his staff and discussed decisions

with his subordinates; Montgomery established himself in a lonely camp
where he slept and ate in a wood-paneled trailer captured from Rommel.
There was no question of Montgomery’s professional competence.***
He had proven his ability to command in the 1940 campaign in France and
in North Africa during 1943.

The Normandy invasion was the type of

operation in which Montgomery excelled, a ’’set piece”** carefully planned
assault with overpowering forces at his disposal.

By the time the

Allied forces broke out of the Cherbourg penisula certain idiosyncrasies
of Montgomery were becoming apparent to the members of SHAEF, especially
the Americans.

Paramount of these traits was Montgomery’s caution when,

to the belief of the free-wheeling Americans, aggressive action was
needed.

Eisenhower, Bradley, and Patton were associated with Montgomery
g
Ambrose, Supreme Commander, p. 425.

^°John S'. D, Eisenhower, The Bitter Woods (New York: G.P. Putnam's
Sons, 1969), p. 48
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since early 1943 in the Mediterranean Theater and among these three he
achieved a reputation for caution and for requiring an almost unreason
able superiority before launching an attack.

This caution in military

philosophy seemed inconsistent with his personality, which could be
described as cocky; nearly to the point of arrogance.
Eisenhower commented in his book CrUSade In Europe:
General Montgomery has no superior in two most important
characteristics. He quickly develops among British enlisted
men an intense devotion and admiration--the greatest personal
asset a commander can possess. Montgomery*s other outstanding
characteristic is his tactical ability in what might be called
the '’prepared” battle. In the study of enemy positions and
situations and in the combining of his own armor, artillery,
air, and infantry to secure tactical success against the enemy
he is careful, meticulous, and certain.^
One outstanding and undeniable fact about Montgomery's World War II
career which gained him world fame is that he never won a battle in
which he had not first built up an overwhelming superiority of force,
both in men and material.

13

His admirers reply that the quality only

proved that he was a great general.
Eisenhower had supreme confidence in Montgomery as a tactical
commander, and despite newspaper coverage charging that Montgomery was
too slow moving to the attack in Normandy, there was no criticism of
Montgomery's tactics.

14

A remark Eisenhower made to Major General

Francis DeGuingand, Chief of Staff, 21 Army Group, after the battle of
the Falaise Gap shows that there had been no major disagreement with
Montgomery's conduct of the land battle to that point.

Eisenhower was

■ii ■
Eisenhower, Crusade In Europe, p. 211.
13Ansel E. Talbert, "Report on Field Marshal Montgomery:
I— Does the Record Back Monty?" Army, Navy, Air Force Register
(29 November 1958), p. 1.
DeGuingand> °peratjon Victory, p. 398.
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discussing an alteration of boundaries between the Second Army (British)
and the First US Army which established the boundary between the two
nationalities when he said, ’’This is the first time when I have ever had
occasion to question a tactical decision made by Monty.
Eisenhower continued to regard Montgomery highly even though
there were misunderstandings between the two men.

When Supreme Head

quarters was disbanded at the end of the war Eisenhower wrote a letter
to Montgomery which included the following:
This great experiment of integrated command, whose venture
was cavilled at by some and doubted by many, has achieved un
qualified success, and this has only been made possible by the
sympathetic, unselfish and unwavering support which you and all
other commanders have wholeheartedly given to me. Your own
brilliant performance is already a matter of history. . . .
III.

MONTGOMERY

Personality and Character Traits
Those who got close to Montgomery knew him as an intense little
man who never raised his voice, never used expletives or abuse.
he was angry he spoke with a tight-lipped and waspish contempt.

When
17

To

the subordinate, it sounded like a statement of contemptuous conviction
when he was told that he was "utterly useless." There was no argument
with Montgomery on his decisions and no hope of appeal to any human
weakness in his character.

With those he liked he was affable, easy

to get along with, and startlingly clear in saying what he wanted.

His

16
Montgomery, Memoirs, p. 390.
17
Major H.A. Deweerd, Great Soldiers OF World War II, (New York:
W.W, Norton and Company, 1944), pp. 102-25, passim.

Chief of Staff said he was a "magnificent master to work for" and that
he never had a 'row* with his commander. 18 He had personal idiosyn
crasies which no one dared violate.

He detested coughing during a

briefing and when a significant number of persons coughed he would stop
the briefing for three minutes while everyone coughed. 19 Anyone coughing
after this caught the full impact of his look of reproach.

He did not

smoke and would not permit anyone to smoke in his presence before break
fast.

After breakfast limited grants were permitted to a very small

number of people.

Eisenhower, who was practically a chain-smoker, was a

constant irritation to him.
when in his presence.

Even the indomitable Churchill deferred

He drank no alcoholic beverages and excused him

self after dinner when drinks were served.

Card playing held no interest

for him either so he vacated the mess as early as possible.

Montgomery

had one trait which shows his self-confidence; that was his ability to
sleep in the face of momentous challenges and impending battles.

He*

retired early and arose shortly after dawn.

The business of running the
20
war was arranged to be included in time for the evening meal.
He had the ideal temperament for a soldier.

Nothing appeared to

worry him, he accepted responsibility with complete ease, and he was not
a coraplainer.

He had a clarity of mind which permitted elimination of

the inessentials and isolation of the necessary facts.

Once the facts

were identified he simplified the problem and arrived at decisions which
1o
DeGuingand, Operation Victory, p. 189.
*^Alan Moorehead, Montgomery;
Hamilton Ltd., 1946), p. 104

A Biography (London:

Hamish
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provided enormous dividends.
unique.

His knowledge of the military art was

Early in his career he studied the art of command, the psycho

logy of war, and the tasks of the various arms of the service.

He could

talk with exact and technical knowledge with either an engineer or
artilleryman as easily as someone from his own arm— infantry.
Montgomery never got excited, never lost his temper, and never
changed a decision once it had been made.

He gave tasks to his staff

and permitted work without interference in routine assignments, but fre
quently penned replies to the Supreme Commander and sent "Monty-grams"
to his commanders in his own handwriting.

21

He supervised the tactical

movements closely and paid particularly close attention to Lt. Gen. Miles
C. Dempsey’s Second Army (British). He was accused of commanding the
Second Army through Dempsey and in view of the direct contact he had with
that Army the charge seems justified; however, Dempsey was with Mont22

gomery in North Africa

and was one of the few men to whom he felt close.

It was natural that he would turn to someone he knew and trusted from the
former campaign.
The 21 Army Group had an air of austerity surrounding it that
was deliberately cultivated by Montgomery as a means to an end.

He '

realized that unless he lived reasonably hard, he could not keep in the
condition necessary for his task, and in addition, such arrangements
would prevent stories of his staff living in luxury as had been reported
about field headquarters in World War I. Morale of the troops during
,

2l
DeGuingand, Operation Victory, p. 189

* R.W, Thompson, Montgomery: The Field Marshal (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1969), p. 36.
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engagements was of prime importance and he kept abreast of its state at
all times. 23 He worked incessantly to maintain a high state of morale
among the fighting men and they never disappointed him.

His physical

bravery was common knowledge among the fighting men as he was frequently
seen in the danger areas of the battlefield.

The black beret, his per

sonal syihbol to the men, was worn for ease of identification and the
beret with two badges became known far and wide among the troops.

Soon

after its appearance on the battlefield the news spread that Montgomery
was present, and the men were reassured.

His appearance on the battle-

field was said to be worth a division when produced at the right moment. 24
For every strength in a man's character there is usually a corre
sponding weakness and Montgomery had his share of both.

His supreme con

fidence in himself led to firmness of decision, but it also reduced his
flexibility and prevented change to better plans when such change might
have provided a superior solution.
somewhat indiscreet with the press.

He was very outspoken and at times
He caused discord between the Brit

ish; and Americans by announcing British successes which were in fact
joint Allied accomplishments.

There was the element of showman and actor

in him which accompanies most great leaders and the charges of "egotistical
and vain" were results of these traits.

He believed success in battle

was the ultimate triumph and he tried to capitalize on his past successes.
When he.released information to the press he never called a press confer25
ence, he commanded one.
^Montgomery, Memoirs, p . 83.
04
DeGuingand, Operation Victory, p. 178.
25
Baldwin, Battles Lost and Won, p. 495.
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Montgomery was a small man who spoke in what has been described
26
as a ’’bird like voice” by his biographer . Reflective and soft-spoken,
he was a diplomatic and devious man to attain his ends.

He was the

paragon of ascetic men, who neither smoked nor drank, and had no apparent
interest in women after the death of his wife.

Mild and deliberate, he

projected the figure of the military intellectual; the general who out
smarted the enemy as the result of careful study, rumination, and preparation, 27
Montgomeryfs Opinion of Eisenhower and Their Conflicts
The second chief conflict between Eisenhower and Montgomery was
over the role of the Ground Forces Commander.

Historically, the British

always employed three commanders, one each for sea, land, and air.

The

decisions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to make one man responsible for
all actions in a Theater under the title of Supreme Commander obviated
these three positions.

Montgomery was placed in command of the land

forces during the cross-channel operation and again on 25 July when, by
virtue of being the senior commander, he commanded both, the newly
formed 12th Army Group and his own 21 Army Group.

He still clung to the

idea of a Ground Force Commander and proposed to Eisenhower that he be
assigned to fill that position, or in the absence of himself, that Bradley
fill the position and he would serve under Bradley,

28

The latter was a

, Eisenhower, The Bitter Woods, p. 48.
Moorehead, Montgomery; A Biography, p. 56.

See also;

27
Martin Blumenson, ’’Patton and Montgomery,” Army, (June 1972),
p.16,
2g

Montgomery, Memoirs, p. 269.
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conciliatory gesture as he would never have been placed under the command
of a junior officer.
This line of thought was not Montgomery*s alone.

29

As the result

of a dispatch made to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff on 18
August to an inquiry regarding future operations, Montgomery was visited
by, the Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff who advocated retention
of the system ' < of command then in effect.

The matter came to the atten

tion of Marshall who told Eisenhower to ’’take direct command as soon as
possible in order to end public acrimony.”
command of all forces on 1 September.

| Eisenhower took operational

On that same date Montgomery was

promoted to a rank above Eisenhower*s— Field Marshal.

The subject was

dropped after Eisenhower took operational command but was raised again
during the Ardennes offensive when the Allied Force was split.

The results

were devastating to Montgomery who choose the wrong time to press his
point.

Eisenhower issued a directive on the conduct of future operations

derived from a meeting with Montgomery and Bradley.
arrived the day after the directive was released.

Montgomery’s letter
He phrased the letter

in terms which left the Supreme Commander no latitude and Eisenhower
accepted the proposition as a challenge to his authority.

31

Eisenhower

was so upset with Montgomery that he prepared a telegram to the Chief of
the Imperial General Staff requesting the removal of Montgomery.

General

DeGuingand, Chief of Staff, 21 Army Group, recognized the severity of the
29
Joseph Patrick Hobbs, Dear General: Eisenhower’s wartime
Letters to Marshall (Baltimore; Johns Hopkins Press, 1971), p. 166.
30ibid.
^ J . Eisenhower, Bitter Woods, pp. 381-82.
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situation and asked Eisenhower to hold the message until he could talk
with Montgomery.

After a hurried trip to Montgomery*s headquarters an

apology was immediately sent to Eisenhower and the text of the cable
?2
was destroyed.
DeGuingand said the matter of being the land force
commander was the only time he ever seriously disagreed with his
’"Chief*'.33
On the point of overall command of the European Theater of Opera
tions, Montgomery said in later years that he never had any argument with
Eisenhower; that on the whole he was in agreement with the Supreme Com
mander.

This appears to have been a mellowing in the aftermath.

critical of Eisenhower from the beginning.

He was

He disdained Eisenhower’s

broad use of the staff and commented that if the war was to be fought by
committee action it would never be won.
At Supreme Headquarters Montgomery's adherents in higher echelons
were greatly outnumbered by his opponents.

General Bedell Smith tried

to be absolutely fair, but found it difficult to conceal his dislike*for
Montgomery.

General Morgan, his British deputy, made no secret of his

personal antipathy and his critical attitude.

Montgomery did enjoy the

confidence of Maj. Gen. J. F. M. Whiteley and the impartial and considered
support of Maj. Gen. Kenneth W. D. Strong, the Chief of Intelligence.
But in general, Montgomery's churlish attitude to Eisenhower, his bluntly
phrased criticisms of strategy, his failure, more often than not, to
attend conferences in person, his ill-timed criticisms of the command
structure and the strategy of the Supreme Commander, coupled with the
32Ibid. p. 384.
33Personal Letter, DeGaingand to B. Pedigo, dated 24 October 1972.
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aloof austerity of his military life, earned him dislike and ill will.

34

Eisenhower knew Montgomery would not comply with orders to which
he objected until the very last moment.

Montgomery wanted to have a com

plete independence of command and to do what he wanted.

This was a

minor difficulty, but one which caused the Supreme Commander much cha
grin.

When, following some minor infraction, Eisenhower asked him why

he never obeyed orders, Montgomery replied that if he did not like the
orders he would go as far as he could in disobedience and try to bluff
his way through, but if he could not get what he wanted, then he would
submit in the end.^
The general disagreement on the strategy taken after crossing
the Seine is brought out in the following comment by Montgomery:
The rightness or wrongness of the decision taken is, of
course open to argument. But what cannot be disputed is that
when a certain strategy, right or wrong, was decided upon, it
wasn't directed. We did not advance to the Rhine on a broad
front; we advanced to the Rhine on several fronts, which were
un-coordinated. And what was the German answer? A single and
concentrated punch in the Ardennes, when we had become un- ^
balanced and unduly extended. So we were caught on the hop.
There were other points which tried the patience of Eisenhower not the
least of which were Montgomery’s press conferences.

He was frequently

quoted out of context and the rivalry between the British and American
press corps intensified the problem.

The enemy propaganda machine took

full advantage of the situation to drive a wedge between the two
ZA

Thompson, Montgomery:

The Field Marshal, p. 225.

35
Field Marshal Earl Alexander of Tunis, The Alexander Memoirs:
1940-1945, John North (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company Inc., 1961),
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Montgomery, Memoirs, p. 286.
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nationalities when it broke in on a BBC broadcast to imitate the broadcast and criticize the handling of a battle by the US commanders.

37

A final point of conflict was Montgomery’s apparent caution.

At

a lunch with the Prime Minister on 26 July, Eisenhower commented that
he was worried about the outlook the American press had taken on the
fighting during the breakout from the St. Lo area.

The press had sur

mized the British were not taking their share of the fighting and of the
casualties.

Eisenhower quoted casualty figures to Churchill to emphasize

his point and the Prime Minister agreed.

38

The following day Montgomery

received instructions through the Chief of the Imperial General Staff
to move more boldly,

39

but he steadfastly refused to attempt to break-

out until he was satisfied the time was correct.

40

The differences

between American and British thought was succinctly stated by Field
Marshal Sir William Slim in 1952, ’The big difference between American
and British forces is that Americans act before they think and British
41
think too long before they act.”

^Pogue, The Supreme Command, p. 388.
^Montgomery- Memoirs, p. 260.
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Bryant, Triumph In The West, pp. 180-82, passim.
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Major L.F. Ellis, History of the Second World War, Victory
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IV. BRADLEY
Personality and Character Traits
General Bradley has aptly been described as the soldier’s
soldier.
combat.

42

He was admired, respected, and even adored by those he led in
His career began quietly in 1915 upon graduation from the

United States Military Academy and continued in the same vein until the
beginning of World War II. Appointed in 1941 as Commandant of the Infan
try School at Fort Benning, Georgia, he became the first man in his class
to reach the rank of General.

A ’Z

He had not served outside the United

States when chosen by Eisenhower to be his assistant in the Mediterranean
Theater.

He worked quietly in that position until Patton requested him
44
as Assistant Corps Commander for II Corps.
The command of II Corps

passed to him when Patton was elevated to command Seventh Army.

When

Eisenhower selected commanders for the American ground forces Bradley
was chosen to command the US First Army in the cross-channel assault
and 12th Army Group when it was activated in August.

45

Patton

became involved in the celebrated slapping incident and was passed over
for the position.

46

Bradley was a stabilizer for Patton and the shock absorber be
tween Eisenhower and the armored forces leader.

He was quiet, studious,

^Eisenhower, Crusade In Europe, p. 262.
43Biographical sketch of General Omar N. Bradley, U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
^Ladislas Farago, Patton: Ordeal and Triumph, (New York:
Ivan Obolensky, Inc., 1963), p. 245.
45Eisenhower, Crusade In Europe, p. 215.
^Farago, Patton:

Ordeal and Triumph, pp. 342-359.
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and unassuming, a commander who gave his staff tasks and did not interfere
while they were being accomplished.

The time spent under Montgomery in

Normandy was served as a willing subordinate who followed orders.^ His
astute planning of the battle around St. Lo, coupled with unheard of
48
"carpet bombing" by the Bomber Command, was the key to the breakout
from the bridgehead area.

For two days the aircraft bombed immediately

in front of the Allied troops and literally churned up the terrain over
which the Americans advanced.

The breakout was successful and Bradley

continued to move eastward.
In the conduct of commanding his army group Bradley did much of
his planning on the intelligence maps in his headquarters.

Each evening

he received a formal briefing from his senior staff officers on the
enemy*s capabilities as well as the capabilities of his own command.

49

By knowing the enemy*s logistical and tactical situation he could effect
ively deduce their next tactical moves.

This ability to perceive imme

diately the true situation and the objectives of the attacking forces
permitted Bradley to assess correctly the German primary objective during
the Ardennes offensive. 50

!

His quiet manner led many to a false assessment of his abilities.
Some called him "farmer" because of his deceptive appearance and the lack
of a personal gimmick such as Patton*s ivory-handled pistols or General
^Montgomery,

Memoirs, pp. 251-271, Passim.

48Combat Operations Data, First Army:
(Unpublished, 1946), pp. 13-14.
49
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12th Array Group, Report of Operations, G-3 Section, (Final
After Action Report), Vol.V, Part II, (Unpublished, n.d.), Passim.
50
General Omar N, Bradley, A Soldier’s Story, (New York:
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Mark Clark’s carbine and hand grenades.
about Bradley except his achievements.
quietly and efficiently without fanfare.

There was nothing remarkable
Even these were accomplished
Eisenhower observed during the

campaign in Sicily that Patton dashed for ephemeral glory in Palermo
while Bradley was fighting his way through the forbidding heights toward
more valuable objectives.

He concluded that "Bradley with his faithful

adherence to the less spectacular, but more practical, design in the face
.'51
of overwhelming odds was the real hero of the campaign."
The quiet,
calm man from Missouri was to exercise these qualities many times over in
the months ahead.
Bradley’s Opinion of Montgomery and Their Conflicts
Following the breakout at St. Lo the American forces swept
through the Cherbourg peninsula to the south and quickly cleared the
Peninsula.

Patton was given the mission to swing his Third Army in a

left turn to the north and close the escape route in an encirclement
of the engaged enemy forces*

He reached Argentan which was only a few
52
kilometers away from the British forces on the other side of Falaise.
Bradley ordered him to stop where he was and build up his forces in pre
paration for a counter-attack to breakout.

The gap had not been closed

and Patton was furious with Bradley because he was told to stop.

Mont

gomery’s Canadians had the task of linking up with Patton but failed to
do so due to enemy resistance. 53 On the second day Patton asked
Cl
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permission, to close the gap with his forces, but Bradley denied this request. Nineteen German divisions were inside the pocket

54

and Bradley

did not think Pattonfs forces, who were already holding a forty mile
front, could stop the Germans.

His forces could have been severely mauled

in the effort and rendered ineffective for the pursuit that followed.
One week later the gap was closed by the Canadians and sixty
thousand^5 men of the German Army were trapped in the ’Falaise Pocket.1
More escaped than had been anticipated, yetthe

completionof the encircle-

ment ended the effective German power in France except for the border
areas.

Throughout June and July Bradley loyally obeyed the British

ground commander, and fully acknowledged his directives.

But with the

appearance of Patton on the battlefield and his own promotion to 12th
Army Group Commander, which set him on the same command level as Mont
gomery, a change began to show itself.

TheFalaise affair was the first

sign of what was to come.
After halting Patton at Argentan, and thus perhaps aborting a
greater capture of enemy troops than actually took place, Bradley began
to wonder whether he had done the right thing.

He was infuriated at the

slowness of Montgomery’s advance and his apparent inability to get the
Canadians moving more quickly.

From this point Bradley began to be crit

ical of Montgomery and suspicious of his tactics.

The start of a

54Bradley, A Soldier’s Story, pp. 377-379.
55
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Hereinafter referred to as USMA, War in Western Europe.
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definite break between Bradley and Montgomery had begun.

56

It was not only the Falaise Gap episode which helped to begin
this break between the two major allied commanders.

At the same time,

the American correspondents greeted Bradley's assignment to command 12th
Army Group with comments that the American should have a separate command.
As a result, the correspondents began to take up narrow nationalistic po
sitions with the Americans often openly critical of Montgomery and the
British, on the defensive, trying to vindicate the hero of Alamein.

Both

sides overlooked the fact that the balance of power had changed within
the Allied camp; for not only had the command structure changed, but also
the ratio of British to American divisions, with the American formations
outgrowing the British rapidly.

57

A second encirclement by the Americans which cleared the German
resistance from the front of a stalled Second British Army caused Bradley
to bristle.

After obtaining an admission that the Second Army did not

have sufficient troops to close the encirclement, Bradley proposed that
his 12th Army Group turn north into the British sector and cut the enemy
off on the left bank of the Seine.

General Dempsey, commander of the
58
Second Division, agreed and Montgomery "nodded agreement."
Eighty
thousand Americans crossed in front of the British line of advance and
forced the Germans into a narrow crossing on the mouth of the Seine

where Allied aircraft strafed and bombed at will.

Dempsey advanced with

almost negligible resistance to occupy the front cleared for him by the
56
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US troops and crossed the river on a ready-made bridgehead59 established
by the Americans.

Removal of the Americans from the British sector re

quired close traffic coordination of crossroads and bridges.

An agree

ment was reached for a system of two-hour clearances on the roads.

The

British and Americans were to pass columns through these junctures for
alternating periods of two hours each until the forces were unraveled.
Several days later when Dempsey was questioned by the press on his advance
to the Seine, he complained that "the movement could have gone faster but
for the US traffic that snarled his front." To this Bradley commented:
Although we were probably unduly sensitive to any reflection
on US command, I was piqued to learn that our diversion had been
characterized as an obstruction by its chief beneficiary. I had to
remind Monty that Dempsey's half-time use of roads in a sector
cleared by Americans was vastly preferable to a full-time claim
on roads still occupied by the German.
After Montgomery visited Bradley on 17 August and they dis
cussed the proposed single thrust in the north, he stated he had Bradley's
complete approval for his plan.

There seems little chance that Bradley

would have agreed to stop 12th Army Group in its tracks to advance the
British to the Ruhr.

On the contrary, he proposed a thrust from the

south with Patton leading, and a supporting attack in the north by 21
Army Group.

Nowhere, except in Montgomery's accounts, did Bradley indi

cate approval of the single thrust in the north.
The greatest rift came following the Ardennes offensive and the
view in some circles that Montgomery had saved the day for the Americans.
At the same time, Montgomery began clamoring for the title of Ground
59Ibid.
60Ibid.
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Commander again.

Bradley felt that he had been severely undermined by

Montgomery's remark to the press, and that he would suffer a loss of
confidence among the subordinate commanders who had been placed under
Montgomery's temporary command.

When Bradley raised the issue of the

ground commander to Eisenhower he received a reassuring reply that it
would not occur.

To emphasize the degree of separation between the two

men, and how deeply Bradley felt about it he told Eisenhower:
Nevertheless you must know after what has happened I can
not serve under Montgomery. If he is to be put in command of
all ground forces, you must send me home, for if Montgomery
goes in over me, I will have lost the confidence of my com
mand.61
Several days previously Bradley indicated to Patton that he would feel
obliged to ask for relief rather than submit 12th Army Group to Mont
gomery's command and Patton replied, "If you quit, Brad, then I'll be
62
quitting with you."
Quite often during the war Bradley disputed Montgomery's views,
challenged his decisions, and questioned the wisdom of his moves.

Unlike

his British associates, he says, "I was never so intimidated by the
legend of Montgomery that I could unhesitatingly accept his judgement as
infallible.

Like the rest of us, Monty is mortal; and being mortal, he
63
has made mistakes."
V.

PATTON

Personality and Character Traits
Few generals have been more praised, hated, honored, and misun
derstood than George S. Patton, Jr.

A man of many masks, he was the

great combat leader of the war who commanded the Third Army in Germany.
61Ibid.

62Ibid.

53Ifcid.
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He was unpredictable, capricious, paradoxical, and complex while at the
same time being dependable, loyal, brutal yet sensitive with an as
tonishing mixture of arrogance and humility.
After successfully completing a campaign he invariably gave the
credit to his subordinates and personally thanked God for guiding him.
He was capable of complete reversal of character at any time and could
deliver a tempestuous tirade, either to a group or an individual, or he
could praise the same audience, and make them feel they were the most
64
important persons on earth.
Much of what Patton did seemed outrageous by ordinary standards,
but often was a studied attempt to work on the imagination and curiosity
of the soldiers.

An important part of this was his apparent contempt of

cold, discomfort, land mines, and shellfire.

He never seemed to consider

his own safety or comfort when in the presence of the troops.

He be

lieved men were b o m with luck and could develop it like any other gift.
Luck could wear out, or perhaps a man counted on it too much and was not
psychologically as careful.

He said luck was a psychic quality, an abil

ity to recognize a winning chance and take it before it really emerged.
On the other side of luck was the law of averages, and that the luck of
a frontline infantryman wore out faster than the luck of a rear echelon
. 65
cook.
General Patton was an unusual mixture of a profane and highly
religious man.

At one time in Europe a group of clergy visited his head

quarters and were surpris ed, because of his reputation as a rough-spoken
64

George S. Patton Jr., War As I Knew It, (New York: Pyramid
Books, 1947) p. 84.
,
^Harry H. Semmes, Portrait of Patton, (New York:
Century-Crofts, Inc., 1955), p. 16.

Appleton-
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soldier, to be treated in a dignified and decorous manner.

As the visit

was nearing an end one of the clergymen saw a Bible and asked if he read
the Scriptures. Patton replied with an oath of profanity that he read
them every day.6**
In matters of discipline he maintained stringent rules and en
forced those rules diligently.

He demanded that his regulations on the

wearing of the uniform be rigidly enforced and fined the men and officers
for failure to wear helmets and other items of the uniform.

He expected

and received prompt and willing obedience in all matters of discipline.

(\7

His hold on the men and officers under him was not only that of
strict discipline; a large factor was admiration for the man himself.

He

was unstinting in his efforts to improve the fighting units and to look
out for those who worked under him.

He often said that it was as cul

pable not to praise a man when he did well as not to discipline him when
he did poorly
In the popular mind, he was a flamboyant swashbuckler blessed
with boldness, courage, drive, and luck.
become a general officer.

But it took more than that to

The showmanship to impress the public with his

toughness and the braggadocio that assaulted the ears of his troops only
camouflaged his high professional competence.

Constantly interested in

technological advance, he strove to anticipate the effect of new weapons
and equipment on the methods of waging warfare.

He had a wide range of

^Semmes, Portrait of Patton, p. 6.
^7Ibid, p. 8.
Robert S. Allen, Colonel, Lucky Forward: The History of
Patton1s Third US Army, (New York: Vanguard Press Inc., 1947),
p.28.
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interest, a sharp discernment of the contemporary scene, and a profound
sense of history.

69

He dressed immaculately and expensively.

His normal uniform was

riding breeches with a specially made English combat boot topped off
with sheepskin-lined leather jacket, helmet, and his famous ivoryhandled pistols.
He lived his life with utter contempt for conventions with which
he did not agree.

Politics was a low form of life to him, but when his

position demanded that he receive congressional committees he could be
gracious and charming.

They did not talk his language or know his way

of life and were, therefore, in his view, an interference with the success
ful conduct of the war.
He was first and always an exhibitionist.

He played to the gal

leries; his dress and ivory-handled guns were largely stage props that
became his trademark in the public mind.

He was spontaneously bold and

witty in his sayings, and again this was part of the show.

Quick repar

tee was his stock in trade; he strove for it and for the most part was
amazingly good at it.
ept.

Sometimes he overreached and was pathetically in

He was quick to anger and equally quick to realize when he made a

mistake.

The slapping of a soldier hospitalized for nervous disorder

almost ended Patton’s military career.

He thought the man was ma

lingering and ordered him back to fight with his organization.

As a

direct result of this incident Patton was not selected to command the US
First Army forces in Operation OVERLORD or subsequently to command 12th
69
Martin Blumenson, The Patton Papers:
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1972), p. 15.

1885-1940, (Boston:
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Army Group.
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He was not even considered for the positions as public

sentiment was running too high against him at the time.
Patton was basically a cavalryman, imbued with the spirit of
mobility and shock action.

He seemed to prefer the direct smash and the

lighting thrust; he was the slasher and the master of the ad hoc opera
tion.

The aggressive action demonstrated by his Third Army was a direct

reflection of its commander.
Patton *s Opinion of Montgomery and Their Conflicts
What seems to be a dichotomy of personalities between Montgomery
and Patton were in fact similarities.

Both were showmen and both were

commanders who supervised combat operations far below the normal command
level.

Each demanded free rein in order to conduct the battle in their

own fashion.

Yet neither permitted the same degree of freedom within

his command.

The tight control exercised by both commanders was a result

of the intense rivalry between the men as individuals.

Montgomery, while

on a higher command level than Patton, was in direct competition with him
for headlines and glory.

Pattonfs ground gains and lightning advances,

coupled with steam-roller tactics and large numbers of prisoners taken,
were grabbing headlines away from Britainfs hero.

The British and Ameri

can press aligned behind their standard bearers and intensified the
nationalistic rivalry.
The first conflict between the two men was in Africa and was not
a face to face disagreement.

Eisenhower invited Patton to Tunis for a

victory celebration but did not invite him to sit on the reviewing plat
form which included Montgomery and other dignitaries.
^Farago, Patton:

Ordeal And Triumph, p. 367

Patton told

41

Bradley, who accompanied him to Tunis, that he was sorry he had gone as
"the celebration turned out to be a Franco-British show dedicated to the
71
glory of Montgomery and the rebirth of the French Army.”
The second
encounter was over planning for the invasion of Sicily.

Montgomery

caused the plans of Patton to be cancelled even before they were com
pleted because he did not like them.

He proposed to General Sir Harold

Alexander, the 15 Army Group and Mediterranean Commander, plans which
were more favorable to his forces and Alexander called a conference to
solve the difference of opinion.

Patton said after the conference that

Alexander called the conference to influence the invasion in Montgomery's
favor, in accordance with Montgomery's demands, and to justify giving him
everything he asked for on a silver platter.
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The Montgomery plan ’

called for Patton's Seventh Army to conduct a supporting attack for Mont
gomery's Eight Army.

The tasks outlined for Seventh Army was almost an

impossible task that held the seeds of disaster.

Alexander and Eisen

hower agreed to the plan; however, Alexander was quite frank as to the
difference in the missions.

He stated in his report of the operation:

The risk was unevenly divided and almost the whole of it
would fall on the Seventh Army. In other ways also it might
well seem that the American troops were being given the tougher
and less spectacular task: their beaches were more exposed
than the Eighth Army's and on some of them there were open
sand bars, they would have only one small port for maintenance
and the Eighth Army would have the glory of capturing the more
obviously attractive objectives of Syracruse, Catania, and
Messina, names which would bulk larger in press headlines than
Gela or Licata or the obscure townships of central Sicily.
Both I and my staff felt that this division of tasks might possi
bly, on3this understandable ground, cause some feeling of resent
ment
71
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72
Farago, Patton:
73
p. 108.

Ibid, p. 279.

See also: Patton, War As I Know It, p. 52.
Ordeal And Triumph, p. 275.
See also: Alexander, The Alexander Memoirs,
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Patton was furious with the changes but told Alexander "I only obey
74
o r d e r s i m p l y i n g that he would not question the orders as British
commanders frequently did.
Montgomery was not through yet.

He also wanted to be the over

all ground commander with sole jurisdiction over his own as well as
Patton's Seventh Army.

After getting ashore he told Alexander , "It is

clear that coordination, direction and control should be undertaken by
75
one Army commander and a joint staff."
Patton disagreed violently and
told Alexander there would be two Annies, both under Alexander's command
and not Montgomery's.
When Montgomery got to Mt. Etna the eastern route around the
mountain was blocked.

He decided to go around the other side only to

find the road had been assigned to the 45th US Division who was already
moving on it.

Montgomery demanded that Alexander stop the 45th Division

and let his Eighth Army proceed.

Alexander promptly did as requested and

the 45th Division was then withdrawn back to the beaches over which they
entered and moved to the opposite flank of the American forces.

In the

next two days the British assault lost its momentum and Eighth Army went
on the defensive.

Patton now had the opportunity he wanted.

He intended

to beat Montgomery at his own game and capture Palermo, one hundred miles
distant, in only five days.
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Sicily sharpened the cutting edge of the rivalry.

It became acute

when Patton's contribution to the conquest of Sicily was obscured by an
74
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apparently deliberate design to minimize his achievements lest the pub
licity cast a reflection on Montgomery’s part in the campaign and shadow
his prestige.
Europe was a continuation of the rivalry.

Before Patton ar

rived in France he said, "I am afraid Monty doesn’t want me because he’s
77
afraid I’ll steal his show."
On 1 August 1944 the Third Army was acti
vated and thereafter Patton tried to regain his position and his fame.
In early July Patton told Bradley that he was in the doghouse and apt to
78
die there "unless I pull something spectacular to get me out."
Bradley
later commented, "I’ve often wondered how much this nothing-to-lose atti79
tude prodded Patton in his spectacular race across the face of France."
The march across France had not escaped the attention of Mont
gomery.

His proposed narrow front thrust demanded that certain units

assume a static role.

Patton’s counterproposal for a thrust on the

southern axis was his effort to reverse the roles; however, he was as
unsuccessful with Eisenhower as Montgomery had been.
Patton exerted pressure on Bradley to let him advance when sup
plies were being routed to 21 Army Group for an advance in the northern
sector.

Bradley permitted reconnaissance in force and Patton created

emergency situations whereby he received gasoline and ammunition to save
the trapped force.

In this manner he was able to divert gasoline and

ammunition to Third Army and at the same time continue its advance across
80
France at the expense of Montgomery.
Montgomery accused Patton of
77Farago, Patton:

Ordeal And Triumph, p. 447.

^Bradley, A Soldier’s Story, p . 357.
^Patton, War As I Knew It, p. 125.

7^Ibid.

44
of trying to subvert the 21 Army Group mission and after the war was over
81
Patton admitted that was his goal.
There was a touch of the nebulous in the rivalry of Montgomery
and Patton to the distinct detriment of realism and logic in the war.
Both men were military virtuosos in their own different ways, but had all
the whimsy and vanity of matinee idols.

Q1

Pogue, The Supreme Command, p. 293.

CHAPTER III
THE NARROW FRONT PLAN
I. INTRODUCTION
On 12 September 1944 the Combined Chiefs of Staff approved Eisen
hower’s recommendations for an advance on a modified broad front to
secure the ports of Antwerp and Rotterdam.

Simultaneous with the approv

al the importance of securing the ports and the advantages of the north
ern routes of advance into Germany were underlined.

Montgomery opposed

the Combined Chiefs of Staff in favor of his own alternative. Where the
difficulties of supply led Eisenhower to favor the strategy of a broad
)
front, they caused the British commander to advocate a single thrust in
the north.

In his view, the recent success had merely postponed the mo

ment for decision between the two policies.

The supply of a general ad

vance, difficult in August, would soon prove critical; meanwhile, he
argued, a strong attack in the north could throw the Germans back over
the Rhine north of the Siegfried Line, and, if given enough support,
could penetrate the Ruhr and the northern plains of Germany as far as
Berlin. 1
It is not surprising that Montgomery opposed the broad front
approach across Europe.

He was a student of military history and both

ljohn Ehrman, Grand Strategy, Vol. V, (London: Her Majesty’s
Stationery Office, 1956), p. 525.
45
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the British and the Germans had been unsuccessful in every broad front
offensive operation conducted during both World Wars.

In the campaigns

of 1914 the German advance in Western Europe was checked on a broad front
that consisted of a series of trenches extending from Switzerland to the
coast.

Heavy casualties occurred as the machine gun and barbed wire made

the persistent infantry charges obsolete.

On the western front the

Germans at Verdun and the Allies at the Somme failed in their attempts
at a major breakthrough.

The losses were immense— the Somme offensive

cost the British 400,000 casualties.

In 1917 the Russians collapsed and

the Germans concentrated their entire forces on the western front.

The

French morale cracked when their offensive failed and the British and
Canadians were left to hold off the Germans in Flanders.
In the Second World War the German ground and air blitzkrieg
overwhelmed the land forces of Europe in 1939-40.

Germany’s main strike

forces were concentrated on a narrow front and relied on speed, mobility,
shock action, and tremendous firepower to carry the situation.

With the

blitzkrieg in the west, the power of the German Wehrmacht dispelled any
illusions about the conflict being fought in the static trench warfare
of the previous war.
On 10 May 1940, Germany attacked France through Belgium and the
Netherlands, thereby outflanking the Maginot Line where the French
and British attempted to establish a defensive line.

The Dutch and

Belgian armies capitulated, and within two weeks the Germans had pene
trated the line of the dispirited French armies at Sedan and reached
the Channel, trapping the British Expeditionary Force and some French
units to the north.

The surrounded troops turned what could have become

a major disaster into the incredible evacuation of Dunkirk.

Most of

47
Britain’s soldiers were saved but nearly all their equipment was lost.
Hitler stopped the rapid advance of the German armor on narrow frontages
short of the Dunkirk beaches.

2

Another example of failure of the broad front was Germany’s
attack launched on Russia in June 1941.

Success depended on immediate

and decisive victory following the attack.

One hundred and fifty divi

sions attacked along a 1,600 mile front and were met with unprecedented
resistance.

By the end of the year the objectives, Moscow and Lenin

grad, still remained in possession of the Russians.
Until the summer of 1942 the British Army in North Africa alter
nated between defeat and victories on every front.

General Erwin Rommel

and his Afrika Korps had driven the British almost to Cairo.

Alexander

and Montgomery entered the fray against Rommel, and in October 1942 the
British won their first decisive battle of the desert war at El Alamein.
This battle was conducted on a comparative narrow front— as were his sub
sequent victories in Sicily, Italy, and Normandy.
II.

STRATEGY OF THE PLAN

Eisenhower sent a message to the commanders of 12th and 21 Army
Groups on 4 September 1944 stating that the armies had advanced so
rapidly that further movement in parts of the front, even against very
weak opposition, was almost impossible.
2

This situation was due to

The theme has been advanced by Count Ciano in his Diary, pp.
266-7, that Hitler stopped his army in order to save the British Army.
Hitler’s belief at the time was that Great Britain was too great a
power to completely destroy her army. The heritage and history of
England had to be preserved in her army and there was no glory in de
stroying a force he had already beaten into the sea.
3
Message, Eisenhower to All Commanders: MSG 13765; SHAEF SCS
381, Post Overlord Planning. Located in U.S. Army Command and General
Staff College Library.

48
extended supply lines and the possibility of becoming inactive due to
lack of materiel.

His instructions were to keep the enemy engaged all

along the line of contact.

This would prevent reorganization of the bits

and pieces for a defense along the Siegfried Line or the Rhine river.
This message was the clue for Montgomery to urge that the drive to the
Ruhr be given full backing on a narrow front in the north.

The dis

organized condition of the German Army coupled with its loss of mobility
4
through the destruction of over 15,000 trucks since D-Day presented just
the situation Montgomery wanted.

It demanded an advance on a narrow

front as that would accentuate the restricted mobility and enforce
dispersion of the WehrmaCht while enabling the Allies to exploit their
greatly superior capacity for concentration and movement.

There was

every likelihood that if he were to make a single powerful thrust, he
could cut through the over-extended and straggling German armies to the
Rhine.

Such a course, in his opinion, would involve no real risk.

For

the next month the enemy was likely to possess neither the mobility to
launch a counterattack nor the reserves to form a substantial counter
concentration of force.

The southern flank could be held by airpower as

Patton had already demonstrated in his drive toward Metz
Even before the Allies reached the Seine Montgomery had foreseen the
scope and nature of this unique opportunity.

On 17 August he suggested

to Bradley that the 12th and 21 Army Groups should be kept together as a
4

12th Army Group Report of Operations, G-2 Section, (Final After
Action Report), Vol. I, Part II. (Unpublished, n.d.) p.6. Located in
the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Library.
^General H. H. Arnold, Global Mission, (London:
1951), p. 351.
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solid mass of forty divisions to advance northwards.

When this plan

was first proposed to Bradley he expressed complete agreement with it.

7

On 18 August Montgomery wired General Alan Brooke the above information
and was visited by the Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Lt. Gen.
Sir Archibald Nye.

Montgomery gave a summary of his views concerning

the strategy and the organization of command to be followed:
1. The quickest way to win this war is for the great mass
of the Allied Armies to advance northwards, clear the coast as
far as Antwerp, establish a powerful air force in Belgium and
advance into the Ruhr.
2. The force must operate as one whole, with great cohe
sion and so strong that it can do the job quickly.
3. Single control and direction of the land operations
is vital for success. This is a whole time job for one man.
4.
The great victory in N.W. France has
been won by per
sonal command. Only in this way will future victories bewon.
If staff control of operations is allowed to creep in, then
quick success becomes endangered.
5.
To change the system of command now,
after havingwon
a great victory, would be to prolong the war.**
General Alan Brooke was visiting the Italian front with the Prime Minister
when the message arrived, but there is little doubt that when General Nye
supported the five points he spoke for General Alan Brooke as well as for
Churchill.^

Chester Wilmot, The Struggle For Europe, (New York:
Brothers, 1952) p. 460.
See also: Montgomery, Memoirs, p* 267,
7
1
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8
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III.

ROUTES OF ADVANCE AND COURSES OF ACTION AVAILABLE

The plan Montgomery presented to Eisenhower was for "one power
ful full-blooded thrust of approximately forty divisions across the Rhine
and into the heart of Germany, backed by the whole of the resources of
the Allied Armies."^

He believed it would be likely to achieve decisive

results and possibly end the war by the close of 1944.

The success of

such a plan would be dependent upon the ability to concentrate sufficient
strength, supported by adequate combat support and combat service support, 11 to ensure continued momentum after the Seine river was crossed.
The plan called upon the combined Allied resources in the widest sense,
and entailed stopping the Allied forces in certain sectors and giving
12
them a static role in the fighting.
There appeared to be two feasible axes of advance along which
such a thrust into Germany could be mounted (see map 3).

The first was

the northern axis through Belgium to the Rhine, crossing the river north
of the Ruhr industrial region; once over the Rhine, this route led into
the open plains of northern Germany.

The alternative axis through Metz

and the Saar area led into central Germany.

Montgomery favored the

northern route since it would enable the Allies to exploit their greater
mobility and strength of armored forces in the plains of northern Germany
^Sir Bernard L. Montgomery, Normandy To The Baltic, (Germany:
British Army of the Rhine, 1946), p. 149.
11

Combat support is defined as the operational assistance furn
ished combat elements by other designated units. In this situation it
covers the artillery, engineer, signal, and intelligence functions.
Combat service support is the service provided by units in the fields
of administration and other services. Here it includes the medical
services, supply, maintenance, transportation, and other logistical
services.
12
Montgomery, Normandy To The Baltic, p. 149.
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with greater affect than would be possible in the more rugged terrain to
the south.

The northern route was also the shortest, most direct route

to Berlin— the final objective.
Phasing of the Operation
The operation envisioned by Montgomery required five phases for
successful completion:
Phase I:

Crossing theSeine.

The Seine river formed an obstacle of tremendous military con
sequence and the necessity for establishing bridgeheads on its eastern
bank was a factor of overriding importancein Montgomery's plans for
finishing the war. It would be necessary to maintain the combat strength
and relative combat power, as well as the impetus of the attack, to keep
the enemy sufficiently on the withdrawal straight through to the Rhine.
Phase'll:
!

Crossing the Rhine.

The crossing of the Seine was planned as a deliberate river

crossing and the crossing of the Rhine as a hasty crossing.*4

It was

Montgomery's intention to "bounce11*5 his way across the Rhine before the
enemy succeeded in reforming a front to oppose the advance and check its
progress; the army would become involved in determined combat west of
*^Montgomery believed that Germany would fall when Berlin was
threatened, and that a battle for the city would not be necessary.
*1 A

A deliberate river crossing is a crossing opposed by all the
defensive power available to the enemy force. It is a crossing con
ducted under fire against an entrenched force. A hasty river crossing
is characterized by speed of approach and seizure. It too is an
opposed crossing, but the enemy is in a withdrawal posture and con
ducting delaying actions to gain time for space.
15
This is intended to imply a hasty river crossing while in
pursuit of the retreating enemy.
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the Rhine.

Moreover, should the enemy establish proper defenses on the

Rhine the crossing would become a deliberate crossing which would consume
more time and lives.
Phase III:

Isolation of the Ruhr.

Assuming success to this point because of the concentration of
combat power to gain bridgeheads east of the Rhine, the force would have
an area from which to launch operations into the heart of Germany.

By

directing the thrust over the river north of the Ruhr the immediate
objective became the Ruhr industrial region without which the German
capacity for waging war would dwindle away within six months.
Phase IV:

Fixing the Forces in the Open Plains.

Once the Ruhr was isolated the Allies would be free to develop
operations in the open plains of northern Germany.

Since the Ruhr was

the enemy’s prime industrial region, it was logical that he would con
centrate his available military resources in the north to defend it.
When this occurred the Germany Army in the north could be brought to
battle, fixed, and destroyed in terrain suitable for the superior mo
bility of the Allies.
Phase V:

Seizure of Berlin.

The drive to Berlin would be practically unopposed after the
German Army was destroyed in the northern plains.

Montgomery believed

that Germany would surrender when Berlin was surrounded.

If the city did

not surrender it would require only short woTk to reduce it against the
resistance it was capable of producing.

Historically, the city had sur

rendered when threatened and with the city’s capitulation this time the
nation would stop fighting.
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A second course of action, providing that the essential prerequi
sites of speed and concentration of maintenance resources could be
effected, was a drive into Belgium with the clearance of the Channel
coast as far as Antwerp.

Sufficient airfields would be obtained to estab

lish the air forces in Belgium for air support in the succeeding phases
of the operation.

Once this phase was accomplished, phase II would con16
tinue with emphasis placed on getting across the Rhine river.
IV.

THE EXPECTED GERMAN ORDER OF BATTLE

Enemy" resistance on the entire front showed signs of collapse.
The bulk of the remaining enemy forces, estimated as the equivalent of
two weak panzer divisions and nine infantry divisions, were northwest
of the Ardennes but they were disorganized, in full retreat, and unlikely
to offer any appreciable resistance if given no opportunity to reorganize.
South of the Ardennes the enemy forces were estimated as the equivalent
of two Panzer Grenadier and four poor infantry divisions.

The heter

ogeneous force which was withdrawing from southwest France numbered ap
proximately 100,000 men but its fighting value was estimated as the
equivalent of about one division.

The equivalent of one-half Panzer

and two infantry divisions were being driven northward up the Rhine
17
river by the US Seventh Army.
During the advance to the Siegfried Line in the months following
September 1944, there was only sporadic contact with the enemy along the
fronts of the armies. Only in a few instances did the Germans try to
16
Montgomery, Normandy To The Baltic, pp. 150-51.
^SHAEF, Intelligence Estimate, 31 August 1944, SHAEF G-2
Reports, Aug-Nov. 1944. Located in the U.S. Army Command and General
Staff College Library.
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make a stand and these were usually at river crossing sites.

The inade

quacy of the German forces, their lack of communications, their drastic
shortages of equipment, and what seemed to be command confusion on the
lower levels, led to the abandonment of any pretense of re-establishing
a line anywhere except at the West Wall
without consistent plan.

18

Resistance was spotty and

Many bridges were abandoned intact and few

cities or towns were defended.

"Road inarches punctuated by occasional

skirmishes of short duration and involving a company or at most a bat19
talion for only several hours was the action."
The intelligence summary of SHAEF, dated 9 September 1944,
stated the condition of the German army:
The whole wreck of the Balkans and Finland may yield up
perhaps half a dozen divisions. These will go no way to meet
the crying need for more divisions to man the West Wall; more
over, a line in Transylvania will need to be manned. Where,
then are more divisions to be found? Not in Norway, withdrawal
would take too long. . . . Denmark might still supply one
division, and a dozen or more may yet be formed in Germany,
given time, from training units, remnants, and so forth. The
Italian and Russian fronts risk collapse if anythingnmore is
withdrawn from them. . . . In short, C. in C. West may not
expect more than a dozen divisions within the next two months
to come from outside to the rescue.
The German General F. W. von Mellenthin commented on the thrust
through the Ruhr and said that while it would have "simplified the Al
lied supply problem, it would also have simplified the German defense
18
The German name for the Ziegfried Line was the West Wall.
19Blumenson, Breakout And Pursuit, p . 689.
20

Commander-in-Chief West. A position similar to Eisenhower's
in the German command structure. At this time it was occupied by
Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt who assumed command on 5 September 1944.
21

SHAEF G-2 REPORTS, Aug-Nov. 1944.
Command and General Staff College Library.

Located in the U.S. Army
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problem.”

It was his contention that the divisions assembling on the

Moselle to stop Patton could have been diverted to Belgium to stop
Montgomery.

Opposing Patton was Army Group G composed of three

23
separate panzer brigades.
During August 1944, the Germans wondered
why the Allied command did not immediately push forwards across the
*

Moselle and cut off Army Group G as it retreated north.

Later develop

ments revealed Eisenhower* s strategy when Aachen and the bend in the
Lower Rhine were attacked.

It is a straight line from Normandy to

Berlin, via Aachen and the Ruhr.

Lieutenant General Bodo Zimmerman,

Chief of Operations, Army Group D, believed that had the strategy of
Montgomery succeeded in the autumn of 1944, there would have been no need
to fight for the West Wall, not for the central and upper Rhine, all of
24
which would have fallen automatically.
V.

ORDER OF BATTLE TO SUPPORT THE PLAN

Montgomery sent a message to Eisenhower on 18 September 1944 in
which he again outlined the narrow front plan and the administrative and
logistical problems associated with it.

He presented what he felt were

the advantages of the northern route and then told Eisenhower that, if
he accepted the suggestions, a force consisting of the 21 Army Group and
the US First Army of nine divisions would be adequate to obtain the
desired result.

Such a force would require full support in the matter of

29

General F. W. von Mellenthin, Panzer Battles, (Norman, Oklahoma:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1956), p. 315.
25Ibid, p. 315.
24Seymour Freidin and William Richardson, ed. The Fatal Decisions,
(New York: William Sloane Associates, 1956), p. 238.
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maintenance supplies; other Armies would have to do the best they could
with what was left over.

25

The composition of 21 Army Group as of 15 September 1944 is
shown in Chart 1.

It consisted of seventeen divisions mixed between five

corps of three divisions each and two divisions held in Group Reserve.
The reserve was one armored division and an airborne division that be
came non-operational on 18 September 1944.

In each corps there were

normally two infantry divisions and one armored division.
The US First Army was composed of three corps and its composition
is shown in Chart 2.

The United States Army switched divisions between

corps frequently; however, the assignment shown is correct as of 15
September 1944 and, furthermore, transfers would not have altered the
total number of divisions in the First Army.

The First Army was made up

of three corps of three divisions, each corps consisted of one armored
division and two infantry divisions.

26

The total combat power of the combined force consisted of twentysix divisions:

nine armored and seventeen infantry.

It will be noted

that this number is fourteen divisions below the forty divisions Montgomery said he would need to accomplish the thrust.

27

25
Montgomery, Memoirs, p. 279.
^USMA, War In Western Europe: Part I, p. 226.
27
On 4 September Montgomery's message to Eisenhower stated he
would need forty divisions to make the thrust. By 18 September he had
lowered this requirement to the 21 Army Group plus the First US Army of
nine divisions. In Montgomery's later speeches and writings he reverts
to the original figure of forty divisions with no mention of the lesser
number.

CHART 1
ORDER OF BATTLE 21 ARMY GROUP

Composition of 21 Army Group (British) as of 15 September 1944.
21 ARMY GROUP
Group Headquarters
British 79th Armored Division
British 6th Airborne Division (non-operational on 18 September)
Canadian First Army
British I Corps
British 49th Division
British 51st Division
104th Division (arrived 7 Sept: in combat 24 Oct)
Canadian II Corps
Polish 1st Armored Division
Canadian 4th Armored Division
Canadian 2d Division
Canadian 3d Division
British Second Army
British VIII Corps
British 11th Armored Division
British 3d Division
British XII Corps
British 7th Armored Division
British 15th Division
British 53d Division
British XXX Corps
British Guards Armored Division
British 43d Division
British 50th Division
Source: A Military History of World War II with Atlas, Vol 1, Operations
in the European Theaters, ed by T. Dodson Stamps and Vincent J. Esposito,
United States Military Academy, West Point, New York, 1953 pp. 635-36.
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CHART 2

ORDER OF BATTLE FIRST US ARMY

Composition of First US Army as of 15 September 1944.
FIRST (US) ARMY
Headquarters
V Corps
5th Armored Division
4th Division
28th Division
VII Corps
3d Armored Division
1st Division
9th Division
XIX Corps
2d Armored Division
30th Division
29th Division (not assigned until 21 Sept)
Source; A Military History of World War II with Atlas, Vol 1, Operations
in the European Theaters, ed by T. Dodson Stamps and Vincent J. Esposito,
United States Military Academy, West Point, New York, 1953 pp. 639-37.
VI.

LOGISTICAL SUPPORT AND ITS AVAILABILITY

The demands Of"four rapidly advancing armies required as much as
a million gallons of gasoline daily and overtaxed the Allied lines of
communications, which extended in some cases as far back as Cherbourg and
the invasion beaches.

These limitations certainly made it impossible to

launch any number of drives through the Siegfried Line and also made
the success of a single thrust beyond the Rhine doubtful.
58

From the
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beginning of OVERLORD planning various staffs had recognized supply diffi28
culties as one of their major problems.
They stressed the necessity of
capturing sufficient ports to provide adequate and easily accessible
stores, and emphasized the vital importance of Cherbourg, Le Havre, and
the ports of Brittany if a drive into Germany was to be sustained.

The

planners assumed that the rate of the advance beyond the Seine would be
much less rapid than the rate actually achieved by the land forces.

29

In mid-August as the tremendous possibilities of a rapid advance
became evident, Allied supply organizations made great efforts to provide
support for the campaigns which were developing.

30
Communications Zone

troops were laying pipelines for carrying fuel, constructing at the peak
as much as thirty to forty miles a day.

Special emphasis was placed on

the rapid restoration of railroad lines so that overburdened truck com
panies could be used more economically.

In the last week of August at

the height of supply difficulties an emergency airlift and the Red Ball
Express truck line31 were established to deal with gasoline shortages
which became more acute as the advance continued beyond the Seine.

32

280VERL0RD Logistic Annex: Port Operations. Passim. Located
in the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Library.
^Operation OVERLORD, First Army Tactical Plan. Located in the
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Library.
30
Communications Zone by definition is the rear part of the
theater of operations behind the combat zone which contains the lines
of communications, establishments for supply and evacuation, and other
agencies required for the immediate support and maintenance of the field
forces.
31
The Red Ball Express was a group of truck companies formed into
long range transportation assets. They operated twenty-four hours daily
between the Cherbourg port areas and Paris on one-way roads to transport
supplies to the combat units. Primary loads were food, ammunition, and
gasoline.
32

USMA, War In Western Europe: Part I, p. 177
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Despite the superhuman efforts of the logistical commands, the total
tonnage received for the month of August was lower than the two previous
months.

CHAPTER IV
THE BROAD FRONT PLAN
I. INTRODUCTION
In both the American and British armies it was understood that
proposed tactical plans might be debated and various viewpoints devel
oped.

General Eisenhower encouraged this type of discussion and often

invited criticism of his plans.'*' It is possible that he added to his own
command problems by failing to make clear to Montgomery when the discus
sion stage ended and the execution stage began.

Associates of the Brit

ish commander emphasized that he never failed to obey a direct order, but
that he would continue to press his viewpoints as long as he was permitted
to do so.

Eisenhower, accustomed to more ready compliance from his

American army group commanders, delayed too long in issuing positive di
rections to Montgomery.

In his efforts to give full voice to the British

he was more tolerant of strong dissent from Montgomery than he should
have been.

Many observers have interpreted this toleration as indecisive

ness on the part of Eisenhower and thought him too slow in issuing final
orders stopping further discussion on questions of command and strategy.
■^General Eisenhower conducted conferences on the following dates
to discuss future strategy with his army group commanders: 22 August,
22 September and 7 December 1944. While there is no evidence indicating
Eisenhower accepted any plans other than those he proposed, he did use
the commanders as a "war gaming" panel to discuss the advantages and
disadvantages of the proposed actions.
^Alexander, The Alexander Memoirs, 1940-1945, p. 16.
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It is difficult to sustain the charge that Montgomery willfully
disobeyed orders.

It is plausible to say that he believed he was repre

senting firmly the best interest of his country and attempting to set
forth what he and his superiors in the United Kingdom considered to be
the best strategy for the Allies to pursue in Europe.

3

When his state

ments on these matters were accompanied by what appeared to be a touch of
patronage or cocky self-assurance, some staff members of SHAEF viewed
them as approaching insubordination.^ There is no evidence that Eisen
hower shared these views.

Critics of Montgomery say that he was trying

to continue the position he occupied
On 1 September 1944, the day

as land force commander.
General Montgomery was promotedto

the rank of Field Marshal, Eisenhower assumed operational command of all
forces in the European Theater.^ Montgomery conducted operations under
supervision of the Supreme Commander up to that time; now the time had
arrived for Eisenhower personally to direct the land battle.

He had a

definite plan for the conduct of the campaign and as operations were pro
ceeding exceptionally well as a result of the long range planning con
ducted before the invasion, he saw no reason
out plan.

This plan, which both the

to alter the well thought-

British and American Army group

commanders wanted to alter in their favor, was the broad front plan.

3
Bryant, Triumph In the West, p. 205-06.
^Wilmot, The Struggle For Europe, p. 489.
^ ° ntgomery, Memoirs, p. 270.
See also: Pogue, The Supreme Command, pp. 253, 264-65.
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II.

STRATEGY OF THE PLAN

General Eisenhower’s mission, as laid down by the Combined Chiefs
of Staff, was to ’’enter the continent of Europe and, in conjunction with
other United Nations, undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany
and the destruction of her armed forces.”^ Operation OVERLORD was the
first phase of the operations to accomplish that mission; the plans for
subsequent operations were to be made after the lodgment area was seized.
Nevertheless, Eisenhower made his basic decision prior to the invasion.
The SHAEF planners, at least a month before D Day, outlined general
strategy to be followed for the defeat of Germany after capture of the
lodgment area.^
The planners selected what they considered to be the chief tar
get area of Germany and the best route by which this objective could be
reached.

They recognized Berlin as the ultimate Allied goal but held

that the city was too far east to be the objective of a campaign in the
West.

The decision was made that the Ruhr, the nearest industrial area

vital to German economy, would be the primary Allied intermediate objec
tive; but even if it should succeed in eluding the Allies, the loss of
the Ruhr and its heavy industries should virtually seal the fate of the
z:
The exact wording of Eisenhower’s mission created a problem for
the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The Americans wanted broad sweeping state
ments while the British wanted more positive statements of his mission.
The final revised directive was issued on 12 February 1944. See: Pogue,
The Supreme Command, pp. 53-55.
^SHAEF Planning Staff Draft, Post NEPTUNE Courses of Action After
Capture of the Lodgment Area, Main Objectives and Axis of Advance, I, 3
May 1944, Post OVERLORD Planning I. Hereinafter referred to as SHAEF
Planning Staff Draft, Post OVERLORD Planning I. Located in the U.S Army
Command and General Staff College Library.
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Wehrmacht.

The second most important industrial area in western Germany

was the Saar Basin on the southern route around the Ardennes.

Within

these two areas was the bulk of Germany's warmaking power (see map 1).
III.

ROUTES OF ADVANCE AND COURSES OF ACTION AVAILABLE

Once the Allied forces were securely established on the Continent
four general courses of action would be open for their advance across
Europe. 9 The first was southeast from the lodgment area in an effort to
cut off the German units in southern France and defeat the enemy forces
in detail.
threat

The second was eastward from the lodgment area with the main

directed toward Metz and theSaar; that is, to make the main

effort south of the Ardennes.

A third course of action was in a north

easterly direction with the object of striking directly in the Ruhr by
the route north of the Ardennes.

The fourth course open to the planners

was a combination of the second and the third courses of action.
The first course of action was discarded almost immediately as
it did

not fulfill the requirements of Eisenhower's mission orders; it

avoided the main German forces and did not lead to the strategic objec
tive of Berlin.
Considerations Of The Courses Of Action
1. The route south of the Ardennes:

The advantages were that the

first part of the advance would be over terrain favorable for the use of
o
°The Wehrmacht was the German Armed Forces.
^T. Dodson Stamps and Vincent J. Esposito, ed.A Military History
of World War II With Atlas: Operations in the European Theater. 2 Vols.
(West Point, New York: United States Military Academy, 1953), Vol.I,
p. 432. Hereinafter referred to as Stamps and Esposito, Military
History
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armor and for the construction of advanced airfields; consequently a
quick approach to Metz was believed possible.
were the following:

Among the disadvantages

it was not a direct route to the Ruhr; both flanks

would be exposed; communications would be extended over the width of
France.
2. The route north of the Ardennes.

An advance along this, the

most direct route to the Ruhr, would have the left flank protected by
the Channel; the country contained good airfields and some excellent
ports, particularly Antwerp:

The advance through this region would

capture the V-weapon sites nearest England and the terrain was better
favored for offensive action than the southern route.

The disadvant

ages were that there would be nothing to prevent German forces in South
ern France from escaping and taking part in the fighting to the north
and there were numerous water obstacles that would have to be crossed.
3.

Simultaneous advance on both axes.

An advance on a broad front

would force the defender to extend his front and would leave him in doubt
as to the direction of the attacker's main thrust.
opportunities for surprise and maneuver.

The latter would have

The disadvantages was that the

use of two axes would require the maintenance of two widely separated
lines of communication.*^
From the beginning, therefore, there was a SHAEF plan to angle
the attack from the Seine in the direction of the Ruhr.**

This plan

SHAEF Planning Staff Draft, Post OVERLORD Planning I.
in the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Library.

Located

**Leahy, I Was There, p. 262 covers events for strategic direction
< of -the campaign worked out at the Second Quebec Conference. At that time
tl^re was agreement betweenChurchill and Roosevelt that the main thrust
would go north of the Ardennes. Churchill was most emphatic that the
main attack proceed along the previously agreed upon axis. Therefore,
the decision to make the main attack on the northern axis was not Eisen
hower's alone.
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was based on the idea of a slow advance after a careful build-up at the
Seine and a series of actions which would push the enemy forces back to
the German frontier north of Aachen by D Day plus 330 (2 May 1944).
It was considered dangerous to attack by a single route and thus can
alize the advance and open it to a concentrated enemy attack.

SHAEF

decided in favor of a broad front both north and south of the Ardennes
which would give the Allies the advantages of maneuver and the ability
to shift the main weight of attack.

If the enemy could be forced to

extend his forces to meet threats in the Metz Gap17 and the Ruhr area
while maintaining his coastal defenses along the Channel coast, his hold
would be weakened along the whole front.

In this circumstance, a deep

penetration on both sides of the Ardennes or north of that area would
force an enemy withdrawal from the Ardenneswest of

the Siegfried Line

for a concentration to meet the Allied mainthrust.

In light of these

conclusions, the SHAEF planners recommended that the main line of advance
be along the route north of the Ardennes with a supporting attack on the
route south of the Ardennes through Verdun to Metz and the Saar Basin
(see map 3).
IV. ALLIED ORDER OF BATTLE TO SUPPORT

THE PLAN

When the enemy began to retire from Normandy in confusion after
mid-August, Eisenhower returned to the pre-D-Day concept for the advance
into Germany.

While favoring a major thrust into the Ruhr area, he still

*^The Metz Gap is the plains south of Luxemburg and north of the
Swiss border. This was the natural route for an advance into Germany
from the west as the Aachen Gap north of the Ardennes was the entrance
from the northwest, and the Belfort Gap permitted passage into south
eastern Germany from the south.
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13
wanted a secondary attack to the south of the Ardennes.-1

Some SHAEF

Staff members believed that in holding to this view he was overlooking
the fact that the bulk of the enemy forces, once held east of the Seine,
had been committed in the Mortain and Falaise Gap areas during the break
out from the Normandy peninsula, and were no longer available to threaten
any single line of advance which might be made to the northeast or to
the east.

To them, as well as to the commanders, speed was needed to

destroy the enemy before shattered elements could be pieced together for
14
a defense of the Siegfried Line or the Rhine river.
In mid-August, before it was clear that the German collapse west
of the Seine would be as sweeping as it proved to be, Generals Bradley
and Patton discussed a scheme for sending three corps across the Rhine
near Wiesbaden, Mannheim, and Karlsruhe to end the war speedily.

To them

this was the shortest route into Germany and one that promised the best
dividends.

General Bradley thought that both First and Third Armies

should execute the maneuver,^ whereas Patton believed that the Third
Army alone,^ if given sufficient supplies, could move to the Metz— Nancy
area and cross the German border in ten days.
Thus the British and the US commanders, each conscious of the
opportunities on his own front and desirous of seizing them quickly,
favored single thrusts into enemy territory.

One would have swung nearly

13The secondary attack had a two-fold mission. It was to secure
terrain to the east and provide a link up with the Seventh Army fighting
up the Rhone valley from southern France.
■^©gue, The Supreme Command, p. 250.
15Ibid.
16Patton, War As I Knew It, p. 110.
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all of the Allied force to the northeast; the other would have thrust the
main US forces almost due east.

On 22 August 1944, Eisenhower considered

the various plans of his subordinates.

He expressed his intention even

tually to direct 21 Army Group north of the Ardennes while 12th Army
Group advanced beyond Paris and prepared to strike just south of the
Ardennes. 17 At the moment there were certain tactical requirements to
consider.

In order to aid the 21 Army Group in carrying out its imme

diate mission of destroying forces between the Seine and the Pas-deCalais, it was necessary to reinforce the British army group with an
entire airborne command and such other forces as were required.

He J

added that 12th Army Group*s rate of advance east of Paris would depend
on the speed with which ports in Brittany could be cleared and the Allied
supply situation improved.18
General Montgomery notified Eisenhower on 23 August that to sweep
through the Pas-de-Calais region to Antwerp he would need an entire US
19
Army moving on his right flank.
General Bradley argued that one corps
would be sufficient for this purpose. 20

General Eisenhower, although

believing the British commander overcautious, acceded to his request in
order to ensure success.

At the same time, he ordered Bradley to use

his remaining forces to clear the ports in Brittany, defend the lines of
17
Pogue, The Supreme Command, p. 250.
1812th Army Group, Report of Operations, G-3 Section, Final
After Action Report, Vol V, Part II. Located in the U.S. Army Command
and General Staff College Library.
19
Montgomery, Memoirs, p. 269.
^Bradley, A Soldier's Story, p. 399.

69
communications against possible attacks from the Paris area, and amass
supplies for an advance eastward toward Metz.

21

When Eisenhower was told by the service support personnel that
they could support the British advance through northern France and Bel
gium, Eisenhower wrote Montgomery:
All of us having agreed upon this general plan, the prin
cipal thing we must now strive for is speed in execution. All
of the Supply people have assured us that they can support the
move, beginning this minute— let us assume that they know
exactly what they are talking about and get about it vigorously
and without delay.
In supporting Montgomery's attack with the US First Army, Eisenhower also
allocated the bulk of 12th Army Group's gasoline to that army, thus de
priving Third Army of the means of making a rapid drive to the east. It
was a blow to the hopes of Patton, who felt that Montgomery had won in
his attempts to strike for Berlin from the North.

23

In explaining his decision to General Marshall, Eisenhower said
that he had temporarily changed his basic plan for attacking both to the
northeast and the east in order to help Montgomery seize tremendously im
portant objectives in the northeast.

He considered the change necessary

even though it interfered with his desire to push eastward through Metz,
because 21 Army Group lacked sufficient strength to do the job.

He added

that he did not doubt 12th Army Group's ability to reach the France-Germany border, but saw no point in getting there until the Allies were in
a position to do something about it.^
21

Pogue, The Supreme Command, p. 251.

22Ibid.

^Patton, War As I Knew It, p. 112.
24Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. and Stephen E. Ambrose, The Papers of
Dwight Eisenhower; The War Years: IV, (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press,
1970), pp. 2092-94. Hereinafter referred to as Papers of Eisenhower, IV.
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Patton still had seven divisions going to the east and he still
had eight days in which to advance before the fuel supply led him to a
temporary halt.

Bradley directed Patton to complete the reduction of

Brittany, protect the south flank of 12th Army Group, and prepare for a
continuation of its advance to seize crossing sites over the Rhine be
tween Mannheim and
V.

K o b l e n z . 25

KNOWN GERMAN OPPOSITION AND ITS LOCATIONS

The logistical difficulties which persisted until December and
prevented the Allies from mounting a sustained offensive gave the Germans
an opportunity to regroup and reorganize.

This period was used to stiffen

the resistance and as a result the fighting along the 500-mile front from
Switzerland to the North Sea turned into the hardest kind of infantry
struggle in the months that followed.

Advances were slow and laborious,

and gains were usually measured in yards instead of miles.
On 8 September 1944, Field Marshal von Rundstedt compared his com
bat strength to that of the Allies in a report to the German High Command:
Our forces comprise forty-eight infantry divisions and fif
teen panzer divisions; of these only one-fourth are at full com
bat strength, so that their total effectiveness can be estimated
as twenty-seven infantry divisions and six or seven panzer divi
sions at most. To these are opposed some sixty
enemy units at
full battle strength.27
2^USMA, War In Western Europe, Part I, p. 150.
See also: 12th Army Group Letter of Instruction #6, dated 25 August
1944, 12th Army Group Report of Operations, Vol V. pp. 85-87. Located
in the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Library.
2^Field Marshal von Rundstedt took command of Army Group West on
5 September 1944 and apparently his intelligence was in error or he was
deliberately wrong as there were only forty-seven Allied divisions
opposing him at that time.
27USMA, war In western Europe, Part I, p. 180.

In spite of the demoralized condition of his troops, Rundstedt
took advantage of the Allies* critical logistical situation and his
strong defensive position to reorganize his armies.

General Walter

Model’s Army Group B took over the sector from the mouth of the Scheldt
to the Moselle with the following armies from north to south; the
Fifteenth, First Parachute, Fifth Panzer, and the Seventh Army.

Army

Group G under General Johannes Blaskowitz held the front from the
vicinity of Trier, Germany to Switzerland with the First and Nineteenth
Armies. With their defensive positions within the Siegfried Line Rundstedt’s remnants were to be a formidable force when encountered in the
Ardennes at the Huertgen Forest.

The Volksgrenadier divisions were

formed of Air Force and Navy personnel, given rifles and practically no
training and rushed into the front lines to man the defenses.

These

divisions were usually battle tested in a quiet sector of the line and
then moved to areas of heavier fighting.^®
Rundstedt established his main line of resistance abng the Maas
River in the north, the German border in the center, and the western
edge of Lorraine and Alsace in the south.

The line ran west of the -

frontier in the south in order to protect the coal region of the Saar
and to keep it in production as long as possible.

In that region the

front extended generally along the line Thionvi1le-Metz-Nancy-Epinal and
on to the Swiss border.

Rundstedt*s development of his defensive posi

tions has been described by Martin Schulman in Defeat in the West as
follows:
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Having been given carte blanche to withdraw his forces to
the borders of the Reich, the old man set about his task with
the coolness and efficiency of a man who knew what he was about.
Deciding that the Maas River in the north, the Siegfried Line in
the center, and the Moselle and Vosges Mountains in the south
offered the most effective geographical barriers, he ordered
his armies to take up sectors along these lines as quickly as
they could. Immediately behind these positions he set to work
filling up and reorganizing the shattered remnants of the
divisions beaten in Normandy. As soon as a unit was even a
semblance of its former self, it was shoved into the Siegfried
Line, where it completed its training and reformation. By the
end of September his front line looked neat enough to pass an
examination of the General Staff College.
VI.

LOGISTICAL SUPPORT CONSIDERATIONS

Early estimates of developments beyond the lodgment area had
visualized a pause by the Allied forces on the line of the Seine for
a period of approximately three months as a likely necessity.

This halt

was anticipated in order that the forces might be reorganized and rein
forced and their logistical situation strengthened before initiating the
30
next phase of the campaign
(see map 4).
In procurement estimates of June 1944, which were designedly
optimistic for purposes of planning, D plus 90 (4 September 1944) was
set for reaching the Seine, D plus 200 (23 December 1944) the Belgian
frontier, D plus 330 (2 May 1945) the surrender of Germany.
first and last of these dates proved pessimistic.

Both the

The Third Army reached

the Seine on D plus 75 (20 August 1944) and the surrender came on D plus
336 (8 May 1945).31

2%artin Shulman, Defeat In The West, (New York: E.P. Dutton,
Co., Inc. 1948), p. 263.
30USMA, War In Western Europe, Part I, p. 148.
3ippgue, The Supreme Command, p. 257.
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Comraunications Zone logistical personnel who just days before
assured Eisenhower they could support Montgomery1s drive through northern
France and Belgium now found their position critical.

The fact was that

on D plus 97 (11 September 1944), one week after they were expected to
reach the Seine and almost seven months before they were supposed to
reach the German border north of Aachen, the Allies actually sent units
across the German frontier.32

It was in this period of the pursuit be

tween the Seine and Germany that supply and transport facilities proved
hopelessly insufficient for the slashing attack which developed.
The failure of the Allies to realize their hopes of victory in
late August may have resulted, in part, from a lack of optimism on the
part of the OVERLORD and SHAEF planners.

The means of communication,

built for a slower, more ponderous drive than that which developed, could
not sustain the ten or twenty-day pursuit that opened the way to the
smashing of the enemy short of the Rhine. 33 The original supply estimates
emphasized the opening of the Brittany ports and Le Havre and the amassing
of supplies west of the Seine before beginning a drive toward the Ruhr.
The Brittany ports were still judged to be of primary importance as late
•7 A

as 1 September 1944.

But on 9 September when Bradley and Patton dis

cussed the port situation they believed Brest was too far away and too
badly damaged to be of assistance to the 12th Army Group. 35
32US Army, 3d Armored Division: Spearhead In The West, (Germany,
1945), p. 211. Located in the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Library,
33Pogue, The Supreme Command, p. 259.
3^Patton, War As I Knew It, p. 121.
33Bradley, A Soldier's Story, p. 365.
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In hardly any respect were the Allies prepared to take advantage
of the opportunity offered to destroy the German forces before winter.
The build-up of men and critical supplies in Great Britain, the arrival
of divisions in France, the rebuilding of rail lines, the laying of pipe
lines, and virtually every other function was geared to a slower rate of
advance than that required in late August. Unfortunately the period of
the great opportunity lasted for only a few weeks and there was not
sufficient time to make the necessary readjustments in the logistical
machinery which would insure speedy victory.

CHAPTER V
OPPOSITION TO MONTGOMERYfS NARROW FRONT PLAN
I. INTRODUCTION
During the months August through December 1944 there was a break
down in communications between Eisenhower and the American commanders
Bradley and Patton.

Bradley knew of Montgomery’s plan for a single

thrust in the north and Eisenhower’s refusal to implement the British
commander’s plan was also known.

However, the events which occurred

during the months that followed indicated to Bradley that the narrow
front plan was being implemented in bits and pieces. Over a period of
months Montgomery received the forces and logistical support, originally
requested in August, to implement the plan.

Even though these forces

and supplies were for missions other than the single thrust, the Ameri
cans looked upon the allocations as evidence that Montgomery was getting
what he wanted at their expense.
General Eisenhower failed to convince the American commanders
that he was not favoring the British plan.'*’ Repeatedly, both Bradley and
Patton opposed the allocations made to the 21 Army Group and it is clear
that, both, they did not understand the broad front concept, and that
professional jealousy marred the relations between the British and Ameri
can leaders.
-^-Bradley, A Soldier’s Story, p. 400; Patton, War As I Knew It, p. 112.
75
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Eisenhower's practice of inviting comments on future operations
resulted in the repeated presentation of the narrow front plan on practi
cally a monthly basis.

When asked for comments, Montgomery would resub

mit the narrow front plan updated to conform to existing conditions.
This caused suspicion by Bradley and Patton and was the primary reason
they believed Eisenhower was favoring the northern route route of ad
vance. Montgomery, on the other hand, was well aware the plan had been
refused time after time.
As noted earlier, the broad front concept provided for a double
envelopment of the Ruhr with primary consideration given the northern
advance.

Fulfillment of this plan required additional support to assure

capture of the Channel ports, obtain airfields, and overrun the launching
2

sites for the V-weapons which were falling on Great Britain.

The 21

Army Group was astride the northern axis of advance and, therefore, re
ceived priority in men and materiel. Such priorities were based on both
a tactical consideration and political objectives.

During the Second

Quebec Conference Prime Minister Churchill and Sir Alan Brooke were in3
sistent that the northern route be the primary route of advance.
They
believed the V-weapon attacks were having such severe effect on the
morale of the British subjects that an early capture of these sites were
necessary to lift the sagging spirits of the English people.

Eisenhower,

as an Allied commander, was bound tactically and politically to support
2

The V-weapons were rocket-propelled missiles with wings which
were commonly called "Buzz Bombs'’ because of the sound the rocket motors
made. There were two models used, the V-l which was used until September
1944, and the improved version, the V-2, which was considerably more
accurate.
3
Supra, p. 35.
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the view, but his American subordinates, who apparently did not under
stand the reasons behind his support of Montgomery, viewed the actions
as victories for Montgomery.
II.

THE CONTROVERSY OF ACCEPTANCE

Montgomery
On 20 August 1944, Eisenhower held a staff meeting at his head
quarters to discuss the future conduct of the war.

One of the decisions

reached was to send 12th Army Group south of the Ardennes.

Montgomery

disagreed and on 22 August sent his Chief of Staff, DeGuingand, to dis
cuss the merits of his narrow front plan with Eisenhower.

In a two hour

session DeGuingand was unsuccessful in his attempt to change Eisenhower!s
position and so reported to Montgomery.

The British commander then re

quested that Eisenhower visit him, and at a conference on 23 August,
Montgomery outlined his views and plans to Eisenhower.
avail, and the British leader was turned down again.

It was to no
Eisenhower agreed,

however, that 21 Army Group alone was not strong enough to undertake the
tasks on the northern axis and told Montgomery that whatever American
assistance was necessary would be provided.

Montgomery wanted an Ameri

can army of twelve divisions on his right flank, and under his command,
but Eisenhower said American public opinion would not permit 12th Army
4
Group to be reduced to only one army.
Montgomery recognized that he had
failed to get the narrow front plan approved.5
Montgomery fs talk with Eisenhower did have some influence on the
^At that time the US Ninth Army had not been formed.
^Montgomery, Memoirs, p. 269.
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Supreme Commander as his letter to General Marshall on 24 August 1944
indicates:
For a considerable time I was of the belief that we could
carry out the operation to the northeast simultaneously with
a thrust eastward, but later have concluded that due to the
tremendous importance of the objectives in the northeast we
must first concentrate on that movement. The general distribu
tion of troops will be as follows: The Army Group of the North
will operate toward the northeast generally westward of the
line Amiens-Lille with its principal mission as given earlier
in this letter.
Bradley will be directed to clean up the
Brittany Peninsula, protect our right rear and to thrust for
ward with the bulk of his offensive units along the right
boundary of 21 Army Group so as to assist in the rapid accom
plishment directed to begin the accumulation of forces east of
Paris to take up the eastward advance south of the Ardennes.**
After his promotion to Field Marshal on 1 September, Montgomery
said, ’’The more I considered what we were setting out to do, the more
9
certain I was that it was wrong.” He decided to make another approach
to Eisenhower and sent a message on 4 September in which he asked for
another visit to discuss his second proposal which included the following
points:
1. I consider we have now reached a stage where one really powerful
and full-blooded thrust towards Berlin is likely to get there and
thus end the German war.
2. We have not enough maintenance resources for two-full-blooded
thrusts.
Those missions were for Montgomery to capture the LeHavre Pen
insula as well as the city and fortress, and Bradley was to complete the
conquest of Brittany to provide maintenance areas and accelerated flow
of divisions into the theater.
^The force to be accumulated east of Paris was to be built up
from divisions enroute to the theater from England.
^Alfred D, Chandler Jr. and Stephen E. Ambrose, et al., The
Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: The War Years, (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins Press, 1970), IV, 2093.
Q
Montgomery, Memoirs, p. 270.
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3. The selected thrust must have all the maintenance resources it
needs without any qualification and any other operation must do the
best it can with what is left over.
4. There are only two possible thrusts: one via the Ruhr and the
other via Metz and the Saar.
5. In my opinion the thrust likely to to give the best and quickest
results is the northern one via the Ruhr.
6. Time is vital and the decision regarding the selected thrust
must be made at once and para. 3 above will apply.
7. If we attempt a compromise solution and split our maintenance
resources so that neither thrust is full-blooded we will prolong the
war.
8. I consider the problem view as above is very simple and clear
cut.
9. The matter is of such vital importance that I feel sure you will
agree that a decision on the above lines is required at once..
Eisenhower replied on 5 Septemberby

stating, "While agreeing with your

conception of a powerful and full-blooded thrust towards Berlin I do not
agree that it should be initiated at this moment to the exclusion of all
other maneuvers.
While it was clear to Montgomery that the 21 Army Group would not
be allowed to make a single thrust in the north, for the Americans in the
south such a view was harder to accept because he started receiving pri
ority in logistical support for Operation MARKET/GARDEN less than one
week later.
Bradley and Patton
When Montgomery approached Bradley on 17 August about the single
thrust in the north,12 Bradley felt that Montgomery was using the same
tactics he had used in Sicily when he recommended that the United States
forces sit*-out the campaign on a defensive front while Eighth Army went
10Ibid, p. 272.
**Chandler and Ambrose, The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower,
IV, 2120.
12

Supra, p. 35.
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on alone to take Messina.

13

Anxious lest Montgomery gain an advantage,

Bradley proposed a counter plan for a double thrust which was, in effect,
a restatement of the broad front plan.*^
Bradley believed the narrow front plan had been accepted as the
following shows:
On August 23 Eisenhower decided tentatively in favor of the
single thrust. In a letter to 21st Group he directed that
Montgomery make the main effort up in the Channel coast. Monty
had won the initial skirmish. I was ordered to support the Brit
ish effort with all nine divisions of First Army.
Third Army was not to be benched but our recommendation for
a five-corps thrust in the south through Metz had been watered
down to a feint by three. With this priority in troops, Mont
gomery was also to have top priority in supply. As a result,
the First Army was to be given priority over the Third Army in
12th Army Group tonnage.
Both Eisenhower and Montgomery stated on 24 August that the single thrust
was not approved, yet Bradley andthe army commanders

in 12th Army Group

did not receive these facts aftertheir meeting.

mission of 21 Army

The

Group, as approved by Eisenhower,was the clearing ofthe Channel coast
and securing Antwerp, but Bradley and

his subordinates saw itanother

way.16
When Eisenhower accepted Montgomery's view that the northern
thrust of advance should be "powerful and full-blooded" he also committed
himself to the logistical support of the 21 Army Group at the expense, if
necessary, of the Americans.

To assure that the principal logistical

effort would be in support of Montgomery, Eisenhower revised the supply
^Bradley,

A Soldier's Story, p. 399

14Ibid.
15Ibid, p. 400.
16Ibid.
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tonnage between the First and Third Armies, and required the bulk of the
supplies to be shipped to First Army.

Third Army was to continue just

as far as it could in advance toward Germany, but in the event of a
shortage of logistical supplies Montgomery and the First Army were to be
supplied, even if Patton had to be halted.

17

Patton was to meet Bradley on 25 August at 12th Army Group Head
quarters at Chartres.

Upon arrival he was briefed on the situation and

directed to continue his advance to the east with the seven divisions re
maining under his command.

He stated in his book, "Monty had won again,

and the weight of the operation was to be turned north rather than east
On 29 August Patton felt the first shortage of supplies when a scheduled
shipment of 140,000 gallons of gasoline failed to arrive.

At first

Patton thought "it was a backhanded way of slowing up the Third Army.

I

later found that this was not the case, but that the delay was due to a
change of plan by the High Command, implemented, in my opinion, by General
Montgomery."19 On the same day Third Army's XII Corps captured nearly
100,000 gallons of aviation gasoline at Chalons (see map 1), "but this
was only a drop in the bucket for a corps which during the past month had
become accustomed to consuming 200,000 gallons a day.
20

purposes XII Corps was out of gas."

For all practical

Not to be outdone by

17Ibid, p. 403.
18Patton, War As I Knew It, p. 112.
19Ibid, p. 114.
20Colonel Robert S. Allen,'Lucky Forward: The History of Patton's
Third US Army, "(New York: Vanguard Press, 1947), p. 136.
See also: George F. Dyer, Ed by, XII Corps, Spearhead of Patton's Third
Army, Unpublished Corps History, 1947, p. 198. Located in the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College Library.
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Montgomery, Patton ordered his XII Corps to "continue until the tanks
stopped, and then get out and walk . . .

21

In essence, the decision that emerged from the 23 August meeting
resulted in a temporary shift of the main effort to the northern route.
Yet the shift was more tactical than strategic in that it was made for
the purpose of gaining intermediate objectives vital to a final offensive
along the lines of the original strategic concept.

But to Bradley and

Patton it seemed to indicate acceptance of British views at the expense
of those held by commanders in the 12th Army Group.
Ill CONTINUING CONFLICTS
Securing the Port of Antwerp
Success in the land battle on the Continent rested on the ability
of the allies to support their forces.

Until the first of September all

the ports captured except Rouen were on the Cherbourg Peninsula and too
far in the rear to support the advance planned for 21 Army Group.

The

port of Antwerp was a prize worth gambling for and Montgomery was given
orders to capture it.

The British commander stated he would require as-

sistance and the US First Army was assigned to support the attack.

22

The

city of Brussels and the port city of Antwerp fell to the British on 4
September (see map 5).

The port was captured intact with only minor dam

age caused by the defending Germans.
The tremendous good fortune of capturing the Antwerp port
undamaged was the result of help received from a Belgian engineer who
met the advancing British troops outside the city and offered to guide
them by a safe route to the center of the city.

■91^Patton, War

As I Knew It, p. 115.

22

Supra, p. 68.
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He directed the force down side streets, through narrow corridors,
and over flimsy bridges which barely supported the weight of the tanks.
Gaps through the German minefields were known to the engineer and the
British column was led safely through them to the dock area.

The engineer

directed that the sluice gates be taken first as they were the key to the
whole port.

The important areas were captured without serious challenge

and during the night forces to consolidate the position were transported
along the same route.

The following morning the city was captured with

minimum fighting due to the surprise attack from within the city*s cen
ter.23
Militarily, the capture of Antwerp was of greater value than that
of Brussels; what the Allies needed more than anything else was a fully
equipped deep-water port.

Antwerp provided an, even better answer to

this requirement than any of the Channel ports still in German possession.
The approaches to the port, miles down-river, however, were still occupied
by the Germans and it took another sixty days to clear the estuary.

It

was then necessary to clear silt and mines from the channel and the port
24
began operations under allied control on 28 November 1944.
Early September Disagreements
Eisenhower*s reply to Montgomery's message of 4 September denied
for the second time, permission to make the single thrust in the north.
Montgomery immediately requested another meeting to discuss logistics,
^Geoffrey Dennis, ed., The World At War, (London:
Publishers Limited, 1951), Vol. IV, p. 268.

Caxton

24Mary H. Williams, Chronology 1941-1945, The US Army In World
War 11: Special Studies, (Washington, I960), p. 339.
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V-2 rocket sites near Rotterdam and Amsterdam, and "a reallocation of
present resources of every description that would be adequate to get one
25
thrust to Berlin."
The meeting on 10 September saw another attempt
on Montgomery's part to get the single thrust approved and another re
fusal by Eisenhower.

As Montgomery recalled:

It was essential for him (Eisenhower) to know my views; the
decision about the action to be taken was then his. It was ob
vious that he disagreed with my analysis. He repeated that we
must first close to the Rhine and cross it on a wide front; then,
and only then, could we concentrate on one thrust. We parted
without any clear decision, except that, as I understood it, the
"broad front" strategy was to remain in operation. But Eisen
hower agreed that 21st Army Group should strike northwards
towards Arnhem as early as possible . . . . 6
The next day, 11 September 1944, Montgomery sent Eisenhower
another message saying that if the northern thrust towards the Ruhr
was not to have priority over other operations the large scale operations
scheduled for Arnhem could not begin before 23 September and maybe
not until 26 September.

The message produced immediate results.

Eisen

hower's chief of staff, General Smith, went to see Montgomery on 12 Sep
tember to tell him Eisenhower had decided to give priority to his drive
in the north.

The thrust of Third Army to the Saar, which had been

approved a week earlier, was to be stopped.

Three American divisions

were to be grounded and their transportation used to supply extra transport to 21 Army Group. 77

The bulk of the logistical support of 12th

Army Group was to be reallocated to the First Army and Montgomery was to
coordinate directly with First Army to secure his right flank.
Montgomery, Memoirs, p. 274.

Ibid, p. 275.

27The transportation for 21 Army Group was obtained by taking the
transportation assets of three newly-arrived divisions and transferring
those vehicles to the British. The divisions were still on the beaches
at Cherbourg and LeHavre when they were stripped of their vehicles.
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On 13 September, tanks from the 3d Armored Division broke through
a soft spot in the Siegfried Line ten miles south of Aachen.

No sooner

had the troops crossed the frontier than they were halted because of a
shortage of supplies.

The priority of supply to 21 Army Group emptied

12th Army Groups supply depot and destroyed its ability to continue the
attack.

It was to be two months before the momentum could be regained.

Montgomery’s attack to Arnhem was destined to use the entire logistical
backlog and to empty storage depots until the logistical tail could be
shortened by obtaining ports for closer supply.

Communication Zone

personnel were maintaining lines of communication on two axes and each
forward area was over three hundred miles from the port serving it.

The

British condition was made worse by wide spread defects in their threeton trucks which rendered many of them inoperative until replacement components could be secured from Great Britain.

28

IV. OPERATION MARKET/GARDEN
On 17 September 1944 a bold attempt was made to loosen the
stiffening resistance in Northwestern Europe by dropping three airborne
divisions behind the German right flank in Holland with a view to clearing
the way for a drive by the British up to and across the Lower Rhine.

By

dropping the airborne forces in successive waves over a sixty-mile corri
dor of Holland behind the German front a foothold would be gained on all
four of the strategic areas needed to cross the interval; the passage of
the Wilhelmina Canal at Eindhoven," the Maas (Meuse) at Grave, the Waal
28

This shortcoming was overcome by the action stated in #27, above.
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at Nijmegen, and the Lower Rhine at Arnhhem.

29

The airborne troops con

sisted of three divisions; the British 1st Airborne Division was dropped
at Arnhem, the US 82nd Airborne Division at Nijmegen and Grave, and the
US 101st Airborne Division north of Eindhoven at Zon and Veghel (see map
8).30
The plan to seize the bridges was a double one.

The airborne

operation, known as MARKET, had as its purpose the capture of the vital
bridges in each area of operation.

In rapid support of the airborne

troops, armor and infantry of the British Second Army were to advance
northward from the line established generally south of the Dutch frontier.
The plan was for the armored divisions to pass over the bridges held by
the airborne troops and cut off the land exit of enemy troops from western
Holland.

The land operation, known as GARDEN, was to take place on a

very narrow front with only one road available to serve as a line of
communication for most of the attack.

The axis of advance lay through

Eindhoven, Veghel, Uden, Grave, Nijmegen, Arnhem, and Apeldorn to the
\

Zuider Zee.
The first landings of the main airborne forces were made on 17
September and follow-up troops and reinforcements continued to be flown
in on succeeding days in spite of unfavorable weather on several occasions.
Initial losses, enroute and at the drop zones, were very light and tend
to support the airborne commander's contention that heavy bomber attacks
on anti-aircraft gun positions immediately preceding an airborne operation
29Major General H. Essame, The North-West Europe Campaign 19441945, (Aldershot: Gale § Polden Limited, 1962), p. 56.
30
Gharles B. MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign, The US Army
In World War II: The European Theater of Operations , (Washington, 1963),
pp. 140-73 Passim.
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would greatly reduce casualties.

Such attacks were undertaken by heavy

bombers of both Bomber Command of the Royal Air Force and the US Eighth
Air Force neutralizing enemy airfields in the vicinity of the drop zones
and anti-aircraft gun positions enroute.

On 19 September ground forces

of the British Second Army advanced from the south and made contact with
all of the airborne forces except those to the north of the Lower Rhine
in the Arnhem area.

Here the isolated British division was holding out
■zi

against greatly superior forces, including a panzer division.
Operation MARKET/GARDEN was characterized by bungling on the
part of the Intelligence Officers.

They apparently ignored current in

formation transmitted by the Dutch Underground about the presence of Ger
man armor in the area and planning officers dealing with the Arnhem phase
of the operation were influenced by SHAEF intelligence reports which esti
mated that the Germans could produce only eleven infantry divisions and
32
four armored divisions to defend on in that sector.
In spite of the
fact that SHAEF Intelligence, on 16 September, reported that they thought
two SS Panser Divisions might be refitting in the Arnhem area, no revisions in planning resulted.

33

When the airborne troops jumped from

their aircraft, on Arnhem, under marginal weather conditions, they de
scended on "some 2,500 German troops, mainly belonging to the 9th SS
^*CP Stacey, The Victory Campaign: The Operations In North-West
Europe 1944-1945, (Ottawa: The Queen's Printer and Controller of Station
ery, 1960), p. 314.
J Essame, North-West Europe Campaign, p. 57.
33Stacey, The Victory Campaign, p. 314.
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Panzer Division."34 Within ten minutes the remainder of 9th SS Panzer
Division was enroute to Arnhem and the 10th SS Panzer Division was sent
to

N i j m e g e n . 35

The initial assault forces were dropped in three waves

and, before reinforcements could be brought over from the English air
fields, the weather closed in and further drops were cancelled.

An ex

ception was the Polish 1st Paratroop Brigade, determined to get into the
war, which jumped at low altitudes, in near impossible weather conditions,
at Arnhem on 21 September and linked-up with the British division two
days later.^
The days that followed were marked by confusion and heavy
fighting in the area between Nijmegen and Arnhem.

It was not until 24

September that British infantry reached the Lower Rhine in force and ar
tillery began supporting the beleagured British forces on the northern
bank of the river.

The situation was grave and permission to withdraw

had been given the previous day.

The airborne troops were forced into

a steadily diminishing perimeter, which by 24 September measured only
1,000 yards by 1,500 yards.

Montgomery finally ordered the withdrawl of

all forces from across the Lower Rhine which was effected during the

^Essame, North-West Europe Campaign, p. 57.
35
Montgomery, Normandy To The Baltic, p. 184, says there were remnats of four panzer divisions: the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions and
9th and 116th Panzer Divisions. The Official History of the Canadian
Army in the Second World War by Colonel C. P. Stacey, The Victory Cam
paign: The Operations In North-West Europe 1944-1945, (Ottawa: The
Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationery, 1960) p. 313, agrees with
the number of divisions but says they were four panzer divisions no
longer fit for action who were in process of refitting and re-grouping.
3^stacey, The Victory Campaign, p. 314.
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night of 25-26 September when 2,228
men, under cover of darkness, in
filtrating in small groups the enemy lines, withdrew across the river.
Casualties were heavy— the division lost over 7,000 men; killed, wounded,
and missing-in-action.39
The MARKET/GARDEN operation was significant primarily because it
was planned, executed, and failed under the leadership of Montgomery.
It was the first operation planned to prepare the way for his single
thrust in the north scheme.

The operation failed to secure a bridgehead

beyond the Lower Rhine, had not effectively turned the north flank of the
Siegfried Line, had not cut off the enemy’s land exit from Holland, and
had not positioned the 21 Army Group for a drive around the north flank
of German defenses in the Ruhr region.

The hope of attaining these stated

objectives had prompted the ambition and daring that went into Operation
MARKET/GARDEN.

The failure to obtain such important objectives would

mean that his other plans would be questioned, and that the operation had
failed.^
V.

MID-SEPTEMBER CONFLICTS

The day after Operation MARKET/GARDEN was launched Montgomery
sent a message to Eisenhower stating his disagreement with the Supreme
37Montgomery, Despatch, p. 50.
^Montgomery, Memoirs, p. 295.
Report by The Supreme Commander To The Combined Chiefs Of Staff
On The Operations In Europe of the Allied Expeditionary Force 6 June 19448 May 1945. Dated 13 July 1945. p. 68. Hereinafter referred to as:
Report To The Combined Chiefs of Staff. Located in the U.S. Army Command
and General Staff College Library.
^Montgomery's record states he never lost a battle after he as
sumed command of 8th Army in Africa. The MARKET/GARDEN operation did
gain limited objectives; however, the failure to accomplish the assigned
mission and the loss of over 7,000 men must be classed as a failure.
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Commander1s letter of 15. September outlining plans for a general advance
of the Allied Armies to the Rhine and into Germany.
twelve paragraphs, seven pointing

Montgomery submitted

to the advantages of

vance on the northern route with his

own 21 Army Group

lettinghim ad
and theUS First

Army,4* and five dealing with the disadvantages of the proposed broad
front advance.

Eisenhower replied that he did not see any difference in

their basic concepts, but violently disagreed that all the divisions, ex
cept those of the 21 Army Group and nine of First Army "could stop in
place where they are and that we can strip all these additional divisions
from their transport and everything else to support one single knife
like drive towards Berlin.

This may not be exactly what you mean but
42
it is certainly not possible."
To this Montgomery replied that Eisen
hower should give 12th Army Group

an order to halt and

that ifthe order
43
was not obeyed the Allies would get into greater difficulties.
On 22 September Eisenhower summoned a conference at SHAEF head
quarters to decide upon strategy for the conduct of the war after Germany
was invaded.

Montgomery, as always, did not attend and sent DeGuingand

to represent him again.

DeGuingand carried with him the plan Montgomery

had presented to Eisenhower on 18 September and introduced the plan for
further consideration.

That night DeGuingand sent a message to the effect

that Eisenhower had supported Montgomery's plan one hundred percent,

44

^Montgomery, Memoirs, pp. 278-80. Previous to this time Mont
gomery said he would need a force of forty divisions to make the thrust
to Berlin. This is the first time he ventured doing it with only nine
divisions in the US First Army plus his '21 Army Group.
42Ibid, p. 281.
43Chandler and Ambrose, The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower,
IV, p. 2164.
44Montgomery, Memoirs, p. 282.
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and that the northern thrust was to be the main effort and get full sup
port.

Montgomery commented, "on 23 August when I had asked him to take

the decision to support my plan he had refused.

Now at last, on the 23rd

of September, I was told he had agreed and would support my plan.

He had

taken the decision exactly one month too late."45
DeGuingand was overly optimistic when he wired Montgomery that
his plan had been given complete support.

Eisenhower*s apparent change

of mind was verbal only; he said Montgomery should have priority but he
refused to implement the single thrust to Berlin.

Montgomery wanted con

trol of First Army; all he got was permission, limited largely to emergen
cies, to communicate directly with its commander.

Captain Harry Butcher,

USNR, Eisenhower's aide, believed Montgomery had reduced his aims from
Berlin to the Ruhr and was attempting to get operational control over the
US First Army.

He further said that Montgomery wanted 12th Army Group

stopped and the support provided to his forces, otherwise the Allies
would not get the Ruhr.

According to Butcher, "With change in concept of

object, Ike found himself in agreement so far as emphasis to the 21 Army
46
Group was concerned, but not for command."
Had Field Marshal Montgomery been present for the conference it
is possible that later misunderstandings over operational priorities
might have been avoided.

The Supreme Commander, while interested in

future drives into Germany, asked early in the conference for "general
acceptance of the fact that the possession of an additional major deepwater port on our northern flank was an indispensable prerequisite for
45 Ibid.

^Butcher, My Three Years With Eisenhower, p. 675.
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the final drive into Germany.Further, he asked that a clear distinc
tion be made between logistical requirements for the present operations,
aimed at breaching the Siegfried Line and seizing the Ruhr, and similar
requirements for a final drive on Berlin.^®
In the course of the conference, Eisenhower declared that the en
velopment of the Ruhr from the north by .21 Army Group, supported by the
US First Army, was the main effort on the next phase of operations. r
Montgomery's mission was to open the port of Antwerp and develop opera
tions culminating in a strong attack on the Ruhr from the north.

General

Bradley was to support Montgomery by assuming responsibility for the Brit
ish VIII Corps sector and by continuing to thrust, as far as current re
sources permitted, toward Cologne and Bonn.

The 12th Army Group was to

seize any favorable opportunity to cross the Rhine and attack the Ruhr
from the south when the supply situation permitted.

The remainder of

12th Army Group, reduced now to the Third Army, was to take no more ag
gressive action than that permitted by the supply situation after the
full requirements of the main effort had been met. 49
Through a misunderstanding, Montgomery thought Eisenhower had ap
proved his single thrust plan when, in reality, nothing more than supplies
and maintenance priority had been given.

Logistical priority was essen

tial to secure the fully usable port of Antwerp, and to properly position
the Allied troops for a continuation of the broad front drive into Ger50
many when the supply situation permitted.
47
Pogue, The Supreme Command, p. 294
^Post OVERLORD Planning I, SGS 381. Meeting at SHAEF Foreword
22 Sep 1944. Located in National Archives, Washington, D.C.
^9Ibid, MSG FWD 15510, Eisenhower to Bradley.
*^Pogue, The Supreme Command, p. 294.
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VI. LATER ATTEMPTS AND THE AFTERMATH
October began with Eisenhower urging Montgomery to clear the
Schelde estuary in order to put the Antwerp port into operation.

After

some delay, during which clearing of the area around Nijmegen was ef
fected, Montgomery directed that priority be given to clearing the
Schelde estuary.

After much hard fighting by the First Canadian Army

the mission-was accomplished in early November.
Meanwhile, General Marshall, while on a visit to the European
Theater of Operations, met with Montgomery on 8 October at the British
Commanderrs headquarters.

Montgomery told Marshall of his unhappiness

with Eisenhower’s leadership, and said that since Eisenhower had taken
personal command of the AEF the armies had become separated nationally
and not geographically; that there was a lack of firmness; and that
operational direction and control were lacking.*** Montgomery was ma
neuvering for the position of Land Force Commander, but Marshall, who
had previously directed Eisenhower to establish his headquarters on the
Continent and assume operational control as soon as possible, was dian
metrically opposed to his views.
The results of the meeting were dis
cussed with Eisenhower upon Marshall’s return to Rheims, and Eisenhower
finally moved to end Montgomery’s complaining.

Eisenhower brought the

issue into the open in his message to Montgomery dated 13 October 1944
in which he stated:
In order that we may continue to operate in the same close
and friendly association that, to me at least, has characterized
our work in the past, I will again state, as clearly as is possi
ble, my conceptions of logical command arrangements for the
^Montgomery, Memoirs, p. 284.
^ Supra, p. 26.
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future. If, having read these, you feel that you must still
class them as "unsatisfactory" then indeed we have an issue
that must be settled soon in the interests of future efficien
cy. I am quite well aware of the powers and limitations of an
Allied Command, and if you, as the senior commander in this
Theater of one of the great Allies, feel that my conceptions
and directives are such as to endanger the success of oper
ations, it is our duty to refer the matter to higher authority
for any action they may choose to take, however drastic. 3
To this Montgomery replied, "You will hear no more on the subject of com
mand from me.

I have given you my views and you have given your answer.

I and all of us here will weigh in 100 percent to do what you want. .
. ."3^ Contrary to what he said this was not his final word on the sub
ject of command; he would remain a critic until after the Ardennes
fighting was concluded.
In the same letter, Eisenhower directed that a meeting of Army
Group commanders would be held on 18 October to discuss the capabilities
of the Army Groups, and the timing of the attack by US First Army and
Second British Army to gain the Rhine.55

Knowing of Montgomery’s reluc

tance to leave his tactical headquarters Eisenhower suggested that the
meeting could be held at Montgomery’s tactical headquarters.

Bradley

said, "By convening the conference on Monty’s home grounds, SHAEF made
it impossible for him not to a t t e n d . T h e outcome of the meeting was
^Chandler and Ambrose, The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower,
IV, p. 2220.
^Montgomery, Memoirs, p. 317. It was in fact 31 December 1944
before the issue died. Montgomery gained information from Decuingand
that Marshall had telegramed Eisenhower saying the President of the
United States and himself (Marshall) had complete confidence in him and
that the appointment of a British officer to hold operational command
of control over Bradley would be entirely unacceptable in America, p. 319.
55Chandler and Ambrose, The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower,
IV, p. 316.
^Bradley, A Soldier’s Story, p. 433.
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a decision that the Allies would continue hammering at the enemy with all
possible force in an effort to destroy the morale of the Reich and bring
the war to an end. '
Eisenhower’s decision to resume the fall offensive in November
resurrected the perennial dispute over strategy.

During the meeting

Montgomery advanced his plan for a concentrated attack toward the Ruhr
north of the Ardennes in spite of the decision already issued by the Su
preme Commander.

The date set for the attack by 12th Army Group was 5

November; the 21 Army Group was still in the midst of clearing the Scheldt
estuary and would be engaged there for the next two weeks.

58

The next meeting of the Supreme Commander with his army group
commanders was held on 7 December at Maastricht.

Montgomery argued that

’’the Ruhr must be our strategic objective; that our main effort must be
made in the north as it is there, and only there, that suitable country
exists for a mobile campaign, i.e., to the north of the Ruhr.”59 His plan
consisted of a single thrust plan with the additional suggestion that the
12th Army Group be divided into two groups— the northern portion, con
sisting of ten divisions, was to be used to support 21 Army Group’s right
flank north of the Ardennes.

The 21 Army Group was to re-group and launch

a strong offensive from the Nijmegen area with the object of securing all
ground between the Rhine and Meuse rivers, after which it would penetrate
into Germany, reinforced by American divisions as necessary.
raised the issue of command again by stating:
'^Pogue, The Supreme Command, p. 316.
58
Montgomery, Normandy To The Baltic, p. 191.
59
Montgomery, Memoirs, p. 302.
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I considered that one commander should be in operational
control and direction of all forces north of the Ardennes.
That commander must either be myself or Bradley. I would
willingly serve under Bradley.6^
The statement of his willingness to serve under Bradley was obviously a
subtle move to block Bradley's objections to serve under him again.
Bradley was still a Lieutenant General, while Montgomery as a Field
Marshal, was equivalent in rank to a General of the Armies.

Aside from

political objections from the British government, military protocol would
not condone such a command structure.

The national prestige of Great

Britain would have suffered humiliation beyond repair had such an event
occurred.
The ill-will and nationalistic feelings stirred up over the state
ments issued by Montgomery after the German's Ardennes Offensive are re
ferred to earlier in this thesis^* and do not require repeating.

The

circumstances surrounding the incidents demand more explanation.

When

the Germans attacked on 16 December 1944, the main thrust came in the
center of 12th Army Group and divided the Group into two elements— the
First and Ninth Armies were on the northern flank of the salient and
Patton's Third Army and Bradley's headquarters on the south.

To facili

tate control of the divided Army Group, the forces in northern Belgium
were placed under temporary command of Montgomery.

The British commander

fought the battle for the Ardennes with two American Armies backed up by
four British divisions in reserve.

The total British force committed
f\2 The resent
against the enemy in the Ardennes fighting was one brigade.
ment of the Americans was tremendous when Montgomery's statements were
60Ibid, p. 304.
62

a division.

61Supra, p. 35-36.

A brigade is approximately one-third of the fighting forces in
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misconstrued to imply the British had saved the day for the Americans.

63

The American armies remained under his command only long enough to re
store the original offensive line and then reverted to 12th Army Group
control
When the Allied offensive was resumed the US Ninth Army was
deployed north of the Ruhr and the US First Army was south of the in
dustrial complex.

On 1 April 1945 the two armies made contact and the

encirclement of the Ruhr was completed.

The operation constitued the

largest double envelopment in history and signified the successful com
pletion of Eisenhower's broad front policy.

Inside the pocket were

65
trapped the whole of German Army Group B and two corps of Army Group H .
The object of Montgomery's attention for eight months was now in Allied
possession.

The next month was spent in pursuit to the Elbe river where

the Russian Armies from the east met the Allied Armies advancing from the
West.

Soon after the link-up of the Russian and Western armies the war

ended in Europe.

^ •Z

Bradley, A Soldier's Story, p. 483.
64Ibid, p. 486.
65Report To The Combined Chiefs of Staff, p. 104.

CHAPTER VI
FACTORS AFFECTING THE NARROW FRONT PLAN
I.

INTRODUCTION

When Montgomery envisioned the single thrust through Europe to
Berlin in August 1944, he clearly believed the war in Europe could be
concluded by the end of the year.* The crumbling German Army in front
of his troops was practically defeated, and German commanders were
recommending surrender to save their country.

Those recommendations

were ignored by the German High Command and were never presented to
Per Fuhrer, Adolf Hitler.
During the early fighting in France, Eisenhower commuted across
the Channel.

Eisenhower's absence from the battlefield caused Montgomery

to believe the Supreme Commander was out of contact with the realities of
the situation.

This was not true, however, for Eisenhower kept abreast

of the tactical progress by daily situation reports and visits to the
fighting units.

2

In addition to the daily tactical reports, Eisenhower

received information on the land, sea and air logistical support capa
bilities.
Logistical support was already presenting problem areas by midAugust, and in the midst of the supply crisis Eisenhower arrived with
1
Montgomery, Memoirs, p. 266.
2

Eisenhower, Crusade In Europe, p. 265.
Supreme Command, p. 198.
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See also: Pogue, The
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his headquarters to assume personal command of the troops in the field.
It had been long ordained that this would occur at some point after the
lodgment area was secure, but it was unfortunate for Montgomery that
it occurred when it did.

Decisive action was needed at the time change

of command took place and the controlling headquarters was almost four
hundred miles behind the front lines.

At the urging of General

Marshall, Eisenhower established his headquarters on the Continent as
soon as a suitable location was found and minimum essential communica
tions were established.^ The problem of personal supervision was com
pounded on 2 September when Eisenhower's plane made a forced landing
and injured his knee.

The injury required that he remain in bed for

a short period and restricted him from visiting the field commands.^
At the time resistance was melting away the Supreme Commander's
mobility was restricted, but he was not out of touch with the current
situation.
What was the possibility for success of a single thrust on a
narrow front to reach Berlin and end the war by the close of 1944? To
answer this question three categories of facts must be considered-the combat power of the Allies, the enemy situation, and logistical
support.

In this chapter these factors will be considered for the

period 1 September - 31 December 1944 as they would have affected
Montgomery's progress across Europe.
3Pogue, The Supreme Command, p. 264.
4Ibid.
Eisenhower, CruSade In Europe, p. 306.
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II.

THE ALLIED SITUATION

When Montgomery said he would need forty divisions to make one
"full-blooded thrust" to the Ruhr and Berlin he would have used all
Allied divisions in north-west Europe.

The 21 Army Group was composed

of seventeen divisions that included one airborne division, six armor
divisions, and ten infantry divisions.

Twelfth Army Group had the

preponderance of combat power with twenty-one divisions, of which
seven were armor divisions, twelve were infantry divisions, and two
were airborne divisions.

Numerous other United States divisions

were arriving on the Continent every day and by 8 September there
were forty-seven divisions ashore.

Most of these new divisions did

not go into combat for a month or more after their arrival.
All divisions available for the single thrust were combattested and proven.

Some participated in the invasion at Normandy,

and others arrived shortly thereafter to participate in the hard
fighting for the lodgment area and the breakout at St. Lo.

The rush

to reinforce the divisions already on the Continent brought the Third
Army over on 5 July and into the fighting on 1 August.** Artillery
support would be provided by five battalions of artillery assigned to
each division, and the twenty battalions of artillery in each of the
five British corps and seven American corps that made up the fighting
6USMA, The War In Western Europe, p. 180.
?Ibid, pp. 221-22.
**Third Army Action Against Enemy Reports, Narrative account
1 Aug 4 4 - 9 May 45, Vol. I Operations, dated 15 May 1945. Located in
US Army Command and General Staff College Library.
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force.

There was a multitude of special artillery and assault weapons

under control of each corps.
Air support for the single thrust would be provided by the US
Ninth Air Force with one medium bomber division, two tactical air com
mands, and one troop carrier command.

The US Eighth Air Force would

provide long range strategic bomber support with three divisions of
bombers. The Royal Air Force had three commands: the coastal command
to protect the coast and the sea lines of communication, the fighter
commander for use in the United Kingdom and limited use on the Continent, and the bomber command.

9

It is not necessary to trace the long and complicated stoiy of
how the heavy bomber forces of the Allies increased in strength, tech
nical efficiency and operational skill until they constituted a powerful
offensive force.

Within the wide terms of their directives they were

largely free to select targets which they favored and to frustrate
attempts to divert them to others which they regarded as less rewarding.
The air power enabled the Allies to win complete superiority of the
skies over England, the lines of communiation to the Continent, and over
the battlefields in France.

To a large part, the Allied Air Forces

gained air superiority over most of Germany.

This advantage to the land

forces grew in the months thatfol lowed and provided a marked tactical
advantage for the Allies.
Tactical air power played a large part in winning air super
iority, but the foundations of air victory were laid by the strategic
bomber forces.

It was the growing danger of their attacks on Germany

^USMA, The War In Western Europe, pp. 223-24.
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that led to the German concentration on air defense with the resultant
neglect to develop a strong offensive bomber force.

This failure alone

provided a tremendous advantage to the Allied land forces.

Even the

landings in Normandy were comparatively unmolested by heavy bomber
attacks.10

By 31 August, apart from fighter-bombers and dive-bombers design
ed for ground attack, the total number of bombers shown in the German
air strength returns for both the eastern and western fronts amounted
to only 881 planes.

Of this total only 649 were serviceable, and many

of that group were non-operational for various reasons.

Additionally,

there were 2,429 fighters of all classes; 422 in the west and 1,192
deployed for the defense of Germany.
The combined Allied air strength operating from bases in the
United Kingdom and France included 5,509 American bombers, 3,728
American fighter planes, 5,104 combat aircraft in the Royal Air Force,
and hundreds of additional miscellaneous types for reconnaissance,
liaison, and transport. 12
The capabilities of these forces, particularly the bomber
forces, were vividly demonstrated numerous times, perhaps the most
spectacular action was when General Bradley ordered the "carpet bombing"
^First Amy Report of Operations, 6 June - 1 August 1944,
Located in the US Army Command and General Staff College Library.
l^EHis, Victory in The West, p. 486.
l^Hugh m . Cole, The Lorraine Campaign, United States Army In
World War II: The European Theater, (Washington, 1950), p. 4.
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to the immediate front of his forces in the St. Lo breakout.

The

bomber's ability to protect Third Amy's exposed southern flank during
its advance across France to the Seine was another example of their many
talents.
During the period 6 June to 31 August 1944, Allied aircraft
flew 480,317 individual sorties.

Of this total 255,428 were flown by

the Americans and 224,889 by British fliers.Bombers were used during
this period to provide aerial resupply to the Allied forces, yet they
slowed the war production in Germany and drove it underground for pro
tection.

For all its previous efforts the most devastating period was

yet to come for Germany.

During the next eight months, German territory

was to receive twice the tonnage of bombs received in the first five
years of the war.14
III.

THE ENEMY SITUATION

Forces Available
In June 1944 there were fifty-nine German divisions in north
western France.

Eight of these divisions were in Holland and Belgium

and slightly over half the total were coast-defense or training divisions.

15

Of the twenty-seven field divisions, only ten were armored

divisions— three of these were south of the Seine river, one was near
Antwerp, and the remainder were in Belgium and Holland.

In the battle

to close the Falaise pocket, eight German divisions were destroyed and
l^Ellis, Victory In The West, p. 487.
14Ibid, p. 488.
■^Liddell-Hart, The Other Side Of The Hill, p. 397.
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approximately sixteen divisions suffered crippling losses necessitating
refitting and regrouping.
From the beginning of the invasion mtil the German Army with
drew to the Siegfried Line, the campaign in the west cost Germany about
one-half million men.

Of these, approximately 200,000 remained in the

coastal fortresses, on the Channel islands, and in other "last ditch"
positions; the remaining 300,000 comprised the killed, captured, and
wounded.

17
The panzer remnants saved themselves at the expense of the

infantry who were left in the Falaise pocket, and although badly mauled,
the panzer forces conducted delaying actions for the next three months.
They were used in an infantry support role, employed singly as antitank
weapons, or used as roving single artillery weapons.

This was due more

to the limited number of tanks available than for other reasons.

18

When Montgomery proposed the single thrust to Eisenhower in
August the German Army was practically a beaten force.

Although there

were numerous paper headquarters responsible for defensive sectors,
the forces available to the commanders were battle-worn divisions of
the Falaise pocket and untried training divisions.
The German forces in the West were under command of Field Marshal
von Rundstedt after 5 September 1944.
^T. Dodson Stamps
History Of World War II, 2
Theaters, (West Point, New
to as Stamps and Esposito,

Rundstedt was Commander-In-Chief

and Vincent J. Esposito, ed, A Military
vols; Vol. I: Operations In The European
York, 1953), p. 428. Hereinafter referred
Military History.

17USMA, The War In Western Europe, p. 158.
*^Charles B. MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign, United States
Army In World War II: The European Theater (Washington, 1963), p. 620.
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West; below him in the chain of command were Army Group B, commanded by
Field Marshal Walter Model, and Army Group G, commanded by General
Herman Balck.

Under Army Group B were the following armies located in

Holland and extending to Luxembourg:

Fifteenth Army, First Parachute

Amy, Fifth Panzer Amy, and Seventh A m y . Under Army Group G in the
south were First Army and Nineteenth Army stretching from Luxembourg
I Q

to Switzerland (see map 7).
Divided between these armies, according to von Rundstedt on
8 September, were forty-eight infantry and fifteen panzer divisions
equivalent to twenty-seven infantry divisions and six or seven panzer
divisions in fighting capabilities.

20

As September began, the American

estimate of the German capability in the west was 700,000 men or 49^
divisions with supporting troops.
The heavy losses suffered in the West and the continued high
rate of attrition on the Eastern Front forced Hitler to provide a
program for reinforcing the two main fronts with new or reconstructed
divisions.

In early July, while the Allies were still held in check in

Normandy, Hitler ordered the formation of fifteen new divisions to
strengthen the German lines.

Of these new divisions two were assigned

to the West, one to Norway and the remainder to the Eastern Front.

21

During the early summer of 1944, Hitler and his closest military
19Vincent J. Esposito, The West Point Atlas of American Wars, 2
vols.(New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, 1959), Vol. II, Map 56.
^9USMA, The War In Western Europe, p. 180.
2%.R. Trevor-Roper, Blitzkrieg To Defeat: Hitler’s War Direc
tives, 1959-1945, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964), p. 201.
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advisers showed more concern with the collapse of the central section
of the eastern front and the Soviet threat to East Prussia than with
the Allied drive toward the boundaries of western Germany.

The number

of divisions engaged on the eastern front was much greater than the
number engaged in the west.
man resources since 1941.

The Eastern Theater had been draining Ger
On the eastern front there were no barriers

between Germany and the advancing Russian Army except the German Army.
In the west, the West Wall gave the Germans a psychological advantage.
Nevertheless, the rapid disintegration of Germany's western forces
during August forced Hitler to turn his attention from the east and
consider ways and means of building up the armies in front of the
West Wall.22
On 2 September Hitler gave instructions for the creation of an
operational reserve of twenty-five divisions to be available between
23
1 October and 1 December 1944.
Some of these divisions were assigned
new number designations, but most were to carry designations belonging
to divisions that were totally wrecked or destroyed.^
The fifteen divisions raised in July and August and the twentyfive reserve divisions to be made available by 1 December 1944 were
called volksgrenadier divisions.

The personnel strength of each was

10,000 men, or 7,000 less than the standard infantry division.

This

2^Waiter Warlimont, Inside Hitler's Headquarters, 1939-45,
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), pp. 298-320 Passim.
25Ibid, p. 329.
2’Cole, The Lorraine Campaign, p. 33.
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deficiency was offset by providing more automatic weapons, field artil
lery, antitank weapons, and assault guns to each division.25
Mobility and Firepower
Early in August Hitler ordered that the Western Front was to
be given priority on the tanks coming off the assembly lines.

Contrary

to the advice of his armor experts he ordered that the new Panther
tanks would not be used to refit the depleted and worn out panzer
divisions in combat, but would go straight from the factory to the new
panzer brigades.

He envisaged these forces as mobile reserves capable

of immediate commitment in the front lines.

Other drastic steps were

taken to meet the crisis in the west by sending approximately a hundred
"fortress" infantry battalions made tip of the older military classes
that were normally employed in the rear areas.

These divisions were

hastily formed, poorly equipped, and rapidly sent forward to the field
armies.

By the end of September many of these ill-prepared divisions

were occupying defensive positions on the line of contact.

26

On 4 September the German High Command assigned priority on all
new artillery and assault guns to the Western Theater and ordered a
general movement of the artillery units in the Balkans back to the
western front.

Continuous pressure in the East, and the West, made it

impossible to strip one front in order to reinforce the other.

The

2512th Army Group Report of Operations, Vol. I, p. 15.
in US Array Command and General Staff College Library.

Located

2^First United States Army, Report of Operations, 1 August 194422 February 1945, p. 57. Located in US Army Command and General Staff
College Library.
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great Allied air offensive against the railroad systems of Central
Europe prevented any rapid and direct large-scale movements.27
On 24 August General Model mistakenly reported to his higher
headquarters that the Allies had sixty-one divisions on the Continent
supported by 16,400 aircraft and that one-third to one-half of the
aircraft could be considered operative at any given time.

Five days

later he reported the worsening condition of his retreating troops;
they had few heavy weapons and were armed with carbines and rifles.
Replacements and new weapons were lacking.

The eleven German armored

divisions would have to be refitted before they could equal the
strength of brigades.

A few of the divisions had no more than five

to ten operational tanks.

The infantry divisions were down to single

pieces of artillery and the armored division's artillery seldom had
more than one battery of guns.

Approximately three-fourths of the

divisional transportation was horse-drawn.

The horse-drawn artillery

and transportation made the struggle between the Germans and the fully
motorized Allies an uneven match.

One German unit, the Fusilier

Battalion, was equipped with bicycles to provide mobility for the
troops.28 German troops in the west were thoroughly depressed by the
superiority in planes and tanks employed by the Allies.
On 4 September Model sent his request for additional troops to
the German High Command and requested that it be placed before Hitler
in its original text.
27

Previous messages had been changed before being

Warlimont, Inside Hitler's Headquarters, p. 335.

28
Cole, The Lorraine Campaign, p. 39.
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shown to Hitler.

In this message he outlined the true situation on

the Western Front and gave its strength as an estimated three and threefourths panzer divisions and ten infantry divisions.

He said his

Army Group B would need a minimum of twenty-five infantry divisions
and five or six panzer divisions.

He never got a reply to his cable

as he was replaced by von Rundstedt the next day.

29

Eisenhower's message to all commanders on 4 September estimated
the remaining enemy forces northwest of the Ardennes as two weak panzer
divisions and nine infantry divisions.

These divisions were thought to

be disorganized, in full retreat, and unlikely to offer any appreciable
resistance if given no respite.

30

General Gunther Blumentritt, Chief-of-

Staff West Front during the Allied pursuit to the German border, had this
to say about the period:
The best course for the Allies would have been concentrate
a really strong striking force with which to break through
past Aachen to the Ruhr area. Strategically and politically,
Berlin was the target. Germany's strength is in the north.
South Germany was a side issue. He who holds northern Ger
many holds Germany. Such a break-through, coupled with air
domination, would have tom in pieces the weak German front
and ended the war. Berlin and Prague would have been occu
pied ahead of the Russians. There were no German forces
behind the Rhine, and at the end of August our front was wide
open.ox
After hostilities ceased in Europe, Sir B.H. Liddell-Hart interviewed
several German generals for his book The Other Side of the Hill and
all interviewed were of the opinion the Allied Supreme Command missed a
29ibid, p. 40.

^Chandler and Ambrose, ed, The Papers of Eisenhower, IV, p.
2117.
3*Lidde11-Hart, The Other Side Of The Hill, p. 428.
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a great opportunity to end the war with Germany in the autumn of 1944.
They agreed with Montgomery's assessment that this could best have been
achieved by concentrating all possible resources on a single thrust in
the north towards Berlin.

General Kurt Student, commander of the 1st

Parachute Army, was in charge of the north flank through which the attack
would have gone, had this to say about the disposition of his forces:
The sudden penetration of the British tank forces into
Antwerp took the Fuhrer's Headquarters utterly by surprise.
At the moment we had no disposable reserves worth mention
ing either on the western front of within our own country.
I took over the command of the right wing of the western
front on the Albert Canal on September 4th. At that moment
I had only recruit and convalescent units and one coastdefense division from Holland. They were reinforced by a
panzer detachment— of merely twenty-five tanks and selfpropelled guns.32
With this force General Student was to defend a battle-front that
stretched for over one hundred miles.
Army Group B was the army facing 21 Army Group in Holland and
the US First Army in Belgium.

Not only were the forward units in dire

need of replacements of personnel and equipment, they also had no
reserve units to add depth to their fronts.

Montgomery assessed the

German tactical situation correctly when he wanted to make the single
thrust— there was nothing behind the front lines.
In contrast, General Eisenhower stated in his book Crusade in
Europe:
In the late summer days of 1944 it was known to us that
the Germans still had disposable reserves within his own
country. Any idea of attempting to thrust forward a small
force, bridge the Rhine, and continue on into the heart of
Germany was completely fantastic. Even had such a force
32Ibid, p. 429.
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been able to start with a total of ten or a dozen
divisions— and it is certain no more could have been
supported even temporarily— the attacking column would
have gradually grown smaller as it dropped off units
to protect its flanks and would have ended up facing
inescapable defeat. Such an attempt would have played
into the hands of the enemy.33
The post-war revelations by the German generals on the Western
Front indicate Eisenhower's statement was not a true estimate of the
enemy capabilities. At the end of August the Germans did not have the
combat divisions that were later formed and shoved into the defensive
lines.

When the Allies stopped at the German border for logistical

reasons, the German High Command was given the opportunity to build
additional divisions.

The volksgrenadier divisions and the panzer

divisions used in the Ardennes Offensive were results of this delay
for logistics.
In the last months of 1944 various types of semi-military
units were shoved into the front lines.

These units were comprised

of men too old or too young to have been used before.

The civilian

police, composed chiefly of men in their early forties, were given
a few weeks' training and put into action wherever they were needed
most.

German Labor Service units, composed of youths seventeen and

under, were taken from their tasks of road building and construction,
given rifles and ammunition, and put in the front lines.

34

Their

construction work was turned over to convict and prisoner labor service
units.
33Eisenhower, Crusade In Europe, pp. 292-93.
3^Milton Shulman, Defeat In The West, (New York:
Co. Inc., 1948), p. 269.

E.P. Dutton
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The fact that these organizations succeeded in holding the
Allies on the German border was a striking testimony to the recuperative
power of the German High Command.

But there is little doubt that this

stand would have taken place if Montgomery had advanced on the single
axis in the north.

TTie fortified positions of the Siegfried Line and

the weather conditions that restricted Allied aircraft later in the
year were factors that ^ould have to be accepted in either event.
IV.

A CONSIDERATION OF ALLIED LOGISTICAL

SUPPORT CAPABILITIES AND REQUIREMENTS
The subject of logistics (or supply) was the underlying cause
of friction between commanders and led to suspensions or alterations of
tactical operations.

The catastrophic logistical situation during the

autumn of 1944 was the result of an unexpectedly rapid pursuit across
France that destroyed the carefully laid plans of the logisticians.
To assess the impact of logistics on the proposed single thrust, it is
necessary to examine the logistical operations that developed in the
European Theater of Operations.
Support Capabilities
Ports
An exasperated staff officer summed up his frustrations over
the problem of ports in a parody of the invasion plan called '’Operation
OVERBOARD.” He wrote, ’’The general principle is that the number of
divisions required to capture the number of ports required to maintain
those divisions is always greater than the number of divisions those
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ports can maintain."^

The logistical planners had ample reason to

suspect that this statement contained more than an element of truth.
From the start, port discharge capacity had been the major single cause
for concern in the planning for support of the land force on the Conti
nent*

Logistic planners had predicted a deficit beginning by the first

of October, even assuming that operations proceeded as scheduled before
the invasion.

By July 1944, the port discharge problem appeared to

constitute the very root of future supply difficulties.

This was mainly

because the course of operations in the first weeks was tied inseparably
with the proposal to accelerate the flow of divisions to the Continent.
The initial plan anticipated meeting requirements of the Allied
forces by development of the beaches, and envisaged the capture and
development of Cherbourg and six smaller ports within one month of the
invasion.

Together these facilities were planned to have a discharge

capacity of about 27,000 tons per day which was sufficient to support
twelve divisions.

Within another month three more ports were to have

been captured and brought into use.

This was to have brought the total

capacity to approximately 37,000 tons per day.

Of this, 33,000 tons

were allocated for United States use to provide the 30,700 tons required
for the maintenance and reserves built-up for sixteen divisions. 36
Yet at the time of the breakout late in July, Cherbourg had
been in operation only a few days and nearly ninety per cent of all
supply support was still coming in over the beaches.

The total dis-

^Roland G. Ruppenthal, Logistical Support Of The Armies, United
States Army In World War'll: The European Theater, 2 vols, (Washington:
Vol. I 1953, Vol. II 1959), Vol. II, p. 46.
36Ibid, Vol. I, pp. 463-64.
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charged to the American units averaged between 20,000 and 25,000 tons
per day, as against previously estimated requirements of 30,000.

The

deficiency was not immediately serious because requirements were not
as large as predicted.

But weather was expected to close out the

beaches in late September, and a delay in capturing the Brittany ports
was already an established fact.

Before the end of July the logistical

planners took action to compensate for the expected delay of the Brittany
ports by projecting an increase in the capacity of Cherbourg and the
minor Normandy ports.

This was accomplished by seeking a larger allot

ment of coastal vessels so that small ports could be used to fuller
37
advantage.
In the last two weeks of August the Brittany ports were recog
nized as improbable assets due to the continued delay in their capture.
Attention was turned once again to the small channel ports and on 25
August five ports were selected for development.

A total of 20,000

tons capacity was set for the five ports, three of which were scheduled
to meet their goals within ten days. 38
Meeting port discharge requirements was not a simple matter of
adding up the total capacity of every little inlet along the coast and
balancing this against the total tonnages it was desired to import.

Port

capacity not only had to be adequate in quantity but of the kind suitable
for handling various types of shipping and cargo.

On paper the Allies

had sufficient port capacity to handle all imports scheduled for the next
57Ibid, Vol. II, p. 47.
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weeks, but they were actually in very short capacity of the type suitable
to unload such commodities as coal, boxed vehicles, and heavy equipment.
Beginning in September a larger portion of supplies was scheduled to
be shipped directly from the United States, loaded so as to reduce broken
stowage to a minimum and thus use space more economically.

Such condi

tions meant that practically every ship coming from the United States
would contain either boxed vehicles or other heavy equipment.

In August

the only port in Allied hands that possessed facilities even partially
adapted to handling such cargo was Cherbourg, and it was obvious that it
lacked sufficient capacity to handle all the shipping coming directly
from the United States.

39

Proposals to handle heavy troop movements

through Cherbourg already threatened to cut into the limited cargohandling capacity of that port.

Some boxed vehicles and other awkward

loads were received at the beaches and minor ports, but the major
portion of the US port discharge requirements could be met only through
the development of the larger deepwater ports.
Tactical developments in the next weeks radically altered the
entire outlook on the port situation, and eventually led to a reevaluation of the port development program.
noted, Antwerp was captured intact.

On 4 September, as already

On 12 September the stubbornly-

defended and badly-damaged port of Le Havre, 225 miles to the rear,
also fell to British troops.
on 30 August.
obvious.

Rouen port had been occupied by the British

The advantages of these ports over the Brittany ports were

Logistic planners turned their attention to them as possible
39Ibid, Vol. II, p. 40.
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solutions to the discharge problems.

An example of their advantage was

that for every 5,000 tons discharged at Le Havre rather than the Britanny
ports, an equivalent of seventy truck companies would be saved because of
shortened shipping routes.40
The logistical support of Allied forces reached its lowest ebb
in the month of October.

At no time during the eleven months of the

continental operations did the supply situation appear so unfavorable
in all its aspects.

This can be attributed in large measure to the

unsatis factory port situation.
In October, when Montgomery would have been in the attack if
his plan had been approved, bad weather set in as expected.

Its adverse

effect on operations was felt most at the beaches and the smaller ports,
because the shallow-draft ships could not be dispatched across the
Channel.

Cherbourg's reconstruction was far from complete and its worst

bottleneck, clearance, remained unsolved.

The small Brittany ports were

making only a minor contribution to total needs.

Consequently, in the

first three weeks of October, unloadings averaged less than 26,000 tons
per day against an estimated requirement of about 45,000 tons.

The

theoretical discharge capacity of ports then in operation was only
28,000 tons.41

4QIbid, Vol. II, p. 44.
41Ibid, Vol. II, p. 96.
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TABLE 1
DAILY PORT DISCHARGES IN TONS

Sept.
Aug.
Oct.
Nov.
Beaches
17,300
13,100
6,300
900
Cherbourg
10,400 11,800
14,000
8,500
Normandy and Brittany
4,400
3,700
4,300
5,800
Le Havre
2,000
4,800
Rouen
900
4,100
Total discharged
30,100
29,300 25,400
27,500
Tonnage required
34,100
38,300 45,400 47,500
Approximate deficit
4,000
9,000 20,000
20,000
Original SHAEF estimate
51,200
30,700
37,600 38,600
Source: United States Military Academy, The War In Western Europe,
(United States Military Academy, West Point, New York,
1952), p. 177.
These, then, were the port discharge and clearance problems when
Montgomery proposed massing forty divisions for a single thrust to
Berlin.
Transportation
Since the OVERLORD operation developed quite differently from
what was expected, the assumptions on which the schedules were based were
essentially incorrect.

For the first seven weeks the advance was much

slower than anticipated, and the Allied forces were confined to a shallow
beachhead on the Continent.

From the viewpoint of logistic support the

lag in operations was not immediately serious, for it resulted in short
lines of communciation and gave the service forces added time to develop
the port facilities.

But the long restriction to this area developed

into serious matters for the future.

The ports and beaches severely

limited the force which could be maintained during the following months.
The temporary advantage gained from the short lines of communica-
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tion and low maintenance requirements in Normandy quickly disappeared
after the breakout from St. Lo at the end of July.

By D plus 79 (24

August) Allied forces had closed to the Seine eleven days ahead of
schedule despite a lag of approximately thirty days at the beginning
of the breakout.

Tactically, and to some extent logistically, the

spectacular encircling drive of early August at the Falaise pocket
brought definite advantages to the Allied forces.

It resulted in

the almost complete destruction of the Seventh Army, and more important
to the logistician, facilitated the capture of the Seine ports and
Antwerp.

From the point of view of logistic support, the rapid advance

to the Seine also had its less favorable aspects, even at D plus 79
gave indications of serious complications.

The fact that the Seine

was reached on D plus 79 rather than D plus 90 was in itself not serious,
for the supply structure was sufficiently flexible to accommodate itself
to a variation of eleven days.

The departure from the scheduled advance
AO

had actually been more serious.
Because of the initial lag in operations, Allied forces were at
the D plus 20 line on D plus 49 and between D plus 49 and D plus 79, a
period of thirty days, they advanced a distance which by plan was to
have been covered in seventy days (see map 4). The lines of communica
tion could not be developed beyond St. Lo in the period before the break
out, and in the subsequent period could not be developed at the speed
with which tanks and other combat vehicles were able to reach the Seine.
The result was that the armies used up their operational reserves by
42Ibid, Vol. II, p. 5.

119
the time they reached the Seine.

Since rail lines and pipelines could

not be built forward quickly enough, motor transport facilities were
strained to the breaking point attempting to meet even the barest needs
of the armies.

The Communications Zone consequently found it impossible
43
\
to establish stocks in forward depots.
The arrival at the Seine marked only the beginning of supp*/

difficulties.

Despite the logistic complications which the rapid advance

clearly forecast, the decision was made to cross the Seine and to con
tinue the pursuit without pause.

On purely tactical grounds this

decision was sound, but on logistical considerations it was a disaster.
From the standpoint of logistics the decision to cross the Seine
and continue the pursuit while implementing Eisenhower's plan to advance
on two axes constituted a radical departure from earlier plans.

The

decision carried with it a supply task out of all proportion to planned
capabilities.

The tasks were much more far-reaching in their effects

than was apparent.

With the supply structure already severly strained

by the speed with which the last two hundred miles were covered, this
decision entailed the risk of a complete breakdown of the logistical
system.

The main problem was the deficiency in transportation which

only worsened as the lines of communication extended farther and farther
eastward.

Despite great efforts, the reconstruction of damaged railways

did not progress as rapidly as necessary.

Motor transport therefore

continued to bear the principal burden of forward movement and was unable
to deliver daily maintenance needs, to say nothing of stocking inter43Ibid.
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mediate or forward supply depots.^

^ can now

understood why the

Communications Zone planners told Eisenhower in August they could
support a drive on both axes, but could not support even one axis two
weeks later unless Patton's drive across France was halted.
Could this system be stretched across Europe to Berlin?

Each

division used about 600 to 700 tons of supplies per day of active
operations; losses of ordnance equipment required replacement each
month of about 36,000 small arms, 700 mortars, 500 tanks, 2,400
vehicles, and about 100 field artillery pieces; artillery and mortar
ammunition was consumed at a rate of about 8,000,000 rounds a month
and 66,400 miles of just one type of field wire was used each month.

45

The Communications Zone personnel made heroic efforts to keep
the armies going.

They took over the main highway routes in France and,

using most of them for one-way traffic, installed the Red Ball Express
system to meet the requirements.

Trucks were on the road continuously;

every vehicle ran at least twenty hours a day; relief drivers were
scraped up from every unit that could provide them; and the vehicles
were allowed to stop only for necessary loading, unloading, and servic
ing.^

The Express reached the height of its performance within five

days after beginning operations.

On 29 August, 132 truck companies with

5,958 vehicles delivered 12,342 tons of supplies forward, and by 5
44Ibid, Vol. II, p. 6.
45USMA, The War In Western Europe, p. 176.
^Stamps and Esposito, Military History, Vol. I: Operations
In The European Theaters, p. 463.
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September had delivered about 89,000 tons.

47

Deficiencies in preventive

maintenance, deterioration of the highways, and constant rains that
turned roads into rivers of mud brought the Red Ball Express project
to a close on 16 November.

But in about eleven weeks it carried over

412,193 tons of cargo to the front.

At its peak it used 7,000 trucks,

(about 140 truck companies), and moved an average of 5,800 tons of
supplies per day.

48

Its round trip distance was 686 miles on the north

ern route and 590 miles for the southern route.

During its lifetime

there were over 122,000,000 miles logged on the system’s trucks.^
The burden on the truck transport system was relieved to a
considerable extent by the use of pipelines for gasoline.

The pipeline

was constructed across the center of France initially, and if the
thrust on the northern axis had been approved, it would still have
been necessary to transport the gasoline hundreds of miles from the
pipeline.
Despite the activity of the Red Ball Express, the pipeline
for gasoline, and tonnages hauled by the using organization, (First Army
hauled 158,424 tons between 1 August-12 September),
to meet demands of the combat forces.

50

it was impossible

As the Allied armies reached the

German border, artillery ammunition requirements rose sharply and
gasoline requirements dropped, but the decrease in gasoline tonnage in
^Ruppenthal, Logistical Support Of The Armies, Vol. I, p. 560.
^Stamps and Exposito, Military History, Vol. I:
The European Theaters, p. 463.

Operations In

^Ruppenthal, Logistical Support Of The Armies, Vol. II, p. 137.
50First United States Army, Report of Operations, Vol. I, p. 89.
Located in US Army Command and General Staff College Library.
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no way offset the increased tonnage for ammunition.

Truck transportation

was stretched to the breaking point and maintenance, deferred by neces
sity, caught up with the truck companies as trucks began to breakdown.
One hundred trucks were taken off the Red Ball route every day.

51

As

Eisenhower recalled,
All along the front we felt increasingly the strangula
tion on movement imposed by our inadequate lines of communica
tion. Regardless of the extraordinary efforts of the supply
system, this remained our most acute difficulty. All along
the front the cry was for more gasoline and more ammunition.
Every one of our spearheads could have gone farther and
faster than they actually did. . . . Nevertheless we had to
each force for its basic missions and for basic missions

Aerial Resupply
To alleviate the desperate shortage of transport in the period of
the pursuit it was natural that air transport, like other movement
facilities, would be exploited as fully as possible.
however, was no magic solution.

Supply by air,

The advantages of speed and freedom

of movement were offset by many limitations, including low volume and
tonnage capacity, uncertain availability of suitable aircraft, inade
quate ground facilities at both loading points and landing fields,
enemy interference, and hazardous weather.

In recognition of the costs

involved using troop carrier and transport aircraft for routine largescale supply, field service regulations specified that supply of ground
units by air was intended only as an emergency expedient.

This regula

tion was quickly changed and attempts to supply the Continent by aerial

^Ruppenthal, Logistical Support Of The Armies, Vol. II, p. 236.
52Eisenhower, Crusade In Europe, pp. 308-310.
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means were made shortly after the invasion.

53

The use of air transport in June and July barely indicated the
extent to which it was later to be developed, although the movement of
both supplies and personnel by air filled an important gap in the meet
ing of emergency needs even in the first two months.

The first supply

by air in the OVERI£)RD operation consisted of prescheduled movements to
the airborne units in the Cotentin Peninsula and immediately revealed
some of the difficulties inherent in the use of air for that purpose.
Of 208 aircraft dispatched to the 82d Airborne Division on 7 June, 64
returned with their loads due to the sudden development of bad weather
enroute.

There were 250 tons dispatched, 155 tons dropped, and 90 per

cent were recovered by the ground units.

Other aircraft flew successful

on-call missions to the 82d Airborne Division during the first week and
delivered supplies by either parachute or glider; the gliders carried
mainly 105-mm howitzers and heavy machineguns.
On 10 August twelve aircraft successfully dropped loads of food,
ammunition, and medical supplies on a hilltop east of Mortain, France,
but of twenty-five aircraft dispatched the following day less than half
made successful deliveries; the remainder dropped their cargo one-and55
one-half miles short of the area as the result of poor visibility.
In the meantime, aviation engineers opened emergency landing
strips in the area making it possible to air-land supplies on a large
scale.

Small shipments of supplies began in the third week of June.
53Ruppenthal, Logistical Support Of The Armies, Vol. I, p. 572.
54Ibid, Vol. I, p. 573.
55Ibid.
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Air transport was used most heavily during the week of 18-24 June when
a channel storm caused port operations to virtually cease.

Approxi

mately 1,400 tons of supplies, mostly ammunition, were shipped to the
Continent by air that week.

By the end of July the IX Troop Carrier

Command had flown approximately 7,000 tons of supply to Allied forces
on the Continent.^
Although the cumulative tonnage transported to the Continent in
the first two months was not large, air transport had proved its worth.
First Army was anxious to establish air service on a scheduled basis.
In fact, there was suspicion in July that the Army was already making
unauthorized use of air transport, for the First Army supply services
began to call regularly for delivery of over four hundred tons per day
by mid-July.

By informal agreement with Ninth Air Force these demands
57

were reduced to a maximum of two hundred fifty tons.'

As this attempt was made to keep the use of air transport within
prescribed bounds, steps were taken to develop the theater’s airfreight
capacity to its full potential.

In mid-June Supreme Headquarters

directed the Allied Expeditionary Air Force to prepare and submit plans
for supply by air at the rate of 1,500 tons per day by D plus 30-35,
and 3,000 tons per day by D plus 45.

The main problem involved in

developing such capacity lay in the provision of landing fields on the
Continent, and within a few days the Allied Expeditionary Air Force
responded with a plan outlining the requirements for fields, supplies,
56lbid.
S‘
?12th Army Group, Report of Operations, G-4 Vol. V, p. 133.
Located in US Army Command and General Staff College Library.
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and units needed to build them.

SHAEF approved the plan and on 11 July

directed the 21 Army Group Commander and the Air Force Commander to
provide airfields and other facilities as early as possible.^

By mid-

July plans were initiated to provide landing facilities on the Continent
capable of receiving 3,000 tons per day, half in the British sector and
half in the American,
built in each area.

To accomplish this goal six landing strips were
The average landing strip was capable of receiving

and clearing only 500 tons per day.

Delivery of 1,500 tons required

600 sorties of C-47 aircraft in each area.60
Delivery improved over the next weeks and additional aircraft
were assigned the mission of hauling supplies to the Continent.

Third

Army was resupplied by aerial means to relieve an emergency situation
on 15 August60 and during the next few days critical supply situations
developed in all forward areas.

Delivery averaged less than 600 tons

per day and the entire logistic situation was worsening.

Both First

Army and Third Army were existing on minimum daily maintenance require
ments.6*
Scarcities bred scarcities.

Airfields for both tactical and

administrative use were urgently needed.

To restore captured fields and

build new ones, engineer materials were shipped in transport desperately
needed for other supplies.

To meet the needs for airfields, 12th Army

88Ruppenthal, Logistical Support Of The Armies, Vol. I, p. 574.

S9ibid.
60Third Army Action Against Enemy Reports, Narrative account 1
Aug 44-9 May 45, Vol. Ill, G-4 Supply, dated 15 May 1945, p. 5. Located
in US Army Command and General Staff College Library.
6*Ruppenthal, Logistical Support Of The Armies, Vol. I, p. 576.
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Group allocated as much as 2,000 tons of cargo per day for forward air62
field construction.
The scheduling of airborne missions necessitated the recall of
troop carrier aircraft and measures were instituted to find substitute
aircraft.

The use of bombers for supply purposes had been considered

earlier, although somewhat unfavorably.

On 17 August it was proposed

that 250 B-24s be used to replace the troop carriers.

Over several

objections because of modifications necessary to convert bombers to
cargo carriers, twelve bombers were converted on 24 August.

63

By 28

August there was no longer any question about using bombers for supply
purposes as urgent calls for aerial resupply were received from all
commands.
By the use of bombers, supplemented by C-47s of the air force
service commands, SHAEF planned that supply by air would continue at
the rate of 500 tons per day.

Meeting the increased urgent require

ments for aerial supply, the peak was reached on 26 and 27 August when
deliveries totaled nearly 2,900 tons each day.

Thereafter daily tonnage

fell off as more C-47s were withdrawn and the rate was limited to the
capability of the bombers.Although it filled an immediate need,
the use of bombers was not to be continued.

They consumed 4.5 tons of

gasoline while transporting 4.5 tons of cargo from the United Kingdom
to France.

By comparison, the C-47s consumed 4 tons of gasoline while

62Ibid, Vol. I, p. 577.
63Ibid, Vol. I, p. 578.
64Ibid. Vol. I, p. 579.
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transporting 10 tons of cargo the same distance.65
Even with the use of bombers and troop carrier aircraft the
tonnage was only an augmentation to surface transportation.

Their

efforts kept the supply system, which was operating under emergency
conditions, from complete collapse.

To believe that any long range

drives could be supported by aerial resupply, except under emergency
conditions for short periods, was utter foolishness.

Not only was it

inefficient to use bombers as cargo aircraft, they were removed from
their primary support role.
Support Requirements
Petroleum
The Allied breakout from the Normandy beachhead, and the pursuit
of German forces retreating across France and Belgium, left planning
for supplies far behind.

As a result the Allied armies resorted to

improvisation, which was justified in a great gamble to bring the war
in Europe to a rapid close.

When the German army did not collapse

after its defeat in France, the attacking armies had to wait for the
development of more effective methods of supply.
The task of furnishing one of the most important types of
supply, gasoline and other petroleum products, fell into two main
categories:
in the field.

delivery to the Continent, and distribution to the aimies
OVERLORD planners devised three principal ways of trans

porting gasoline and other petroleum products to the French coast.

For

the first three weeks after D Day, the armies were supplied by packaged
65Ibid. Vol. I, p. 578.

gasoline and oil.
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It was hoped that after three weeks the Minor

system would be in operation.

This was a system whereby motor and

aviation gasoline would be delivered to British-controlled ports east
of Omaha Beach by tankers, which would discharge their gasoline through
six-inch pipelines to hastily-installed tanks a short distance inland.
Next, the Major system would be ready to function.

Basic to this

system was an untried venture, a cross-channel underwater pipeline
consisting of ten three-inch flexible pipelines stretching from the
Isle of Wight to Cherbourg sixty miles away with a theoretic capacity
of three hundred tons of gasoline daily.^ The extensive tank facilities
of Cherbourg were expected to be destroyed, but when invasion forces
67
entered the city they found the "tank farms” intact.
The tanks
were quickly cleaned out and made available for storage of 500,000
barrels
The gasoline shortage that developed was not one of delivery
to the Continent, but of transportation to the armies in the field.
Engineers began building pipelines inland from Cherbourg.
were hastily constructed and had many leaks and breaks.
were the result of sabotage efforts.

The lines
Some leaks

The numerous breaks caused trucks

to travel an additional 160 miles for their loads on 29 August.

At

^ ”A Narrative Resume of the Activities of The Petroleum § Fuel
Division. Office of The Chief Quartermaster, ETOUSA 1943 to 1945.”
p. 3. Located in the US Army Command and General Staff College Library.
Packaged gasoline was fuel in five gallon cans.
67Ibid, p. 15.
68Ibid.
^Ruppenthal, Logistical Support Of The Armies, Vol. I, p. 511.
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the height of the gasoline crisis, some of the armies were over 250
miles from the end of the pipeline.

The situation improved and by the

middle of September the pipeline was dispensing gasoline at Chartres.
Subsequently the line was extended beyond the Seine another ten miles,
but it was not built further eastward until later in 1944.

The pipe

line's final destination was Mainz, Germany, a distance of approximately
600 miles.

Two other pipelines were subsequently laid, one following

the 21 Army Group in the north starting at Antwerp and one following the
invasion force from Southern France.

70

Motor transport, railroads, and airplanes also carried gasoline
as well as other supplies to the rapidly-expanding front.

Critical

shortages developed in motor transporation after the breakout, and until
the slowdown at the German border hasty improvisation usually replaced
careful planning.
Gasoline consumption was computed a multitude of ways depending
upon who needed the information.

The most frequently used methods were

by gallons per-mile per organization, gallons per man per day, by
barrels, and by tonnage.

To have meaningful figures, two methods are

used below, gallons per organization per day, and tonnage per organiza
tion per day.

A representative corps usage factor is shown below.

^Final Report of the Chief of Engineers, European Theater of
Operations, 1942-1945, p. 30. Located in US Army Command and General
Staff College Library.
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TABLE 2
GASOLINE CONSUMPTION DATA
6 June - 1 December 1944

Unit
Corps Hq
2nd Armd
29th Inf
30th Inf
TOTAL
Source:

Gallons
Tons
Day
Week
Week
Day
47,300
142
331,100
993
Div
76,600
536,200
1,608
230
Div
26,500
185,500
80
565
Div
25,500
178,500
76
532
175,900
1,231,300
528
3,708
Letter, nQuartermaster XIX Corps to Ninth Army Quarter
master,11 dated 14 December 1944. Located in the US Army
Command and General Staff College Library.

Gasoline consumption data compiled by SHAEF for the various
United States armies during a twenty-eight day period is shown in the
following table.
TABLE 3
GASOLINE COMSUMPTION DATA— 12TH ARMY GROUP
(28 Day Period)

First
Army

Third
Army

Ninth
Army

Total for
12th A G

Tonnage on hand
39,635
9,588
11,088
18,959
start of period
190,965
Tonnage delivered 71,987
73,475
45,503
230,600
64,462
Total
81,575
84,563
Tonnage on hand
27,592
11,093
9,972
end of period
6,464
203,071
73,470
Tons consumed
75,111
54,490
Source: Consumption Rates U.S. Forces, prepared by Office of
the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4 Division, Supreme
Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, dated 11 May
1945. Located in US Army Command and General Staff
College Library.
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AMMUNITION
In the entire eleven months of operations on the Continent no
supply problem plagued the Allied forces more persistently or constricted
their operations more seriously than the shortage of ammunition.

Re

strictions on expenditures were imposed shortly after the Normandy land
ings because of tmloading difficulties at the beaches.

Such restrictions

continued with little relaxation until the end of hostilities because
resupply from the United States was uncertain.

71

Most of the trouble over ammunition supply arose not so much
from excessive or unexpected expenditures, but from delivery of inade
quate tonnages to the Continent.

Ammunition was not shipped in suffi

cient quantities and the number of ships hauling ammunition was inade
quate.

Artillery ammunition supply schedules did not meet requirements.

Ammunition supply became serious at the very start of the invasion.
Scheduled landings of ammunition were upset by the loss of key personnel,
vehicles, and equipment on the beaches.

Fortunately, the artillery did

not engage in heavy firing in the first days as naval gunfire gave good
support to ground forces.

Expenditures were actually below estimates.

But ammunition did not arrive at planned rates, and it was almost imme
diately necessary for General Bradley to take emergency action in order
to give high priority to the beaching of ammunition loads.
By mid-June restrictions on ammunition expenditures were imposed
for the first time when First Army rationed ammunition by limiting the
number of rounds per gun which could be fired each day by the two corps.
^Ruppenthal, Logistical Support Of The Armies, Vol. II, p. 247.
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Stocks were low partly because of nondeliveries.

Rationing was initiated

mainly because corps and divisions violated army directives by creating
excessive unreported unit ammunition dumps at artillery positions.

Lower

units stocked excessive amounts forward which reduced reserve stocks in
72
army dumps.
A more serious threat to the whole ammunition position came in
the period of the Channel storm when unloading virtually ceased.

The

shortage of artillery ammunition was alleviated somewhat by using tank
destroyer and antiaircraft battalions in indirect fire roles for longrange harassing and interdiction support.

At the same time there was a

plentiful supply of 90-mm and 3-inch ammunition in those battalions. 73
The ammunition supply improved somewhat after the storm and rationing
was lifted, but controls were maintained to insure no abuse would result
in the more liberal system.
By mid-July the situation worsened and a strict rationing was
imposed in order to rebuild reserves for the offensive operations being
planned.

An allowance was established for specific numbers of rounds

per weapon on a day-to-day basis and permitted no accumulation from one
day to the next

From that point onward expenditures were actually

less than rationing permitted.

Firing was light, for the bulk of the

^First Army Report of Operations, 6 June-1 August 1944, Located
in the US Army Command and General Staff College Library.
^First United States Army, Report of Operations, Vol. I, pp.
123-24. Located in US Army Command and General Staff College Library.
74Ruppenthal, Logistical Support Of The Armies, Vol. I, p. 447.
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artillery was held silent in new positions in preparation for an attack
on 25 July.

75

The shipping and discharge situation also improved in

this period, and as a result of the demand for additional ammunition
ships, there were approximately twenty-nine vessels with a capacity of
76
about 145,000 tons awaiting discharge by the end of the month.
Ammunition supply prospects appeared favorable for a short time
early in September, and the 12th Army Group, although increasingly
skeptical of the Communication Zone’s optimistic forecasts, made rela
tively liberal allocations to the armies in the hope of crashing
through the Siegfried Line on the momentum of the pursuit.

By the

middle of the month this policy left deep holes in the theater’s
reserves, reducing reserve levels in the major types of ammunition by
an average of twenty days of supply from the previous month. 77 Exhaus
tion of some categories was expectedwithin
chargefacilities continued

two weeks.Inadequate

to account formuch

dis

of the delay indeliv

eries .
Increasing uncertainty over ammunition availability character
ized the last two weeks of September as the armies attempted to widen
the breaches in the German defenses.

Twelfth Army Group continued to

allocate ammunition for eight-day periods, and the armies fired at sub-stantially higher rates than in the preceding month.

94-95.
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But the alloca

75First United States Army, Report of Operations, Vol. I, pp.
Located in US Army Command and General Staff College Library.
7^Ruppenthal, Logistical Support Of The Armies, Vol. I, p. 448.
77Ibid, Vol. II, p. 247.
' 78Ibid, Vol. II, p. 248.
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tions reflected the hand-to-mouth supply situation and fell far short
of the desired supply rate.

The allocation for the period 27 September-

5 October, for example, permitted daily expenditures of only 3.8 rounds
per gun for the 240-mm howitzer and 3.1 rounds for the 8-inch gun.79
On 15 October the ammunition officer at First Army showed that
the allocation was completely unrealistic, for the ammunition which the
army had been authorized to expend did not exist in army depots and
80
could not be obtained from the Communications Zone.
There appeared
to be two main causes for the situation that had developed:

inadequate

discharge of ships, and a recent decision authorizing First Army to
increase its reserve of non-critical ammunition items by forty per
cent. 81 This decision drew most of the ammunition into the First Army
area, but even there severe restrictionsstill existed.
During the period 1 August to 12 September, First
lished a five hundred ton mobile ammunition supply point.

Army estab
This rolling

supply point closely followed the troops it was serving and vehicles
returned to the ammunition dumps as soon as they were empty.

The prob

lems of the day are brought out by the following entry in the First Army
Report of Operations:
During this period of rapid displacement, transporta
tion continued to be the most serious problem. Turn-arounds
were extended and the supply of gasoline to the motor
vehicles was in itself a difficult problem. Ammunition
79Ibid.
9,

89First United States Army, Report of Operations, Vol. IV, Annex
p. 3. Located in US Army Command andGeneral Staff College Library.
81Ibid.
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expenditures during this period dropped to approximately
eight hundred tons per day for the Array.8^ This fact
contributed substantially to the success of the operation.
On 11 September, First Army had reached the Siegfried
Line and because of the fact that its supply lines were
extended over great distances, it was not possible to bring
forward sufficient supplies immediately to continue a largescale offensive.88
Ammunition constituted the bulk of tonnage transported to the
combat units.

As railroads were bombed constantly during the weeks

following the invasion few were capable of supporting traffic without
extensive repair.

84

Therefore, the primary means of transporting

ammunition was by trucks.

The immensity of the task quickly becomes

evident when the eight hundred tons for one day, used by First Army,
is multiplied by four to meet the combined requirements of 21 Army
Group and 12th Army Group.
Other Classes of Supply
In this section the classes of supply will be dealt with in
the same terminology and with the same definitions of classes of supply
as Aused in the Second World War.

The reference to a class of supply

will include all items within that class.
There were five classes of supply divided as follows:

Class I

was food; Class II was those items of equipment an organization was
8^At this time the First Army was engaged in closing the
Falaise pocket and the race across France to the German border.
88First United States Army, Report of Operations, Vol. IV, p. 4.
Located in US Army Command and General Staff College Library.
84over nine hundred locomotive engines and thirty-three per cent
of all rolling stock were imported from the United States to replace the
destroyed equipment. As the American engines were built for wide gauge
tracks, two sets of tracks were laid on the roadbed— the narrow gauge
inside the wide.
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authorized to keep and replace as required (tanks, trucks, clothing);
Class III was petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL); Class IV was all
items of supply necessary to accomplish the mission not included in the
other four classes of supply; Class V was ammunition, pyrotechniques,
mines, and explosives.

Classes II and IV are usually combined in tonnage

reports although each was unique in its application.

Food (Class I) was

never a problem to the Allied forces except in variety.

When Paris was

liberated on 23 August, the food supply in Paris was critically low.
Food was diverted from depots to Paris, which reduced reserve levels
of the armies.

Emergency aerial resupply was begun at the expense of
O C

other badly-needed supplies until the situation improved in Paris.
Class II and Class IV were supplies and equipment most frequently
delayed by lack of transportation.

First movement priority was given to

either Class III or Class V supplies depending upon which was needed
the most.

In the pursuit, gasoline was first priority for transporta

tion, and when the battle slowed, ammunition received priority.

Food

was second to the above essential followed by Class II and Class IV,
the lowest priority.

With the exception of a few critical items, the

shortages in Class II and Class IV supplies in the combat zone, like the
shortages in other classes, could initially be laid to the deficiencies
of inland transportation.
Starting on 4 September a system of daily tonnage allocations
was initiated and the period 4-12 September was the most critical period
88Ruppenthal, Logistical Support Of The Armies, Vol. I, p. 577.
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of supply faced in the campaign.

The following table illustrates the

average allocations and receipts from the Communications Zone:
TABLE 4
FIRST ARMY ALLOCATION AND RECEIPT OF SUPPLIES
(6-12 September 1944)

Allocation
Receipts
in tons
Class
in tons
Class I
993
533
Class II and IV
415
289
Class III
2,028
1,954
64
Class V
413
Source: First Aimy Report of Operations, 1 August 1944-22
February 1945, p. 45. Located in US Army Command and
General Staff College Library.
With priority given to gasoline and ammunition, replacement of
worn-out equipment was postponed as long as possible.

There was some

improvement in October, but of an allocation of 5,880 tons, Class II
and Class IV supplies were assigned less than 1,000 tons, and deliveries
came to only 637 tons.

87

Other factors besides transportation and unloading inadequacies
were at work as well.

The unexpectedly heavy attrition of many items in

the first three months of invasion caused shortages in the theater.

At

the end of August, General Eisenhower highlighted some of the more
serious losses for the Commanding General, Army Services Forces.

In

response to the latter*s request for forecasts of future materiel needs,
*^First United States Army, Report of Operations, Vol. I, p. 45.
Located in US Army Command and General Staff College Library.
*^Ruppenthal, Logistical Support Of The Armies, Vol. II, p. 215.
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Eisenhower noted that in the first seventy days of operations more than
2,400 automatic rifles, 1,750 one-quarter ton trucks, 1,500 mortars,
2,000 planes, and 900 tanks were lost in battle.

Additionally, he

emphasized the imperative need for more and more "trucks of all kinds
, .
„88
and sizes."
One major item in which an onimous shortage developed was the
medium tank.

First Army sustained large tank losses in the assault and

in the subsequent hedgerow fighting in Normandy.

In June it reported

187 tanks losses, or 26.6 per cent of its strength of 703, and in July
280 were reported lost, equivalent to 24.4 per cent of the average
authorized strength of 1,153.

These figures indicate that losses were

running at a rate at least three times as great as the seven per cent
replacement factor used by the War Department with the result that the
theater reserve was quickly

drained.

**9

Combat vehicle replacements were critical items of equipment
at all times.

Tanks were a constant need in the armored units, and

some organizations had roving teams of "scroungers” as the following
report indicates:
General Patton maintains an unofficial tank retrieving
outfit which calls itself the "scroungers.” Their sole
mission is to retrieve for reconditioning and re-use any
tanks found abandoned— American or German. Actually the
"scroungers" never hesitated swiping undamaged American
tanks whenever they found them without their crews around.
The activities of the "scroungers" got around to the other
Armies and they were careful to route tank truck convoys
away from Patton*s territory. The "scroungers" had no
table of organization. Their retrieving equipment con88Ibid, Vol. I, p. 522.
89Ibid.
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sisted of a huge trailer with a crane that hoisted the
forward part of the tank up to a drop ramp.
Early in November SHAEF provided the War Department with statis
tics to illustrate the rate at which supplies were being expended in the
European theater.

Each day 1,200 small arms weapons, 1,300 bayonets,

and 5,000 tires were lost.

Every month 700 mortars, 375 medium and 125

light tanks, 900 2%-ton trucks, 1,500 %-ton trucks, 100 artillery weapons
of various sizes, and 150 barrels for artillery weapons had to be re
placed.

In the latter category were 100 2^-ton trucks which were taken

off the Red Ball Express route every day.^1

Lack of spare parts for

these vehicles and of adequate maintenance and repair facilities
resulted in a rising number of deadlined vehicles.
15,000 in November.

These totaled

92

Losses in the first three months were considerably above the
existing replacement factor, and thus tended to confirm the theater!s
earlier assertions that the War Department’s projections of loss rates
were too low.

In mid-August the European theater reported that its

reserves were exhausted, and by mid-September it was finding it in
creasingly difficult to keep armored units at their authorized strength
levels.

Losses in September came to 16.5 per cent of the theater’s

authorized strength as compared to 25.3 per cent in August.
the rate fell to 9.8 per cent.

In October

During November the rate advanced to 11.2

^Technical Intelligence HRPE Report No. 994, Army Service
Forces, dated 15 Jan 45. Located in US Army Command and General Staff
College Library.
91Ruppenthal, Logistical Support Of The Armies, Vol. II, p. 236.
92Ibid.
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per cent, and in December rose to 22.8 per cent reflecting the greatly
intensified combat activity.
Not only was there a shortage of equipment, but there was no
way to transport available equipment to the combat troops.

Tanks were

shipped by rail whenever possible, but not only did the cargo get
misdirected or lost entirely, it took an excessively long time to reach
the front.

Early in December, Major General Leroy Lutes was directed

to conduct an inspection of the Communications Zone and report his
findings directly to Eisenhower and Lieutenant General Brehon B.
Somervell, Commanding General, Army Services Forces.

The following

comments are taken from Lutes' final report dated 24 January 1945.
the subject, "Movement of Supplies From Depot to Using Unit," the
inspection team queried logistic managers from First Army and Third
Army and received these selected comments:
(b)

Regulating Officer, Third Army--"Railroad wagons often
get lost in the shuffle so that priority moves are best
handled by our own trucks."

(e) Ordnance Officer, First Army— "Eighty wagons of ammu
nition on November calls arrived on 13 December. In
following one of our shipments, we found it took five
days for it to move seven miles across Paris. I keep
100 people following my shipments."
(g)

Surgeon, First Army--"We have experienced considerable
delay in receiving medical shipments. On the average
such shipments are three, four, and five weeks old,
with some shipments six or seven weeks old. For
highly critical shipments we can't locate cars."

(h)

Quartermaster, First Army— "Two of our trains, which
pulled out of Rheims the same day, arrived five days
apart. If possible we try to send men to ride our
trains in."
95Ibid, Vol. XI, p. 237.
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(i)

Chemical Officer, First Army— "Twenty-one days1
shipping time is required for movement of supplies
from Normandy."94
Not only was there difficulty in getting supplies into the ports,

cleared through the port area, and providing transportation movement to
forward areas, but the shipments got lost enroute or took excessive time
to reach their destination whether by truck or rail.

The logistical

system accomplished miracles in support of the fighting forces, but
there were limits to what it could do.
V.

SUMMARY

In this chapter an attempt has been made to present the tactical
and logistical situation as it existed when Montgomery wanted to imple
ment the single thrust, and project it through the remaining months of
1944.

In order to assess the situation properly, the disposition of

enemy forces and their defensive capabilities were addressed as well as
the capabilities of the Allied command.

No army can move farther than

the logistical situation will permit, and an examination of the capabil
ities and limitations of the Allied logistical machinery revealed there
were two wars being fought--the land battle against German enemy and
the battle of supply.
There has been no attempt to justify any course of action in
this chapter.

The effort has been directed to a presentation of facts

for logistical considerations, and to the tactical capability of the
^Memorandum for Supreme Commander, Supreme Headquarters Allied
Expeditionary Force, dated 25 December 1944, subject: "Report on Supply
Situation-Northern France," from Major General Leroy Lutes, p. 7.
Located in US Army Command and General Staff College Library.
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Allies.

The defensive capability of the German Amy blocking the route

to Berlin was addressed and found to be seriously deficient during the
late summer months.

CHAPTER VII
EVALUATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
I. THE HUMAN FACTORS
Field Marshal Montgomery came from command of the British Eighth
Army in the Mediterranean Theater a national hero and military figure
who commanded public attention.

He went to the OVERLORD operation with

a reputation in Great Britain as a tactician without peer.

Generals

Bradley and Patton, on the other hand, entered the war late and were
connected with secondary efforts in the Mediterranean.

In sofar as the

public was concerned their achievements were over-shadowed by those of
their British allies.

United States troops had fought well in North-

Africa, Sicily, and Italy, but Montgomery looked upon them as unproven
troops.

Conversely, Montgomery had supreme confidence in himself and the

British troops he commanded.
bilities.

He knew his own as well as his army's capa

When Sicily was invaded he sought to assure success of the cam- .

paign by having the major communications centers assigned as British ob
jectives.* This nettled the Americans, not only because of the necessity
of supporting the United States forces over the beaches, but because
they were assigned sectors with no significant objectives.
*Supra, p . 41; Farago, Patton, Ordeal and Triumph, p.275,
^Supra, p. 41; Farago, Patton, Ordeal And Triumph, p.279,
See also: Alexander, Memoirs, p, 108.
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When Montgomery went ashore at Normandy as the Allied ground
forces commander he accepted the position as his rightful due.

In his

view, it was logical that a successful combat veteran should lead the
Allied armies on the Continent.

This attitude of superiority marked his

service during the fighting in Europe.

It was to be expected that such

an experienced and successful leader would have definite plans for the
strategy to be employed in the final stages of the long war.

Eisen

hower's tactful refusal to accept such plans resulted in Montgomery's
allegations of indecisiveness and led to his charge of lack of direction
3
in the war effort.
Bradley was able to work harmoniously with Montgomery until ele
vated to command 12th Army Group.

From that time relations deteriorated

to a point where Bradley refused to serve under Montgomery.^

Throughout

the campaign Bradley's antagonism toward the British commander was fed
by Patton's dislike for Montgomery.^
After the slapping incident in Sicily and his ill-timed public
utterances, Patton felt he had to redeem himself by performing some spec
tacular military feat

He feared that Montgomery would gamer the atten7
tion and glory that was desperately needed for such redemption.
The
long thrust, begun before Montgomery presented the narrow front plan to

Eisenhower, was threatened with stagnation by Montgomery's proposed drive
SUpra, p. 28; Montgomery, Memoirs, p. 286.
^Supra, pp. 33, 36.
5Supra, pp. ,41-42; Patton, War As I Knew It, p. 52.
^Supra, p. 43; Bradley, A Soldier's Story, p. 357.
7
Supra, p. 43; Farago, Patton, Ordeal and Triumph, p. 477.
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in the north.

In order to assure the needed successes, Patton could not

help but oppose Montgomery's plan.

He had to prevent the British com

mander from making the main effort of the war.
in three ways:

He attempted to do this

first, by obtaining the available supplies to continue

his drive, second, by keeping his forces constantly engaged and thereby
draining off supplies destined for Montgomery, and third, by advocating
that he be permitted to make a thrust to Berlin, with ten divisions,
g
along the southern axis of the Allied advance.
General Bradley sup
ported Patton's proposal and forwarded it to SHAEF where Eisenhower re
jected it.

The plan for a southern thrust was a counter-proposal to Mont

gomery's plan and would have enhanced the role of United States forces if
approved.

From a tactical standpoint, it did not have as much chance of
9
success as Montgomery's plan for the northern axis.
Eisenhower was caught in the middle.
favored neither one.

He weighed both sides and

As the Allied Commander he was bound to respect

the views of the senior British field commander, but he could not support
his narrow front plan.

Not only would such a plan have placed Bradley

and Patton in a subordinate role to Montgomery for the duration of the
war, but it would have relegated Eisenhower to a lesser role and given
Montgomery the laurels due the Supreme Commander.

In spite of Eisen

hower's impartiality in most matters he was obligated to accept the guid
ance of Marshall, the US Chiefs of Staff, and needed to be concerned by
United States public opinion.

Neither of these would have allowed

^Supra, p. 43.
q
Ten divisions would not have been sufficient to drive from the
Seine through Metz, the Saar, Frankfurt and thence to Berlin. The bulk
of Germany's armored force was opposing Patton's army and it was expecting
a thrust from the US Third Army.
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Patton's pursuit to be stopped to support the British thrust, nor would
they have permitted the long-time retention of Montgomery as overall
ground forces commander, especially after United States forces greatly
outnumbered those of the United Kingdom.
II.

PROBABLE TACTICAL PLAN TO SECURE BERLIN

On 26 August the Allied army had reached the Seine river and were
across it at many points (see map 7).

To support the single thrust of

Montgomery, all forward movement of 12th Army Group would have then
stopped and been oriented northeast to support 21 Army Group. The tasks
to be accomplished by the advancing armies would have included crossing
the following major rivers:
and Elbe.

the Seine, Somme, Meuse, Rhine, Ems, Weser,

Each crossing would have encountered stiff resistance as the

Germans fought delaying actions.
Along the main axis of attack the communication centers of Ant
werp, Brussels, Liege, Aachen, Cologne, Hanover, Brunswick, Magdeburg,
and Berlin would have to be captured or contained.

North of the sector,

the cities of Bremen and Hamburg were capable of supporting an attack on
the flank of the attacking force, as were the cities of Koblenz, Kassel,
and Giessen to the south, and thus would need to be isolated.

Contain

ment of the enemy in each city would require a large force, and the Ruhr
industrial area would demand an even larger increment of troops for its
isolation (see map 1).
Starting with forty divisions, divided into four armies, Mont
gomery would have assigned missions to each army in accordance with his
five-phase plan to encircle Berlin.

The composition of the armies under
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Montgomery on 1 September was the f o l l o w i n g 21 Army Group kept two
divisions in reserve, First Canadian Army had seven combat divisions, and
Second British Army commanded eight divisions. The US First Army had
nine divisions under its control on that date.

The remaining fourteen

divisions of the forty-division force would probably have been placed
under one army headquarters.

The logical choice for this was the combat-

proven headquarters of Third Army under General Patton.
The missions to be given to the four armies would have differed
during each phase of the operation.

In the first phase, the primary

effort would be directed to the crossing of the Seine river.

All four

armies would also receive additional instructions: First Canadian Army
would secure ports on the coast, the Schelde estuary, and forward air
fields in its sector; Second British Army would secure Antwerp and
Brussels; the US First Army would secure Liege and Aachen; Third Army
-

-

11

wouldp^otect the south flank and ’’follow and support”

the main attack

of 21 Army Group.
During the second phase the First Canadian Army would attack and
secure Rotterdam and crossing over the Lower Rhine river; Second British
Army and US First Army would secure crossing sites over the Rhine river
in Germany; Third Army would be directed to relieve the main force before
all contained areas and reduce the resistance in those areas, addition
ally, it would conduct crossings over the Rhine and position itself to
participate in a dual envelopment of the Ruhr industrial area.
10Supra, p. 57 58.
* When given a follow and support mission the force is primarily
engaged in those tactical operations required to hold, widen the
shoulders of a penetration, and to secure lines of communications behind
an exploiting force. The follow and support force will relieve elements
of the exploiting force left behind to contain bypassed enemy forces and
destroy or eliminate those enemy forces.
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In phase three, First Canadian Array would secure the remainder
of Holland and contain the enemy forces in that area.

Second British

Army would continue the attack onto the northern plains of Germany to fix
the forces there while US First Army and Third Army would conduct a
double envelopment of the Ruhr industrial complex and isolate it.

Third

Army units would relieve First Army troops of the containment respon
sibility when the encirclement was complete.
In the fourth phase the First Canadian Army would secure Bremen
and Hamburg; Second British Army and US First Army would attack to secure
Hanover, Brunswick, and Magdeburg and contain all enemy forces with the
forces organic to the two armies.

Third Army would reduce the Ruhr poc

ket and secure Koblenz, Giessen, and Kassel.
In the final phase, First Canadian Army would continue the attack
through northern Germany; Second British Army and US First Army would
isolate Berlin and reduce its defenses; Third Army would complete the de
struction of enemy forces in the Ruhr pocket and protect the lines of
communication against local attacks designed to sever the supply lines.
According to Montgomery's calculations the German forces would then sur
render and the nation would lay down her arms.
The tactical success of this plan can almost be reduced to mathe
matical certainties.

The German Luftwaffe was no longer an effective

fighting force; it had only 649 operational bombers, of which approxi
mately half could have been used against 21 Army Group, and 1,614
fighter aircraft available for use in the heartland of Germany.

12

Op

posing this meager force were 3,728 fighters and 5,509 bombers of the
12Supra, p. 102; Ellis, Victory In The West, p. 486.
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Americans, and 5,104 aircraft of various types of the Royal Air Force.
Air superiority, already established by the Allies, would continue without serious challenge.

13

German ground forces included fifteen volksgrenadier divisions
formed in July and August

14

and twenty-five volksgrenadier divisions

formed between 1 October and 1 December.

Of this force, the first fif

teen divisions would have been used up in the early fighting and the
other twenty-five divisions would have been engaged between the Rhine and
15
Berlin. As stated earlier,
these divisions had 10,000 men dredged up
from fortress battalions, non-essential personnel from the navy and air
force, and men too old or too young to have been drafted earlier.

Thus,

the twenty-five divisions provided only 250,000 men to defend against
nineteen combat-seasoned divisions of 325,000 men; the estimated force
remaining for the thrust from the Ruhr to Berlin.

It was believed that

the firepower and mobility of the Allied army was capable of destroying
or isolating these volksgrenadier divisions without great difficulty.
Approximated time factors in the advance would have been the fol
lowing:

begin the attack on 1 September, cross the Seine by 15 September

(phase 1), cross the Rhine by mid-October (phase 2), envelope the Ruhr
industrial area not later than 15 November (phase 3), destroy the enemy
in the northern plains of Germany (phase 4) and capture the city of Berlin
(phase 5) by 31 December.

As seen in the planning, the advance from the

13Supra, p.101; Cole, The Lorraine Campaign, p.4.
14
Supra, p.105; Trevor-Roper, Blitzkrieg to Defeat, p. 201.
Supra, p.106.
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Ruhr to Berlin would take approximately forty-five days.

16

From a tacti

cal viewpoint, Montgomery could have gotten to Berlin by 31 December if
the single thrust had been initiated on 1 September 1944.
III.

LOGISTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

During the pursuit across France in 1944 the Communications Zone
maintained a steady flow of supplies to the armies averaging between
12,000 and 16,000 tons per day.

The lines of communication were short

and turn-around times were minimal. 17 As the armies moved farther from
the port facilities, delivery tonnages dropped and round trip times length
ened.

SHAEF supply planners studied the consumption experience of the pe

riod June-October 1944 and arrived at the maintenance factors shown in
the following table.
TABLE 5
COMBAT ZONE MAINTENANCE FACTORS, JUNE-OCTOBER 1944
Long Tons Per Divisional Slice Per Day

Supply
Class

Normal
Combat

Rapid
Advance

I
100
100
II and IV
117
117
144
180
III
V
180
65
462
Total
541
Source; SHAEF G-4 Study, 27 October 1944, Subject: 1Maintenance". Located in SHAEF G-4 file 400.22 Maintenance, National Archieves, Modern
Military History Department.

When the Allied Army enveloped the Ruhr on 1 April 1945, it
took 32 days to advance to the Elbe river, or thirteen days less than al
located here.
17
Ruppenthal, Logistical Support Of The Armies, Vol. II, p. 431.

m
All divisions in Montgomery*s proposed single thrust would have
consumed supplies at the normal combat rate for the first three months,
or until the passage of the Siegfried Line.

The supply tonnage required

each day to support the four armies was estimated to be:

First Canadian

Army— 3,787 tons; Second British Army— 5,410 tons; US First Army— 4,869
tons; Third Amny— 7,574 tons.

The total requirements of 21,640 tons ex

ceeded the tonnage delivered to the four armies in 1944 by an average of
7,000 tons daily.
The capability of the Allies to move supplies during the period
selected for implementation of the single thrust was 8,491 tons per day
by trucks, and less than 10,000 tons per day by rail to the east of
Paris.*** Bad weather and lack of forward airfield affected the air de
liveries during the autumn, and for about two-and-one-half months, deliveries averaged only about 675 tons per day. 19 The aggregate transpor
tation capability of 19,141 tons daily was 2,500 tons per day below that
required to sustain four armies in normal combat.
After the Ruhr area was encircled the First Canadian Army and the
US Third Army would require 11,361 tons per day at the normal combat
rates, and British Second Army and US First Army would require 8,778 tons
per day while in the pursuit.

As no railroads extended intact outside

the French border, 20 trucks would be required to transport the supplies
18
Ibid, p. 148. See also: "SHAEF Logistical Support for a Rapid
Thrust to Berlin" plan. Located in SHAEF G-4, File 13, in National
Archives, Modem Military History Department. Computations from this
plan are within twenty tons of Ruppenthal1s computations on requirements,
but are optimistic on aerial capabilities (2,000 tons daily versus actual
delivery averages of 650 tons daily) and railroads (estimated 30,000 tons
and actual delivery was less than 10,000 tons daily).
19

Ruppenthal, Logistical Support Of The Armies, Vol. II, p . 163.

20Ibid, Vol. II, p. 148.
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and requirements exceeded capabilities by two hundred tons per day.
Field Marshal Montgomery could not have logistically supported the single
thurst to its destination; therefore he would not have reached Berlin by
the end of December.
IV.

CONCLUSIONS

By the end of August relations between Montgomery and the Ameri
can commanders had deteriorated to a point where continued leadership by
Montgomery was unacceptable to them, to Marshall, and to the American
public.

General Bradley commanded an army group equal in size to 21 Army

Group and the cohesion between the two commanders was gone.

The American

press clamored for equal status for Bradley while British opinion pressed
for continued single leadership under Montgomery.

As a result, with na

tionalistic feelings rising on both sides of the Atlantic, Eisenhower
was ordered by Marshall to take direct command of the forces on the Continent without delay. 21
For nearly two months after D Day, ground gains on the Continent
were measured in yards.

On 1 August Third Army, with General Patton com

manding, was activated and began its drive across France.

Advances

changed from yards to miles and for the first time in the European Thea
ter, an American leader was making newspaper headlines.

Eisenhower did

not dare incur the displeasure of the American public by stopping such
an advance, especially if suck action might be construed at home as a
step towards promotion of a British plan at the expense of American arms.
The German defensive capability by 1 September was reduced to
the conduct of minor delaying actions in preparation for a "last ditch
21Sugra, p. 99.
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stand!1 at the Siegfried Line.

There were no reserves immediately avail

able to the commander of the German Army of the West, and only the
timely action taken in early July that produced fifteen divisions of
voIksgrenadiers prevented a general collapse of the army in the west.
Montgomery's proposed force of forty divisions could have easily beaten
the remnants and untried divisions defending Germany.

The Allies had

superior manpower, mobility, and firepower, marked by high morale; while
the German forces were severely limited, lacked mobility, were reduced
in firepower, and most seriously, were "green” and of poor morale.
By the end of August the Allied supply situation had deteriorated
from what might be called serious to critical.

Previous plans were being

implemented, but the advances across France had been too rapid for the
Communications Zone to keep up an orderly and adequate flow of supplies
to the combat units. Improvisations were implemented that temporarily
sustained the movement of supplies, but the results were too costly.
Initially, Montgomery might have received sufficient supplies
to sustain a combat thrust of forty divisions.

However, as such forces

moved eastward, the volume of supplies would have dwindled below minimum
requirements and such a force would have been slowed down.

The German

defensive effort would then have been able to react as it did in 1945
by manning defensive lines with the twenty-five divisions of volksgrenadiers.

Had the attacking force been slowed, the German divisions per

haps could have been employed in attacks upon the flank of the advancing
forces, or even used to sever its supply line.

Aerial resupply might

have sustained Montgomery's force for a limited time, but its progress
would have stalled and the objective not have been achieved.
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Montgomery's single thrust plan was, therefore, not logistically
sound and would have failed to achieve his objective.

Although tacti

cally feasible, the mission would have ended in failure and placed the
whole Allied campaign in jeopardy.
It might be argued that an early Allied capture of Berlin might
have brought about an earlier end to the war and insured a more favor
able Allied role in the immediate post-war period.
speculation and conjecture.

This is a matter of

The occupation zones and the four-power

occupation status of Berlin, with tenuous Allied communication routes
to the city, were already too well set to have been much affected by an
early Allied entry into Berlin.

All that can be said with any certainty

was that the decision of the Supreme Commander to advance on a broad
front brought the war in Europe to a successful close without risking a
major portion of his force in what, at best, could be called a gamble.
Futhermore, the strategy employed was successful and in keeping with
General Eisenhower's instructions when he assumed the Supreme Allied
Command.
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